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Abstract 
 
In tactical aviation, decision superiority—brought upon by high situation 
awareness—remains the arbiter of combat effectiveness. The advancement of 
sophisticated avionics and highly automated cockpits has allowed the reduction of 
aircrew size, and in certain platforms, removal of the crew from the aircraft entirely. 
However, these developments have not reduced the complex and dynamic interaction 
between situation awareness and crew workload. While many predictive and 
experimental methods of evaluating workload exist, situation awareness can only be 
measured by conducting trials with human operators in a functional prototype.  This 
thesis proposes an innovative methodology to predicatively determine situation 
awareness potential with discrete-event simulation software. This methodology measures 
situation awareness as both a function of task accomplishment and workload experienced. 
Utilizing two common but complex tactical scenarios, this method and existing workload 
measurement techniques can facilitate a direct comparison between a reduced-crew 
highly automated cockpit and a less automated “legacy” aircraft. Finally, conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of replacing human operators with automation in tactical 
events can be made which can be tested in future experiments with actual aircraft and 
aircrews. 
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EFFECTS OF AUTOMATION ON AIRCREW WORKLOAD AND SITUATION 
AWARENESS IN TACTICAL AIRLIFT MISSIONS 
 I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
With the advent of new avionics technologies amidst an aging fleet of aircraft, 
many platforms are undergoing Avionics Modernization Programs (AMP) or block 
upgrades that eliminate crew positions that were integral in the original design.  For 
example, the Navigator and Flight Engineer were common in the previous generation of 
many multi-crew aircraft, but are eliminated in current designs.  The C-130 family, from 
the C-130E/H, to the AMP, to the C-130J and various special operations variants are 
prime examples of variable crew compliments currently in operation.  The advent of 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) weapon systems takes this design evolution another 
dramatic step forward by removing the crew from the aircraft entirely, replaced by a 
wireless connection.  Furthermore, while most airliners operate with a two-person 
cockpit, the industry is beginning to study the efficacy of a one-pilot cockpit (Press 
Association, 2010).  Similarly, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) is developing a multi-mission-capable autopilot to reduce a mission crew to 
just a pilot-supervisor (McDuffee, 2014). 
This inevitable march towards smaller crew compliments has several recognizable 
benefits: reduced training costs as pipelines are closed or reduced, less money spent on 
aircrew salaries, fewer avionics installations required, easier crew scheduling in 
operational units, simplified Crew Resource Management (CRM) from fewer voices in 
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the cockpit, and decrease in aircraft basic operational weight leading to improved aircraft 
performance.  However, simply deleting a crew position is not without risks.  Fewer 
people on-board can increase workload demands of those that remain to the point of 
overload if cockpit design and procedures are not adjusted accordingly.  Aircrew 
specialization disappears as more tasks merge under the pilots’ responsibilities, thus the 
pilot must maintain a general level of expertise in the aircraft’s complex systems, tactics 
and procedures, and has fewer avenues to outsource tasks.   
Not only is crew size affecting pilots’ responsibilities, but mission sets have 
evolved after the aircraft enters production.  The C-130 has evolved into airborne 
firefighting, aerial spraying, helicopter air refueling, and gunship since its first flight in 
1954.  Even in traditional mission sets, such as airland and airdrop, operational units find 
new tactical applications and employment methods that may not be clearly elicited 
originally.  For example, the advent of surface to air missiles (SAMs) have driven the C-
130 to train in the low-level environment, add defensive systems, and train aircrew on 
lookout doctrine, thus adding more responsibilities for the aircrew (AFTTP 3-3.C-
130E/H, 2010).  
Aviation is a highly dynamic environment, where weather, malfunctions, and 
aircraft emergencies can quickly increase aircrew workload past the point of task 
saturation.  Nowhere is this more demanding than in the tactical environment.  Mission 
events such as low-level/terrain following navigation, unimproved/battle damaged 
runway operations, Night Vision Goggle (NVG) usage, chemical warfare defense, 
weapons employment, airdrop/aerial delivery, air combat maneuvering, and threat 
avoidance/defensive maneuvering create a much more demanding and unpredictable 
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profile than the airline industry, yet incorporate more numerous systems, design 
limitations (i.e. low thrust-to-weight ratio), or other factors that do not neatly fit into 
research conducted for single-seat fighters.  Similarly, agility must be programmed into 
tactical airlift to develop the fledging on-call airdrop, emergency aeromedical evacuation, 
Search and Rescue (SAR), and to a lesser extent, humanitarian relief mission sets. 
Problem Statement 
Mission effectiveness is driven by decision superiority.  Decision superiority is 
best modeled through Col John Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop.  The 
combatant that can loop the quickest with the most accuracy is the most successful and 
has achieved decision superiority (Osinga, 2006). While the OODA loop was first created 
for air-to-air combat in single seat fighters, it can readily be applied to highly random 
environments.  Decision superiority drives mission effectiveness in such things as: 
success on the first pass on the drop zone or landing zone, responsiveness to time critical 
situations, or simply aircrew survivability.  First pass success is considered one of the 
most important criteria on tactical missions (AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 2010).  This agility is 
a function of an aircrew’s ability to process vast amounts of disparate information, form a 
coherent picture (known as situation awareness), and act decisively in a coherent manner.  
SA is dependent on the ability of human operators to manage their workload effectively. 
Workload management is most demanding in an unpredictable combat environment: 
when the aircrew is simultaneously communicating on multiple radio frequencies to 
disparate agencies, scanning for threats, with aircraft malfunctions while completing 
tactical tasks in response to mission events.   
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Automation, by changing the nature of human interaction with the machine, must 
also change the operator’s ability to comprehend and react to the environment around 
him or her.  This can be even more significant when automation replaces a human 
operator that was once part of a larger team.  As a result of increased automations, its 
effects on pilot workload and situation awareness in tactical airlift missions are unknown. 
Research Question 
Does advanced cockpit automation provide the aircrew with reduced workload 
and enhanced situation awareness during tactical mission events? 
Research Focus 
The primary case study is the conventional C-130 fleet (both H and J variants).  
The C-130 is an ideal platform for this case study because it has been in continuous 
production for over 55 years, and thus has been through numerous avionics modifications 
and crew-size transformations which has produced a number of case studies and provided 
a significant collection of mission data. 
This thesis will focus on the crew and configuration of the cockpit, as well as the 
effect the configuration of these elements on crew workload and situation awareness (SA) 
in events not commonly found in the commercial airline industry.  This research provides 
analytical computer simulation of workload differences in typical C-130 missions, 
comparing both H and J aircraft.  Furthermore, this research creates a novel methodology 
to quantitatively predict potential SA in a manner that facilitates direct comparison 
between two systems.  From this simulation output, situation awareness theories can be 
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applied to extract how much mental capacity remains for the crew to maintain high team 
SA.  As a result, the reader will understand how the highly automated C-130J with its 
reduced crew size experiences workload and SA differently than the less automated C-
130H and its larger aircrew. 
Investigative Questions 
1. How does the use of automation affect workload during a Station Keeping 
Equipment (SKE) formation airdrop mission? 
By modeling existing operation procedures and inputs from external stimuli (i.e. 
radio communications to ATC agencies), it may be possible to observe and predict 
workload levels through computer simulation. Design of these systems have different 
impacts on the timing, duration, and intensity of high workload periods. Modifying the 
crew compliment or cockpit design alters the balance of roles and responsibilities that 
changes how tasks are shared.  This rebalancing shifts workload peaks in both magnitude 
and timing.  Specifically, the C-130H requires the Pilot to manually fly the aircraft while 
in formation, while the C-130J has the ability to maintain its formation position with the 
autopilot coupled.  Furthermore, the C-130H crew must relay formation commands via 
push-button while the C-130J can do this automatically.  Hypothesis: Automated 
cockpits result in lower workload than non-automated cockpits during formation airdrop. 
2. How does automation affect aircrew situation awareness during a SKE formation 
airdrop mission? 
An aircrew experiencing too much workload loses situation awareness as task 
demands consume mental resources.  The correlation between situation awareness, task 
accomplishment and workload must be examined.  Using the workload analysis from the 
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previous investigative question, a situation awareness (SA) algorithm can be created to 
predict SA potential.  From this algorithm a time-based distribution of SA can be also 
compared to the workload distribution.  Specifically, the C-130J releases the aircrew 
from manual station keeping tasks and presents a higher quantity and quality of 
information through the head’s-up (HUD) and multifunction displays (MFD).  
Hypothesis: automated cockpits result in higher situation awareness than non-automated 
cockpits during formation airdrop. 
3.  How does automation affect aircrew workload during an airland mission? 
The C-130J has fewer crewmembers (Pilot and Copilot only) than the C-130H, 
thus fewer personnel to share workload.  Automation places a higher emphasis on 
programming computers via keyboards, but can also accomplish more checklist tasks 
with minimal or no human input.  Automation can reduce task workload or eliminate 
tasks altogether.  Hypothesis: automated cockpits result in a lower workload than non-
automated cockpits during airland missions. 
4. How does automation affect aircrew situation awareness during an airland 
mission? 
The C-130J presents more data via the MFD, but it can also superimpose trend 
data through a flight path vector in the HUD, trend lines and various parameter gates.  
Conversely, the C-130H relies on analog gauges, some raw computer data (presented in 
numerical form), manually computed parameter gates, and simply looking out of the 
window.  Hypothesis: automated cockpits result in higher situation awareness than non-
automated cockpits during airland missions. 
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Methodology 
The Army Research Lab (ARL) workload discrete event simulation tool, 
IMPRINT (Improved Performance Research Integration Tool), will be used to 
analytically study the effects of workload during sample tactical mission profiles. These 
mission profiles will simulate critical high-workload phases of flight over a tactical 
objective area (such as a drop zone or landing zone) and are unique to the airlift mission.  
Both aircraft will fly similar missions with tasks derived from checklists, regulations, and 
aircraft technical orders.  This modeling provides quantitative data on experienced 
workload.  Estimations can be made of available cognitive capacity that could be devoted 
towards situation awareness.  Furthermore, the information gained by specific task 
accomplishment can also be figured into a situation awareness algorithm. These scenarios 
should demonstrate how workload and situation awareness are affected between 
comparable cockpit designs involving differing crew configurations.   
Assumptions/Limitations  
This research is limited to the tactical airlift mission using of the C-130.  Due to 
the ability of the C-130 to perform multiple missions and the complexity of modeling 
each member of the cockpit crew, it is not practical to simulate many specialized mission 
sets or even variations on common missions. The discrete event simulation will assume 
that all crew members have similar level of abilities, expertise, competence and speed.  
Workload values and task times are taken primarily from the author’s experience and 
from the experiences of other C-130 subject matter experts.  These tasks derive from 
checklists, Air Force regulations, and experience with common tactical employment.  
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This also includes intra-cockpit and external communication as well as other common 
tasks that may not be explicitly codified.  Finally, each simulation will have the same 
conditions and scenarios and will not feature any abnormal or unanticipated change.  It 
may be impossible to achieve this direct comparison during an actual tactical mission. 
While a wide body of historical and operational data on the C-130 exists, 
obtaining, publishing and analyzing that data is problematic.  Air Force Safety 
Investigation Boards, which provide the most detailed information about C-130 mishaps 
is privileged information and cannot be released.  This information includes Line 
Operation Safety Audits (LOSA) which reveals how aircrews handle mission workloads, 
threats and errors related to automation and crew compliments.  Observational results 
may or may not clearly indicate which aircrew compliment performs best in each 
circumstance due to wide variations of avionics designs and accompanying procedures.  
What empirical data exists from drop scores, maintenance capable rates, and time over 
target may indicate an average that could show one aircraft to be superior to the other, but 
the data taken by itself could not explain if the cockpit-induced workload or resultant 
situation awareness was the cause of the difference in performance vice some other 
variable, such as weather or aircrew proficiency. 
Implications  
The results of the project demonstrate automation’s impact on tactical missions 
and crew situation awareness in fluid, unpredictable environments. Understanding the 
tradeoffs in workload, performance, and situation awareness when substituting manual 
crew input for automation may find benefits to automation in certain circumstances, but 
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adverse system behaviors in other circumstances that didn’t exist in legacy, less 
automated systems.  
Second-order effects of this research might extend to tactics developments and 
redesigned procedures stemming from a newfound understanding of task management 
understood tacitly by operational units.  Impacts on capabilities can be weighed against 
available funding to drive cost-benefit analysis when evaluating acquisitions programs.  
Even unit manning and personnel management through the aircrew training pipeline are 
affected by the replacement of the human operator with automation. 
Finally, technology’s caveat emptor clause may not be explicitly written in a 
contract or in a flight manual, but nevertheless lurks in the logic circuits waiting for 
human operators to expose and, hopefully, mitigate safely through superior training, 
judgment, and airmanship. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter will familiarize the reader with the man-machine interaction as it 
relates to cockpit design, automation, workload theory, situation awareness (SA), 
methods of measuring workload and SA, and discrete-event simulation. A basic 
understanding of cockpit design and the man-machine interface addresses some advances 
in technology and the information interface between the aircrew and the aircraft. The 
biggest advent in the avionics revolution in the last generation has been the increasing 
capabilities and reliance on automation, which come with their own set of risks and 
advantages. Cockpit design affects mental workload and situation awareness, which are 
examined in detail. Finally, a primer on discrete event simulation concludes the chapter. 
Cockpit Design/Man-Machine Interface 
An aircraft cockpit has a finite amount of space for controls and instrumentation.  
Cockpit layout is driven by mission, crew composition, and physical limitations.  When 
the airplane was in its infancy, instrumentation was crude and the safe operation of 
aircraft was limited to clear weather, primarily during the day.  The earliest aircraft (and 
some ultralights) relied so heavily on the pilot’s visual perception that only a couple of 
instruments were included, and frequently were of the most basic variety (e.g. instead of 
a fuel gauge, a sight glass is used instead). Thus, when a pilot was unable to determine 
his position in space (altitude, attitude, speed, and course) visually due to night or adverse 
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weather, he could not fly his aircraft.  In 1929, then-Lt. James Doolittle demonstrated the 
first “blind” instrument flight, including takeoff and landing, without any outside visual 
reference.  Doolittle’s experiment was the first example of cockpit instrumentation able 
to provide a pilot with a three dimensional mental picture in real time (Edwards, 1988).   
Basic cockpits, such as those found in early aircraft and basic general aviation 
only featured basic control and performance instruments. These were little more than a 
standard “six pack”: attitude, compass, altimeter, vertical velocity, airspeed, turn and slip, 
and a few engine instruments, fuel, and battery gauges.  When aircraft grew more 
complex, they added more systems, navigation, performance, and mission-specific 
instruments.  Naturally, a multi-engine aircraft requires identical sets of instrumentation 
for each engine.  Extra radios and navigation equipment are innovated or added for 
enhanced mission capability.  Each device, instrument, and control interface added to the 
cockpit consumes available space.  Clearly, this physical design space is limited in 
fighter-type cockpits.  Even large multi-crew aircraft have finite space for the multitude 
of instruments, even with the inclusion of side and overhead panels.  This sometimes 
exceeds 400 distinct gauges and instruments for some commercial airliners (compared to 
3 instruments on the original Wright Flyer) (Adams & Pew, 1990; Lovesey, 1995).  Thus, 
it can easily grow beyond the capability of any one person to physically reach all of 
switches and controls, or even view the instrumentation. 
As cockpits evolved, new “black boxes” were added: autopilot, radar, weapons 
systems, mission sensors, navigational aides, computers, etc.  While many of the 
additions undeniably provided the aircrew with more information and solved specific 
problems, many were added in a piecemeal fashion as an upgrade to existing technology 
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and presented the aircrew with fragmented information.  In some instances, these 
upgrades substituted existing equipment (e.g. upgrading and replacing a radar), but others 
were new additions to the cockpit.  The legacy C-130H1 is a good example of post-
production upgrades literally bolted onto existing instrument panels as aircraft 
capabilities evolved (Appendix A: Description of C-130 Aircraft).  Additions, such as the 
Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) Plan Position Indicator (PPI), or “SKE Scope,” 
mounted prominently on the pilots’ instrument panel, obscure visibility through the 
center windscreen.  Other equipment add-ons, from relatively low-tech aircraft armor, to 
Traffic Collision and Avoidance Systems (TCAS), to data-links, laptops, and moving 
map displays all consume some amount of physical design space and affect ergonomics 
as well as the operator’s ability to view and manipulate the controls and displays included 
as a part of these design changes.  Hence, a trend has been to completely redesign the 
cockpit holistically around state-of-the-art avionics versus making piecemeal changes 
(this captures the evolution of the C-130E/H to the C-130H3 to the C-130J). 
Improvements in computing and information technology have led to cockpits that 
rely on round-dial “steam gauges” in a backup role, if at all.  Instead modern cockpits are 
designed to use multifunction displays (MFD), commonly referred to as a “glass 
cockpit.”  By harnessing an integrated data bus, the avionics architecture can be 
controlled through a central processor or mission computer and data can be passed in any 
combination between sensors and displays.  Instead of controlling components 
individually using different interfaces, a common design element in modern cockpits is a 
Flight Management System (FMS) that serves as a central input/output interface.  Most, 
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if not all, data inputs could be made through a central (or pilot/copilot redundant) 
keyboards, while any variety of raw data can be displayed at the point of interface.   
Glass cockpits allow more information (and more disparate forms of information) 
formatted on the same display space.  Instead of requiring a display dedicated solely to an 
instrument, an MFD can creatively combine a multitude of information in the same 
space, while different data “layers” allow the operator to choose completely different data 
sets (i.e. a pilot can cycle from an attitude-centric display, to a system status display, to a 
navigation display, to a radar or moving map, etc.).  New technologies, such as Heads-Up 
Display (HUD) allow for the display of information in the same field of view as the 
windscreen, thus allowing the pilot to look at a target (such as a runway) while 
referencing flight parameters (Haynes, 1998).  These displays can use color coding, 
graphics and other symbology to enhance the quantity and quality of information.  
In addition to HUDs and MFDs, other innovations of fully digital and glass 
cockpits include datalink, data-bus integration, fly-by-wire, enhanced terrain awareness, 
more capable autopilots, and improved ergonomic controls.  Digital datalinks allow the 
passing of primarily text-based information that once could only be communicated via 
verbal radio transmissions.  Thus, considerably more information can be relayed to the 
aircrew in a shorter time-span, with greater fidelity and detail, and without the same 
short-term memory and transcription limitations of voice-text.  Aircrews crossing oceans 
relied on making position reports and receiving clearances by listening to scratchy and 
weather-distorted HF radios.  With Selective Calling (SELCAL), air traffic control can 
“ping” the aircraft to listen to the HF radio, thus reducing the fatigue associated with 
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actively listening to that radio for hours.  Further advances in technology allow aircrews 
to skip SELCAL and HF radio all-together and pass text messages through the FMS. 
Related to data-sharing, modern digital cockpits feature data busses that 
seamlessly pass and fuse information from one component to another.  Analog and 
transitional cockpits posses a limited capacity to share data between components.  Putting 
the vast majority of the cockpit on an integrated data bus represents a revolutionary step 
in cockpit design and allows an individual aviator to call up and manipulate a wider 
variety of data.   
The capability of the autopilot has evolved from a simple “wing-leveler” to the 
point where an autopilot coupled to autothrottles can autonomously fly an instrument 
approach and land in zero visibility.  Display and ergonomic improvements put more data 
and control literally at the pilot’s fingertips. One key improvement in fighter aircraft 
lethality is Hands On Throttle-And-Stick (HOTAS): moving more control functionality 
over communications, systems, sensors, and weapons onto the flight controls and 
minimizing time spent searching for and reaching for switches in the cockpit. 
In sum, designing a glass cockpit requires more careful considerations from the 
engineer.  Simply adding automation or new display technologies is not a panacea for 
human-machine interaction, particularly if that interaction is too rigid (Secarea, 1990).  
While it is possible to present pilots with more data, information overload is a significant 
concern in modern cockpits (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Secarea, 1990). Poorly designed and 
integrated interfaces increase the workload and time needed to synthesize information 
and open opportunities for larger errors and confusion (Secarea, 1990). Conversely, a 
smartly designed glass cockpit improvement can reduce workload by simplifying steps 
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required to manipulate instrumentation.  Even the best designed cockpit displays and 
controls cannot overcome human performance limits (Hart, 1988).  Provided that the 
operator does not have to flip through multiple layers to find this data or obscure the 
necessary information in a sea of data, modern displays provide more data in a richer 
format.  Because glass cockpits rely much more on integrating display layers and inputs 
primarily through an Flight Management System (FMS) or keyboard, instrument 
manipulation that once consisted of twisting a dial or a couple of switches might now 
require paging through multiple display layers and a series of keyboard entries—all with 
an associated increase in workload and delay in time.   
Automation 
Automation is when a task is performed by a computer or machine instead of a 
human.  Automation is prevalent in everyday life.  While the term conjures thoughts of 
sophisticated computers, other everyday machines—ATMs, smoke detectors, elevators, 
automobile starter motors—are all examples of automation because they replace a 
function that a human once performed or could perform adequately (Parasuraman & 
Riley, 1997).  As such, there exists a continuum of automation that provides the human 
operator with varying levels of control (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Secarea, 1990). At the 
lowest end (no automation) is complete manual decision making and control by the 
human operator. Increasing levels of automation perform information management 
functions first, such as memory jogging or prompting, then serves as a decision and 
action assistant followed by full automation (Boys & Palko, 1988; Endsley M. R., 
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1988b).  Automation can exist as a decision aide along multiple levels defined in Table 1 
and Table 2. 
Table 1: Levels of Decision Automation(Hart & Sheridan, 1984) 
1.  Automated system suggests alternatives for operator to consider or ignore 
2.  Automated system lists alternatives from which operator must decide and execute 
manually 
3.  Automated system lists alternatives from which operator must decide, but system 
executes 
4.  Automated system makes decision and but informs operator, who can intervene before 
execution 
5.  Automated system makes decision and executes, only informing operator after  the fact 
 
Table 2: Levels of Human-Machine Interaction (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978) 
Levels of Human-Machine Interaction 
1. Human does all planning, scheduling, optimizing, etc. and turns task over to computer for 
deterministic execution 
2. Computer provides options but human chooses between them, plans the operations, and 
then turns tasks over to computer for execution 
3. Computer helps to determine options, and suggests one for use, which the human may or 
may not accept before turning task over to the computer for execution 
4. Computer elects options and plans actions, which human may or may not approve; 
computer can reuse options suggested by human 
5. Computer selects actions and carries it out if human approves 
6. Computer selects options, plans, and actions; displays them in time for the human to 
intervene, and then carries them out in default if there is no human input 
7. Computer does entire task then informs human of action 
8. Computer does entire task and informs human upon request 
9. Computer does entire task and informs human if it believes human needs to know 
10. Computer performs entire task autonomously; human is ignored and must trust computer 
in all aspects of the decision-making 
 
While there are ten levels of human-machine interaction, they can be classified in 
four main groups: information acquisition, information analysis, decision selection, and 
action implementation (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  Information 
acquisition supports human sensing by controlling sensors and the registration of input 
 17 
 
data.  This could be a radar scan pattern, “lock on,” or automatic focusing.  Information 
analysis filters raw data into something more contextual and therefore is useful for the 
human operator.  In this case raw data is converted to symbology and certain 
performance characteristics are analyzed (e.g. a radar return has position, range, course 
and altitude data associated). Decision selection augments human decision abilities by 
presenting a desired choice to the human without taking that action.  In many cockpits the 
flight director presents a desired heading and/or attitude correction to the pilot to correct 
back to the desired course and altitude.  However it is the pilot’s choice to follow the 
flight director’s cue or choose another alternative.  If the autopilot was coupled to the 
flight director, then the automation executes the flight director’s command, which 
implements the desired action.  Of course a system, such as an aircraft, should change 
groups or adapt automation to the most appropriate level through the course of the 
mission (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000; Endsley M. R., 1996). 
Just because something can be automated does not necessarily mean that it should 
(Wiener & Curry, 1980).  While it may lead to legitimate cost savings or be inexpensive 
to automate a particular subsystem, whole system performance must be taken into 
consideration (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  Automation can eliminate 
human tasks in some circumstances, but add new tasks or increase workload in others 
(Colombi, Miller, Schneider, McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 2011).  Automation can provide 
several advantages to the human operator.  For instance, complex mathematical 
calculations, system monitoring and warnings (potentially leading to earlier detection of 
failures), fuel efficiency, consistent repetitions of mundane and routine tasks (i.e. cruise 
control or maintain a constant altitude) are good automation candidates (von 
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Tiesenhausen, 1982; Johnson, Bersheder, & Leifer, 1983).  Information overload, 
especially dynamic information, can be filtered for relevance and urgency, or simply 
organized into more coherent form (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  
Precision afforded by automation could add new and more sophisticated/complex mission 
sets that either were not possible before, required more operators (i.e. a larger crew 
compliment), or was extremely taxing to the human operator(s) (National Research 
Council, 1982).  An example of this is the MC-130H terrain following mission where a 
radar generated and computer calculated “cue” allows the aircrew to fly nap-of-the-earth 
missions accurately based on real-time aircraft performance with tighter tolerances and 
lower average altitudes than visual references alone (TO 1C-130(M)H-1, 2013).   
In these situations, automation reduces operator workload, increases reliability, 
improves precision, improves safety by reducing human error, or a combination of these 
factors (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Billings, 1991; Wiener E. L., 1985b).  For instance, 
research into a synthetic vision upgrade to standard HUDs showed both improved 
performance (as measured by course and altitude deviations), better situation awareness, 
and a reduced incident of collision with terrain when used with approaches in instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) (AFRL, 2002).  By reducing operator workload, fatigue 
accumulates more slowly, and the operator has more capacity to perform other, more 
critical tasks.  Well-designed automation in modern, “intelligent” cockpits can serve as an 
assistant to the pilot just as if there was another crew member onboard (Secarea, 1990). 
In effect automation does not simply supplant human action, but can change human 
behavior (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
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While automation easily replaces physical or manual control activities, the 
operator must monitor, supervise, and program these systems. This merely substitutes 
physical for mental workload, and despite removing skills, still requires a human operator 
to supervise (Endsley M. R., 1996). Furthermore, operators may potentially lose manual 
skills, systems knowledge, and even job satisfaction (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Johnson, 
Bersheder, & Leifer, 1983).  Automation itself lends another dimension of complexity to 
already complex endeavors.  Operators must understand the automation’s logic, 
functionality, and responsibilities, as well as its limits and operating parameters (Endsley 
M. R., 1996). Pilots have reported difficulties understanding what their aircraft 
automation is doing and why (Wiener E. L., 1989). This lack of appropriate 
communication has led to distrust, or at a minimum, confusion (Endsley M. R., 1996).   
Dependency  interactive automation elements may cause fixation to the neglect of 
other duties.  For example, because HUD information can be so rich, yet in a narrow field 
of view, pilots can succumb to HUD dependency and must learn to look elsewhere 
outside (Haynes, 1998; Shinaberry, 2013; Kennedy, 2015).  The precision afforded by an 
automated aircraft could become relied upon so heavily that a mission set is not able to be 
performed should that system fail or the mission set vary from the missions for which the 
automation was designed.  For example, the C-17 depends on the Heads-Up Display 
(HUD) such that both pilot and copilot HUDs are required for short-field landings 
(Haynes, 1998; Rabbitt, 1998).  Therefore the failure of either system can result in 
mission failure. 
Continued use of automation can lead to human inactivity and complacency in the 
automated system (Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  Inactivity may lead to inattention when the 
 20 
 
operator should be supervising a highly-trusted system instead, cognitively (sometimes 
literally) putting the pilot to sleep (Secarea, 1990).  Even more benign, pilots accustomed 
to more manual modes of flying feel psychologically distanced, or out-of-the-loop, from 
automated cockpits and processes being performed behind the veil of autonomy (Adams 
& Pew, 1990; Endsley M. R., 1996). A lack of vigilance can cause inattention due to a 
over-trust, a subtle, undetected error that seems reasonable, or simply because humans 
serve as poor passive monitors of automation (Billings, 1991; Parasuraman R. , 1987).   
Complacency becomes pervasive if the operator views their role as passive with 
the operator becoming a passenger in his own aircraft (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). This is a 
function of operator trust (or over-trust) in automation and can lead to inattention or a 
lack of vigilance (Danaher, 1980; Parasuraman, Molloy, & Singh, 1993; Wiener E. L., 
1985b).  This lack of vigilance may be influenced by workload strategies employed by 
the operator to shift attention towards other tasks (Endsley M. R., 1996; Parasuraman, 
Mouloua, & Molloy, 1994).  However, a lack of trust in automation may contribute to its 
non-usage or ignoring cues.  For example, aircrews will ignore automatic alarms if they 
occur frequently enough to be considered erroneous or a nuisance (Billings, 1991; 
Wiener & Curry, 1980). 
While automation itself may be inherently safe, it can contribute to hazardous 
attitudes: misuse (using it when it should not be used or improperly monitoring), disuse 
(not using available automation), or abuse (inappropriate use of automation) 
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  Automation, and the failure to monitor it 
properly, has been a factor in several accidents (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Endsley M. 
R., 1996).  A highly automated Airbus A330-200, Air France 447, stalled and crashed 
 21 
 
due to pilot error related to pitot tube icing. This created erroneous airspeed indications 
which promptly disconnected the autopilot and autothrottles while also changing 
automation logic and protections.  As these changes were not communicated to the pilots, 
they became severely confused as to what information was valid and what logic mode the 
automation was operating in.  Because of their high dependency on automation and 
comfort flying an aircraft designed to eliminate pilot-error with automatic protections, 
when these protections were removed, the pilots found themselves unable to recover with 
manual flying (BEA, 2012).  Thus, in an attempt to eliminate pilot error via automation, 
the heavy reliance on such a system allowed basic manual flying skills, such as stall 
detection and recovery, to erode dangerously. 
Fatal over-reliance and mode confusion are not limited to just this accident.  A  
Boeing 777 crash at San Francisco International Airport, Asiana Flight 214, was due to 
the aircrew believing the auto-throttles were engaged when they were in a manual 
mode—a condition called mode confusion. The aircrew had trusted a system that was not 
engaged and failed to monitor a decay in airspeed due to the throttles being left in idle 
until a stall developed at very low altitude and just prior to the runway (NTSB, 2014).  
Another similar crash related to accidental autothrottle disengagement occurred to a US 
Air 737 (NTSB, 1990). Mode confusion led the aircrew of the airliner to climb at a 
constant vertical speed until it stalled at high altitude (NTSB, 1980; Wiener E. L., 1985a).  
Overconfidence in automation’s reliability killed nearly everyone on a DC-9 when the 
aircraft attempted a no-flap takeoff.  In this case, the crew had implicitly relied on a 
warning system that had failed and neglected to manually verify the position of the flaps 
(NTSB, 1988).  Operator distrust (and disregard) in the significance of angle of attack 
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warnings led to an accelerated stall and total loss of a C-17 (Everhart, 2010).  American 
Airlines 965, a Boeing 757, and Air Inter 148, an Airbus A320, crashed from controlled 
flight into terrain (CFIT) due to improper data entered into the autopilot (Hall, 1996; 
FAA).  The inability of the crew to manually override the autopilot and mode confusion 
was causal to the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Wiener E. L., 1989).   
While each incident was ultimately attributed to pilot error and is much more 
complex than described above, automation mode confusion, over-reliance, or distrust of 
information was causal in each incident.  However, it would be unfair to label automated 
aircraft as inherently unsafe, since operator training is a significant factor in both 
accidents caused and prevented.  Aircraft accident literature abounds with examples of 
incidents involving aircraft flown manually or with less automation available.  Attempts 
to manually override automated safeguards, such as speed limits and stall recovery 
devices have resulted in accidents in both railroads and aviation—accidents automation 
was designed to prevent (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). While automated systems are 
intended, among other things, to reduce pilot error, they cannot completely eliminate 
error (especially input error) and can induce new sources of error. 
Poor design or usage of automation subjugates the operator to perform menial 
tasks to support the machine (Johnson, Bersheder, & Leifer, 1983; von Tiesenhausen, 
1982).  Even worse, automation may delay the response to unplanned, abnormal 
situations by either masking the cause-effect relationship, restricting feedback, or adding 
tasks required to take action (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Endsley M. R., 1996; Norman D. 
A., 1989; Billings, 1991).  Automation or systems failures increase pilot stress and 
workload greater than similar failures in less automated systems (Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  
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This can be due to the amount of data or control lost during an automation malfunction, 
the quantity of tasks or button-pushing required to remedy the situation, or the operator’s 
dependence on the automated system. During normal operations, automation can become 
the distracting object of attention instead of an in-flight assistant due to poor interface 
design, programming or operating difficulty, lag time, software bugs or user error 
(Adams & Pew, 1990).  Even in normal operation, a majority of pilots felt that 
automation increased workload due to manipulation and reprogramming requirements 
(Wiener E. L., 1985a; 1989; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; 2000). 
To effectively use automation, operators should consider the appropriate level of 
automation for the situation at hand. This may entail selecting a higher level of 
automation to deal with a more urgent task priority or deselecting and performing a task 
manually when fixing automation imposes an unacceptable time penalty.  System 
designers should allow for the operator to override automation, where appropriate, and 
incorporate adaptive levels of automation for the operator to choose from. Ideal 
candidates for automation include: 
• Low level, repetitive, and menial tasks 
• Tasks that require long attention spans (i.e. systems and sensor 
monitoring) 
• Data fusion from disparate sensors into a combined display/overlay 
• Intense or recurring computing tasks 
• Tasks requiring little mental effort yet provide immediate feedback 
• Basic decision making within a well defined, constrained, set of rules. 
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Tasks that involved abstract though, complex decision making, critical thinking, 
planning, and problem solving are better left to the human operator (Hart & Sheridan, 
1984; von Tiesenhausen, 1982; Johnson, Bersheder, & Leifer, 1983).    This potentially 
creates a dilemma where those tasks that invoke the least mental workload are easily 
automated (simple transit and navigation), while those tasks that impose the highest 
mental workload (complex planning, emergencies, communications) or are hard, 
expensive, or impossible to automate are left to the human (Colombi, Miller, Schneider, 
McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 2011; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  Ideally, 
automation should free operators from the boring, mundane, and time-consuming tasks, 
enabling them to perform more critical tasks (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; National Research 
Council, 1982). 
 Proper automation design and control should result in an acceptable workload 
such that the operator is engaged and involved with flight tasks.  The aircrew must be 
free to perform necessary planning and other high-level functions as appropriate, yet 
flexible to respond to time-critical tasks.  System engineer’s goals should be to reduce 
system complexity to enhance operator performance and use automation where it can be 
most beneficial (or use automation most appropriately) while preventing information 
overload (Mitchell, 2000). 
Pilots are concerned that automatic systems can implement decisions without their 
consent (Secarea, 1990). From 2010 to 2014, there were 53 aircrew initiated safety 
reports of automation overriding the crew (NASA, 2014).  In a survey of airline pilots, 
fully automatic control without override ability was universally detested, while most 
pilots preferred either a management-by-consent (similar to Sheridan & Verplank’s levels 
 25 
 
4 and 5 of automation) or management-by exception (level 6) form of automation, 
depending on the situation (Olson & Sarter, 1998).  Achieving the proper level of 
automation in the cockpit is a function of cockpit design, Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) training (not described in this thesis), and training tailored to that specific aircraft. 
Workload Theory 
Aircrew workload, specifically the pilot’s workload, has been a design concern in 
complex aircraft for years.  As automation technology matured in the 1980s, the 
relationship between automation management and operator workload began to be studied 
in earnest. Mental workload itself is a complex phenomenon, a consistent definition of 
which has not reached consensus (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Secarea, 1990; Kantowitz & 
Casper, 1988; Mitchell, 2000). Mental workload can be expressed in several different 
ways.  It may be partially characterized as “time pressure” or comparing the actual time 
available against the perceived time available (Sheridan & Stassen, 1979).  It could be a 
task-dependent measure of cognitive bandwidth (Secarea, 1990; Hart & Sheridan, 1984). 
It can also be defined as a function of time load, mental effort, and psychological stress 
(Reid, Potter, & Bressler, 1989; Reid & Nygren, 1988).  
For the purpose of this thesis, mental workload is the relationship between an 
operator’s mental capacity and the required attentional resources needed to perform a task 
(Hart & Staveland, 1988).  Workload should not be confused with task load, which is an 
expression of the quantity of tasks performed in a finite period of time (thus incorporates 
an element of time pressure).  Task demand reflects difficulty and is the level of effort 
required by the task.  Therefore, workload is a combination of task load and task demand.  
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An operator could have a low task demand yet a high task load if they are performing 
many simple tasks.  Conversely, the operator may experience the same workload if it 
involves high task demand yet low task load (few tasks, but they require a large amount 
of cognitive resources). Even for a given task, the experienced workload can vary 
between operators since each may have different capacities.  Capacity is a function of the 
individual traits, environment, fatigue, operator experience, level of training, proficiency, 
workload strategy, and stress (Hart & Sheridan, 1984; Curry, Jex, Levison, & Stassen, 
1979; Childress, Hart, & Bortolussi, 1982). Stress is a function of the confusion, 
frustration and anxiety associated with the task (Reid, Potter, & Bressler, 1989).  In 
addition to psychological stressors, physiological stress—G’s, turbulence, motion 
sickness, temperature, and equipment-induced stress—affect aircrew, particularly in 
tactical or combat scenarios (McDaniel, 1996). 
Human Performance and Workload 
There is no simple relationship between human performance and workload 
(Sheridan & Stassen, 1979).  The concept of arousal affecting performance was first 
studied by introducing rats to electrical shocks to facilitate simple discrimination tasks.  
Thus the rats learned faster when stress was increased, up until a point (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908).  Later research theorized human performance is a function of arousal, 
with increasing arousal leading to increased cognitive performance (Hebb, 1955).   
Performance can be low in a low workload situations (a condition called underload) if the 
operator is not sufficiently aroused, committed, or under-resourced the task.  Conversely, 
performance can be maintained at a high (or increasing) level as arousal (i.e. workload) 
increases from low to high (Figure 1).  Generally, performance increases as more 
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operator resources (i.e. effort) are invested in the task until the point where no further 
increase is possible.  Thus, capacity can be said to increase as arousal increases in a 
function attributed as the Hebb-Yerkes-Dodson Law (Kahneman, 1973).  Workload, 
urgency, significance, and enjoyment all affect arousal level.  Even a relatively low-
demand task sparks arousal if successful completion becomes a matter of life-and-death 
(McDaniel, 1996).  
 
Figure 1: Performance-Arousal Function  (Diamond, Campbell, Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 2007; 
Hebb, 1955) 
Overload is the condition when the operator’s workload exceeds mental resource 
capacity.   When the operator becomes overloaded, performance deteriorates rapidly 
(Kahneman, 1973; Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  However, it is not possible to define an 
overload “redline” that is true for all cases and conditions because operator capacity 
covaries with both the task at hand and the operator’s skillset (Wickens C. D., 1984; 
2002).  This phenomenon may be described as the performance-resource function (Figure 
2).  Below this point, the performance curve may be said to be resource limited since 
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more resources results in improved performance.  From that point until 100% resources 
are committed to the task, it is said to be data-limited because performance cannot 
increase no matter how hard one tries (Wickens C. D., 1984; 2002; Norman & Bobrow, 
1975). Conversely, a low difficulty task simply cannot demand a high level of effort 
beyond what is required for a zero-error rate (Kahneman, 1973).  The concept of 
underload, where an operator is not sufficiently aroused can lead to boredom or 
complacency.  Complacency can lead to task failure, even in low task demand, when an 
operator views that task in low regard and invests insufficient or no resources at all.  For 
instance, an experienced tactical pilot can become complacent and fly the aircraft into the 
ground (McDaniel, 1996).  
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Figure 2: Performance-Resource Function (Wickens C. D., 1984) 
Capacity and Resource Theory 
Workload could be said to be proportional to task demands imposed on an 
operator’s capacity, inferring that an increase in operator capacity (i.e. training, 
experience, etc.) can have similar effects as reducing task load (Wickens C. D., 2002; 
Rolfe, 1971).  A given operator has a limited capacity to devote mental effort, or 
attention, to any given task and often attempts to perform smaller tasks in parallel 
(Wickens C. D., 1984; 2002).  Time-sharing, commonly known as multitasking, is the 
ability to perform multiple tasks in parallel. The proverbial “walking while chewing 
gum” illustrates multitasking of two largely physical tasks that demand little mental 
workload.  This example might be considered an example of efficient time sharing 
because both tasks can be performed in parallel just as well as in isolation (Wickens C. 
D., 1984).   
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Conversely, two higher workload tasks, such as patting ones head and rubbing the 
stomach simultaneously, may demand too many mental resources to be performed 
concurrently and the tasks are disrupted.  Because each of these examples involves tasks 
that occupy similar mental “channels,” they share the same resources and in the second 
example, a “bottleneck” occurs.  Both rubbing one’s head and patting one’s stomach 
involve conscious cognitive effort to dictate motor functions, whereas one may argue that 
walking is an almost subconscious activity.  
Attention is one key component of available mental capacity.  Logically, an 
operator cannot perform any mental work towards a task if he cannot pay any attention to 
it.  Since humans have finite attentional resources, and finite capacities for work, they 
prioritize tasks and may elect to devote fewer resources to obtain acceptable 
performance.  Because attention is active, it requires effort and therefore induces work 
(Kahneman, 1973).  This finite limitation of attention leads to a bottleneck where the 
operator cannot process all of the information available (Kahneman, 1973).  Just like a 
human has focal and peripheral vision, a similar analogy can be drawn when the same 
human filters attentional demands, such as listening to a conversation with a television in 
the background.  This person can choose to listen to one intently, while still hearing the 
other in the background.  Depending on the degree of divided attention, this listener can 
notice any number of attributes or cues from the background conversation but will have 
difficulty discarding certain irrelevant cues (e.g. it’s nearly impossible to observe the 
shape of an object without noticing its color) (Kahneman, 1973). 
In capacity theory, the operator has a finite capacity or “pool” of given resources 
to allocate to primary and secondary tasks (Wickens C. D., 1984; Knowles, 1963; 
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Kahneman, 1973).  Unitary or single-resource theory assumes that only one pool of 
resources exist, which is available to all mental processes equally (Wickens C. D., 1984). 
The workload imposed by the primary task could be measured as the inverse relationship 
of secondary task performance, thus showing an attention or resource bottleneck 
(Knowles, 1963). However, attention connotes awareness, which is not related to specific 
task performance (Wickens C. D., 2002). If the secondary task imposes relatively low 
demand, then impact on primary task performance may not be measurable.  Thus, as 
multiple tasks are being performed concurrently, the operator’s performance is dictated 
by the amount of resources demanded beyond the data-limited regime of the 
performance-resource function (Wickens C. D., 1984).  However there are certain 
limitations towards time-sharing of even simple tasks: one cannot look in two places in 
separate fields of view at once, and the act of time-sharing itself can pull away mental 
resources, such as texting and driving (Wickens C. D., 1984; 2002).  However, this 
constraint does not exist (to the same extent) if listening to the radio and driving, 
Single-resource theory breaks down when trying to explain difficulty 
insensitivity: that is, the performance of a difficult primary task is not adversely affected 
by the secondary task.  If one or both tasks have sufficient data-limited regions on the 
performance-resource function, then single resource theory could explain this 
insensitivity (Wickens C. D., 1984).  But if both tasks are thought to be more resource 
limited, and are performed perfectly in parallel, it may be because there is no structural 
interference between the two tasks.  Multiple-resource theory maintains that there are 
multiple separate resource pools that can be allocated as necessary (Wickens C. D., 
2002).  Perfect multitasking occurs when two tasks do not use overlapping resources.  
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Similarly, two difficult tasks can impose heavy workload without a degradation of 
performance, provided that separate resource pools are required (Wickens C. D., 1984).  
However, a resource demanding task combined with memory-demanding cognitive 
process can create performance degrading interference (Wickens C. D., 2002).  
This multiple-resource theory posits that multiple dimensions exist to define a 
capacity reservoir: stages of processing, perceptual codes, modalities of input, and 
modalities of response (Wickens C. D., 1984).  Processing stages compares a central 
processing function versus cognitive response.  Perception exists in both verbal and 
spatial domains; input modalities can be either visual or auditory, and response 
modalities can be manual or vocal (Wickens C. D., 1984). Parallel processes are still 
possible within the same channels that still use separate, non-interfering resources.  An 
example of this is using focal and ambient (or peripheral) vision to accomplish two 
separate tasks (Wickens C. D., 2002). Thus a task may demand resources in varying 
degrees from different (and multiple) reservoirs. Human performance can still be 
explained by applying the performance-resource function to the capacity in each 
reservoir. Considerable research has been conducted regarding the complex interaction of 
each dimension and channel on the effects of operator performance and task efficiency 
(Wickens C. D., 2002; Vidulich, 1988; Martin G. , 1989; Martin, Wogalter, & Forland, 
1988; Sarno & Wickens, 1995; Goodman, Tuerina, Bents, & Wherewille, 1999; Polson & 
A, 1988; Paivio, 1971; McLeod, 1977)(Wickens C. D., 1980; Tsang & Wickens, 1988; 
Wickens & Liu, 1988).   
In a system-of-systems analysis of multiple remotely piloted aircraft control, 
multiple simultaneous primary responsibilities (i.e. piloting demands) drove a naturally 
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higher workload, but secondary tasks (namely, radio communication) drove “extreme 
spikes” in mental workload.  When the primary task is unexpected and urgent, such as an 
emergency or dynamic, unplanned situation, the workload (with associated attention 
resources) becomes so high that secondary tasks are neglected (Colombi, Miller, 
Schneider, McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 2011). 
From an engineering standpoint, multiple-resource theory describes operator 
performance, which tasks can be performed in parallel, the amount of interference 
between multiple tasks, and how increasing difficulty in one task affects the performance 
of other tasks (Wickens C. D., 2002; Little, et al., 1993).  Thus, in time-constrained, task-
intensive environments, such as the one faced by any aircrew, multiple-resource theory 
can predict the effects of different modalities (i.e. effects of receiving information via 
voice or auditory means), or even the value added of multitasking or sequencing when 
evaluating procedures. 
Expertise 
An expert might experience lower workload than a novice for the same given task 
because the expert perceives how that task interacts with other tasks (Secarea, 1990; Hart 
& Sheridan, 1984).  For instance, the expert is expected to have a better grasp of how an 
individual task fits into the bigger picture (National Research Council, 1982). However, 
the experts’ advantage of pattern recognition decreases as the value of information 
becomes less meaningful.  One would expect an expert to develop efficient workload 
strategies and more ‘automatic’ motor responses by virtue of his/her experience.  
However, the introduction of a surprise or novel situation or dilemma requires a surge of 
attention and greater mental processing resources (Kahneman, 1973).  Failures, 
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abnormalities, and surprises will affect the expert differently than the novice, and 
mistakes made by the expert operator are likely to be recognized and corrected in a 
timely manner with an associated lower level of workload (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). 
Workload Strategies 
Pilots frequently find themselves responding to multiple, simultaneous demands 
with frequent and unpredictable interruptions, which forces them to adapt various 
strategies to keep workload at a manageable level.  They respond to some (multitasking 
where appropriate), defer and delay others and interleave the rest (Loukopoulos, 
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).  Before reaching overload operators can simply increase the 
level of effort to meet increased workload with consistent performance (Hart & Sheridan, 
1984). The operator could chose to reduce the required level of performance or shed 
certain tasks in order to keep the workload level manageable (Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  
Pilots have been shown to trade speed for accuracy where required performance allowed, 
rather than optimize performance, which also reduces the utility of expertise (Higgins & 
Chignell, 1988; Secarea, 1990).   
One of the most common forms of workload management strategies the operators 
believe they use to cope with high-workload situations is multitasking.  However, true 
multi-tasking (i.e. perfect time-sharing) as described in multiple-resource theory is often 
confused for other workload strategies (Wickens C. D., 2002).  Interleaving is the process 
of temporarily interrupting Task A to perform part of Task B then returning to Task A 
and repeating the process (Alion Science, 2013). Some tasks may intentionally be 
omitted, called task shedding. Delegating is task shedding from one operator and 
assigning the task to a different operator (Brockman, 2010).  Adaptive attack is similar to 
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interleaving, but instead of Tasks A and B performing concurrently, the operator 
prioritizes one task and defers the other until resources are available.  Both task shedding 
and adaptive attack are common strategies for unplanned, dynamic events that are high 
priority.  On the other hand, interleaving may be used when checklists or procedures are 
run concurrently, or when giving a brief while executing a checklist (Loukopoulos, 
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009; Adams & Pew, 1990). 
Workload strategies are not without their risks and aviation safety literature 
abounds with accident reports and anecdotes of mistakes caused by missed procedures 
and improperly managed workload.  NASA reported more than 50 incidents of attempted 
no-flap takeoffs in the decade preceding 2009--an error that has resulted in numerous 
fatal accidents and is often caused by omitting checklist steps in the often distracting and 
hectic before-takeoff phase of flight (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009; NASA, 
2014; Adams & Pew, 1990).  While workload may be neatly ordered when designing a 
procedure, random real-world noise, such as radio traffic or the requirement to navigate a 
complex set of taxi instructions often interrupts this flow (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & 
Barshi, 2009).  Distractions and demands simply do not allow for the neat and orderly 
flow of tasks to the operator (Adams & Pew, 1990). This forces some type of workload 
strategy and can potentially compromise operator performance.  As a result of 
compromised performance, task simplification is recommended to reduce workload and 
increase performance (Secarea, 1990). 
Pilots typically believe that they are good at multi-tasking, yet oftentimes this fact 
is hidden in that most tasks performed in parallel are highly rehearsed, thus performed 
almost automatically.  The unpredictability forces pilots to interleave tasks in an ad hoc 
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and creative manner (Loukopoulos, Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).  Although the vast 
majority of these impromptu workload strategies result in acceptable task completion, the 
randomness of the interruption and ad hoc response strategy can lead to serious omissions 
and deviations from procedures, especially when habit patterns are broken (Loukopoulos, 
Dismukes, & Barshi, 2009).  Hence, checklists (particularly challenge and response), 
automated monitoring systems (such as gear and flap warning horns) and informal 
processes serve to catch these inadvertent omissions. 
Workload Measurement 
While physical workload can be judged by evaluating physical movements, 
mental workload, in particular, is difficult to measure.  It is difficult to define workload 
during monitoring tasks unless there is any overt response (Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  In 
aviation, particularly tactical and combat missions, significant effort is devoted to sensory 
intake and processing (McCracken & Aldrich, 1984).  This difficulty compounds when 
operators are transitioning from mundane monitoring to a complex and urgent emergency 
situation management (Hart & Sheridan, 1984).  Monitoring an automated system in 
which the operator has a high level of trust may have a low perceived workload and not 
as easy to observe, whereas a system that the operator does not trust will result in a very 
conscious, therefore reportable, level of mental workload.  Indeed, an operator is more 
inclined to use automation when trust is high, and leave even that system engaged if it 
malfunctions.  Thus, the operator may be forced to trust automation as a workload 
management strategy  when under stress or to free up resources for complex problem 
solving tasks (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).  
Conversely, an operator who has low trust in automation will be less likely to use it and 
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quicker to disconnect it when something abnormal happens (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000). 
 Operators will sometimes seek to fill unused capacity.  While a task may not 
require overt mental work, the human operator may find mental activities to occupy 
him/her.  These activities may be indirectly related to the task at hand (i.e. planning), 
developing situation awareness, or may be daydreams or musings (Hart & Sheridan, 
1984).  Mental processing workload related to situation awareness is non-trivial, yet not 
explicitly linked to any given task.  This level of distraction cannot be objectively 
measured and is far too complex to be predicted, yet it occupies part of the operator’s 
finite mental capacity (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). 
Workload can be measured empirically or analytically through both subjective 
and objective means (Rusnock, Borghetti, & McQuaid, 2015).  Empirically, workload is 
adjudicated with subjective evaluations, surveys, and/or measuring some kind of 
physiological response (i.e. heart rate, eye movement, electrical brain activity, etc).  
Analytical and deterministic methods can begin with the design phase and calculate 
expected workload values from a task network analysis.  Analytical workload 
measurement techniques are predictive in nature, therefore offer a better evaluation of 
workload for systems still in the conceptual stage (Mitchell, 2000).  Analytical methods 
aim to calculate the cumulative workload imposed by a series of tasks.  These are 
frequently performed as computer simulations, such as VACP, or direct performance 
measurements (either physiological or some physical parameter). However, if there is no 
established benchmark of tasks in a controlled environment, then there can be no 
objective measure of workload to compare against (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). Most 
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common forms of measuring workload are subjective evaluations performed by the 
operator after an experiment is run, usually in the form of a survey or questionnaire.  
Subjective workload assessments may easily capture the essence of mental workload, 
especially when the effects of many different contributing factors may be poorly 
understood (Hart & Staveland, 1988).  While subjective assessments lend themselves 
easily to both researchers and subjects alike, they are not without problems. Subjective 
methods rely heavily on judgment, which is influenced by heuristics and biases.  If a task 
was performed multiple times during the experiment, the subject may only be able 
accurately recall the most challenging or latest iteration of that task.  Information fidelity 
erodes as time elapses such that tasks performed early in the experiment or a 
questionnaire conducted well after the task occurred rely more on the recall ability of the 
test subject (Hart & Staveland, 1988). 
Biases aside, subjective methods must establish a degree of consistency in 
workload ratings. Thus, they typically involve relative, linguistic measures such as “low” 
and “high” and avoid quantifying workload values. Since task variables covary with the 
test subjects involved, subjective workload assessments can produce different values of 
experienced workload (Hauser, Childress, & Hart, 1982; Hart & Staveland, 1988).  For a 
given task, variance is also expected as a result of different task weights reflected from 
the evaluator’s biases (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). Questionnaire results may only reveal 
overt responses and conscious mental effort while masking subconscious and background 
processes (Hart & Sheridan, 1984). Most issues with consistencies and biases can be 
mitigated with a large sample size of test subjects.  The three most common methods of 
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subjective workload ratings are: the Subjective Workload Analysis Tool (SWAT), the 
Cooper-Harper Index, and NASA’s Task Load Index (TLX). 
Subjective Workload Analysis Tool (SWAT) 
Subjective Workload Assessment Technique (SWAT) measures mental workload 
only and assumes that the experimenter will use another technique to measure physical 
workload for any significant tasks, if applicable. (Reid, Potter, & Bressler, 1989)  Either 
during or immediately after an experiment is run (or both) the operator rates mental 
workload on the pre-briefed set of scales (Reid, Potter, & Bressler, 1989).  Based on the 
operator rating of  workload, the investigator weighs each component (time load, mental 
effort, psychological stress) and computes a final SWAT value based on the scale 
algorithm. The speed or accuracy of task completion theoretically indicates workload.  
However, this empirical method may not account for workload management strategies, 
information quality, or the relationships between primary and secondary tasks (Mitchell, 
2000).  Thus, an operator evaluation of perceived workload does not reliably predict 
performance (Tsang & V, 1996). 
Cooper-Harper scale 
The standard scale for evaluating aircraft handling qualities has been the Cooper-
Harper scale.  This scale originally seeks to standardize aircraft flyability by defining 
“handling qualities” as more than simple aerodynamic stability and control by 
considering cockpit design (visibility, displays, and control), task performance, and 
implicit factors, such as stress and environment (Cooper & Harper, 1969).  By 
incorporating miscellaneous cockpit tasks with basic aircraft control qualities, this scale 
correlates perceived workload with performance from the pilot’s point of view.  A 
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qualitative scale such as this may be desirable when applying real-world stress and 
environmental pressures, auxiliary tasks, etc., cannot neatly be measured experimentally.  
Cooper and Harper concluded at the time that it was impossible to measure all aspects of 
pilot performance and that there needed to be operator feedback to illustrate those areas 
that could not be measured explicitly, thus a pilot-rating scale was the only method to 
show workload at the man-machine interface (Cooper & Harper, 1969).   The revised 
Cooper-Harper scale is a numerical rating scale designed to be used in conjunction with a 
written evaluation to identify and amplify design shortcomings.  Figure 3 shows the 
original Cooper-Harper rating scale.  The scale asks the pilot to make up to three 
decisions regarding performance that Pilot performance (or compensation) describes a 
level of physical workload.  The Bedford scale is another aircraft handling/workload 
scale similar to the Cooper-Harper. 
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Figure 3: Handling Qualities Rating Scale(Cooper & Harper, 1969) 
 
NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) 
The NASA-developed Task Load Index (TLX) is a popular subjective workload 
evaluation technique.  NASA-TLX computes an overall workload score based on 
weighted averages of six scales: metal demand, physical demand, temporal demand, 
performance, effort, and frustration (NASA, 2015).  TLX theory assumes that task 
demands (mental, physical, and temporal) are multi-dimensional, may covary, and 
contain some objective measure of magnitude (i.e. difficulty) and importance (Hart & 
Staveland, 1988).  These demands are perceived by the operator, who also applies 
psychological variables to yield emotional, cognitive, and physical responses which then 
can be evaluated (Hart & Staveland, 1988).  The amount of covariance is situation 
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dependent, and TLX seeks to identify task demands and the non-task factors and stressors 
that are implicit to the situation. 
In practice, after an experiment is run, each operator/test subject is asked a 
question relevant to each task according to the subscale.  The operator responds by 
marking appropriately along each scale, which appear arbitrary and linguistically 
descriptive.  The experimenter applies a numerical value based on the operator’s rating, 
which is added together to generate a weighted workload score and thus an overall 
workload rating for that task (Hart & Staveland, 1988). 
Physiological Methods 
To maintain performance as workload increases, the operator must increase effort.  
The human body has a measurable physiological reaction to workload and stress. Several 
methods of measuring physiological reactions are: 
• Heart rate activity such as heart rate variability from Electrocardiograms 
(ECG or EKG) (Jorna, 1991; Watson, 2001; Wilson, 1991; 2001; Siegel & 
Keller, 1992) 
•  Respiration rate (Wilson, 1991) 
• Eye movement (Siegel & Keller, 1992; Wilson, 1991; 2001; Schnell, Macuda, 
Poolman, & Keller, 2006) 
• Brain activity, such as those measured from Electroencephalograph (EEG), 
Event-related potential (ERP), and Positron emissions tomography (PET)  
(Wilson, 1991; 2001; Schnell, Macuda, Poolman, & Keller, 2006) 
While physiological measurements can be useful for determining areas of high 
workload, they are empirical in nature, therefore they cannot serve as useful predictors to 
engineers before a prototype is constructed (Mitchell, 2000).  Also, if an operator 
employs effective workload strategies in an effort to balance or level experienced 
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workload, then high workload peaks may not manifest themselves significantly in a 
physiologically measurable way (Kramer A. F., 1991).  Their physiological effects may 
lag behind the actual task, thus making it difficult to correlate imposed workload for any 
specific task or time.  However, when combined with questionnaires and known 
baselines, physiological measurements can be used to correlate subjective workload 
methods (Svensson, Angelborg-Thanderz, & Wilson, 1999). 
Pilot Performance Measurements 
Pilot performance can be measured objectively by recording deviations from any 
number of in-flight parameters.  Aircrews are trained to recognized decreased 
performance shown in late verbal responses, erratic or illogical control movements, 
delayed or ignored cues and prompts (McDaniel, 1996).  The degree to which a pilot 
exceeds a given flight parameter (i.e. glideslope, altitude, heading, etc.) can demonstrate 
how performance suffers from high workload (McDaniel, 1996).  However, by its nature, 
this method solely measures performance, which as described earlier, may only correlate 
to periods of excessively high workload or low operator motivation.  It is best to use 
performance measurements in conjunction with other workload assessment techniques. 
Visual, Auditory, Cognitive, Psychomotor (VACP) Analysis 
  A VACP analysis can account for the multiple-resource theory concept of channels 
or components of workload.  These channels--visual, auditory, cognitive and 
psychomotor--were scaled and quantified first by McCracken and Aldrich (1984) to 
predicatively quantify task workload for a proposed light scout/attack helicopter (Table 
3). Each channel was divided into an ordinal scale and assigned various descriptors 
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according to increasing level of task demand.  Complex tasks involving multiple channels 
simply add the individual channel values together for a total workload.   
Table 3: VACP(McCracken & Aldrich, 1984) 
Scale 
Values  Descriptors 
  Visual 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Monitor, scan, survey 
2.0 Detect movement, change in size/brightness 
3.0 Trace, follow, track 
4.0 Align, aim, orient on 
5.0 Discriminate symbols, numbers, words 
6.0 Discriminate based on multiple aspects 
7.0 Read, decipher text, decode 
  Auditory 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Detect occurrence of sound, tone, etc. 
2.0 Detect change in amplitude, pulse rate, pitch 
3.0 Comprehend semantic content of message 
4.0 Discriminate sounds on the basis of signal pattern 
  Cognitive 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Automatic (stimulus-response) 
2.0 Sign/signal recognition 
3.0 Alternative selection 
4.0 Encoding/decoding, recall 
5.0 Formulation of plans (projecting action sequence, etc) 
6.0 Evaluation (considering several aspects) 
7.0 Estimation, calculation, conversion 
  Psychomotor 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Discrete actuation (button, toggle, trigger) 
2.0 Discrete adjustive (variable dial, etc) 
3.0 Speech using prescribed format 
4.0 Continuous adjustive (fight controls, sensor controls, etc) 
5.0 Manipulative (handling objects, maps, etc) 
6.0 Symbolic production (writing) 
7.0 Serial discrete manipulation (keyboard entries) 
 
This initial VACP model was modified by Bierbaum, et al (1989) to adjust scale the 
ordinal scale into a ratio scale.  The modified VACP scale (Table 4) offers more refined, 
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and in some cases, reordered workload values and descriptors and includes employment 
of night vision goggles (NVGs)(Bierbaum, Szabo, & Aldrich, 1989). 
Table 4: Modified VACP Scale(Bierbaum, Szabo, & Aldrich, 1989) 
Scale 
Values  Descriptors 
  Visual 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Visually Register/Detect occurrence of image 
3.7 Discriminate symbols, numbers, words 
4.0 Visually inspect/check (discrete inspection/static condition) 
5.0 Visually locate/align (selective orientation) 
5.4 Visually track/follow 
5.9 Read (symbol) 
7.0 Visually scan/search/monitor (continuous/serial inspection) 
  Auditory 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Detect occurrence of sound 
2.0 Orient to sound (general orientation/attention) 
4.2 Orient to sound (selective orientation/attention) 
4.3 Verify auditory feedback (detect occurrence of anticipated sound) 
4.9 Comprehend semantic content of message 
6.6 Detect change in amplitude, pulse rate, pitch 
7.0 Discriminate sounds on the basis of signal pattern 
  Cognitive 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Automatic (simple association) 
1.2 Alternative selection 
3.7 Sign/signal recognition 
4.6 Evaluation (consider single aspect) 
5.3 Encoding/decoding, recall 
6.8 Evaluation (considering several aspects) 
7.0 Estimation, calculation, conversion 
  Psychomotor 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Speech using prescribed format 
2.2 Discrete actuation (button, toggle, trigger) 
2.6 Continuous adjustive (fight controls, sensor controls, etc) 
4.6 Manipulative (handling objects, maps, etc) 
5.8 Discrete adjustive (variable dial, etc) 
6.5 Symbolic production (writing) 
7.0 Serial discrete manipulation (keyboard entries) 
 
A predictive workload analysis evaluates a function of tasks up to an entire 
mission by constructing a task analysis, then applying time values to task duration and 
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sequencing to develop a task flow.  Then VACP workload values are added to each task.  
The resultant workload analysis documents total composite workload over time. 
Situation Awareness 
The ability to conceive of the aircraft’s whereabouts, status, weather, fuel state, 
terrain, and, in combat, enemy disposition is critical to effective aircraft operation.  In 
critical phases of flight, poor weather, or in the face of systems malfunctions or can mean 
the difference between mission success and failure or even survivability. Operator 
performance in complex or dynamic environments is often a function of situation 
awareness (SA) (Secarea, 1990). Aircrews spend considerable portions of time and effort 
developing and maintaining SA, especially in evolving environments (Endsley M. R., 
1999).  Indeed the military has had a keen interest in SA in the cockpit dating back to 
World War I and especially more so in the information age of the late 20th century 
(Endsley M. R., 1995a; Press, 1986; 57th Figther Wing, 1986).  In tactical situations, this 
includes knowledge about the locations, actions, and capabilities of both friendly and 
enemy forces (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1999). SA is considered so important that it is 
considered a ‘critical’ grading area for flight evaluations (check rides) for Air Force C-
130 crews (AFI 11-2C-130, Vol. 2, 2014).  A demonstrated failure to maintain SA would 
result in a failure of the check ride and loss of aircrew qualification (AFI 11-2C-130, Vol. 
2, 2014).  A leading cause of military and 88% of commercial aviation accidents have 
been attributed to poor SA (Endsley M. R., 1994; Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991). 
 Situation awareness is the knowledge of environmental factors that influence 
decisions and depends on the operator’s internal perceptual model of the world (Klein, 
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Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). SA is the operator’s perception (or mental 
model) of elements in the environment around him within a volume of space and time, 
the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status into the future 
(Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1999).   Situation awareness drives decision making based on the 
operator’s mental model of the environment. Situation awareness, while independent 
from decision making, forms a basis for it (Endsley M. R., 1995a; 1995b). The 
performance of a combat pilot is highly related to the fusion of decision-making and SA 
(Venturino, Hamilton, & Dverchak, 1989). SA takes inputs primarily from the operating 
environment (the situation itself), while secondary inputs such as motivations, operator 
capacity, and workload adjust the SA mental model.  In turn, the operator makes a 
decision based off his SA and similarly colored by those secondary inputs.  The resulting 
decision leads to an action, which alters the environment/situation and the cycle begins 
again. 
As one would expect, pilot and aircrew SA is highly related to the dimensions of 
space and time (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a). Aviation is inherently and naturally 
spatial in nature.  Navigational position, altitude, speed, and heading naturally come to 
mind, and is frequently invoked in the aviator’s priorities to ‘aviate, navigate, and 
communicate’ in that order.  That is, fly the airplane first (altitude, attitude and airspeed), 
then navigate it, and then worry about other tasks, such as radio traffic.  But, as SA is 
built up over time, it considers events that happened in the past to influence the mental 
model of the present and project a future status.  Even non-visual observations such as 
written procedures, listening to radio traffic, etc., correspond to some mental model of 
space and time.  However, the operator must maintain analytical awareness in order to 
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project his mental model forward (Endsley M. R., 1988a).  SA regarding system status, 
malfunctions are highly analytical, and even observations in the space-time realm involve 
some degree of analysis. 
Levels of Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is more than the possession of many pieces of data: it 
must be processed into some coherent understanding that is valid both in the present and 
in future tense (Endsley M. R., 1995a).  Thus, multiple levels of SA exist as shown in 
Figure 4: Level 1 or perception, Level 2 or comprehension, and Level 3 or projection.  
The first and most basic level is detection or perception of conditions in the environment 
along with basic characteristics of that observation (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a).  This 
could be observing an instrument reading, noticing a warning light, terrain or other 
aircraft, or hearing a radio call.   
 
Figure 4: Situation Awareness/Decision Making Model (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a) 
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The second level of SA involves comprehension of the meaning of those 
observations (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a).  For example, the warning light indicates 
that a system has failed, the fuel gauge indicates available range and time, the instrument 
reading describes aircraft performance, and the radio call relays an air traffic control 
(ATC) clearance.  Because levels of SA build upon each other, poor perceptional SA 
makes comprehension much more difficult.  Aircrews face incomplete information, 
conflicting data, and data incongruent with the established mental model, the resolution 
of which takes a great deal of effort (Adams & Pew, 1990).  Spatial disorientation 
exemplifies a potentially hazardous condition in which the pilot’s mental model is 
incongruent with the real world and conflicts with the information displayed by his 
instruments resulting in confusion about the actual aircraft attitude. 
The third and highest level of SA projects this comprehension towards some 
future status (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a).  Is aircraft performance deviating from 
required parameters?  Will that system failure prevent mission accomplishment?  Based 
on the ATC clearance, what kind of future delays, constraints, and conflicts could arise?  
This highest cognitive level of SA joins cognition with decision making and action. 
Low SA can be attributed to certain failures unique to each level.  Failure to 
correctly perceive information (Level 1) may be caused by unavailable data, data that is 
hard to detect, a failure to observe available data, misreading data, or memory loss.  A 
failure to comprehend information (Level 2) can be caused by a poor mental model, 
incorrect use of a mental model, or over-reliance on incorrect variables.  Failure to 
project a future status (Level 3) stems from poor comprehension or an inaccurate 
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projection of existing trends since people are generally poor at prediction (Endsley M. R., 
1999). 
Attention, Capacity, and Situation Awareness 
Available SA, just like mental workload capacity, is a product of the pilot’s 
previous training and experiences, but is susceptible to preconceptions, biases, and 
objectives and individuals possess different abilities or capacities to obtain and maintain 
SA (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995a).  Non-routine and unpredictable situations, such as 
combat, demand effective integration of large quantities of information on a limited 
cognitive capacity to process (Secarea, 1990; Endsley M. R., 1995a).  Cognitive theory 
applies to SA capacity in much the same manner that it applies to mental workload 
capacity.  While each operator may have different innate abilities to make observations, 
such as good eyesight or good spatial processing abilities, several factors can affect how 
readily a given operator acquires SA. 
It would be reasonable to assume a pilot has observed a warning light simply 
because it is in his field of view.  However, even cues in the normal field of view can be 
missed if they are too subtle or if the operator is not paying sufficient attention to it 
(Kahneman, 1973).  If a pilot notices the light from another aircraft at night, but the 
aircraft’s relative position appears to be fixed in the windscreen, then the pilot might 
assume that light might be a star or a street light.  But, if that light appears to move across 
the screen, the pilot’s attention would naturally be drawn to it, and thus determined to be 
another aircraft.  Similarly, a system status change may go unnoticed if the indication is 
subtle (i.e. a gauge moving slightly, dim light, etc.), yet most pilots would immediately 
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recognize a flashing “Master Warning” light located prominently in the middle of the 
normal field of view—especially if it was accompanied by an audible warning tone. 
Even perfect cueing will not add to SA if attention is not devoted to it.  
Information overload can overwork the operator but also overwhelm the senses or dull 
them to similar stimuli.  An operator listening to multiple radios simultaneously with 
frequent intra-cockpit communications cannot process all the information being forced 
onto one (auditory) cognitive channel.  Thus, the operator must prioritize the demands for 
single mental resource (Endsley M. R., 1995a).  Conversely, the operator can become 
desensitized to frequent, or nuisance warnings, thus negating the effectiveness of those 
warnings (Billings, 1991; Wiener & Curry, 1980).   
For competing attention demands an operator employs strategies to prevent 
information overload.  Indeed a human operator’s capacity for attention is somewhere 
between 2-40 bits per second--far lower than the ability of the environment and modern 
cockpit systems to present them (Lovesey, 1995).  Attention (and therefore SA) priorities 
depend of the determined relevance, implications, and urgency of the received data 
(Adams & Pew, 1990).  The pilot might not pay much attention to an element until its 
status changes (i.e. noticing an unusual sound or handling characteristic).  Instead of 
attempting to continuously monitor the status of all indicators, gauges, and displays 
equally, an operator chooses to sample instrumentation on a priority basis.  The pilot’s 
instrument “cross-check” prioritizes aircraft attitude, then other measures of performance 
(i.e. heading, altitude, etc), then other mission systems (AFMAN 11-217, Vol 1, 2010).  
The pilot therefore samples higher priority instruments more frequently than lower 
priority instruments. Thus, limited pilot attention is devoted to elements in the 
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environment based on how they contribute to overall success based on the pilot’s goals 
(Fracker M. L., 1989).  Because of the prioritization of attention, the operator is much 
more likely to perceive changes to things he is actively observing or engaged in (Adams 
& Pew, 1990). 
Attention can be split between environmental elements that demand different 
cognitive channels as stated in Wickens’ Multiple Resource Theory (2002). The 
performance-arousal function also applies to attention and level 1 SA in much the same 
manner as it does in Figure 1.  A sufficiently bored operator may simply not be paying 
attention, trusting that the situation will continue to proceed normally.  Yet further 
arousal can stimulate an individual to commit more resources to attention and actively 
acquire SA (Kahneman, 1973). No current criteria exist to determine the required level of 
SA needed to obtain a desired level of performance (Pew, 1991).  Thus, less than perfect 
SA causes the operator to assume a level of risk for error.  Good SA increases the 
probability of good performance, but does not guarantee high performance because other 
factors are also at play (Endsley M. R., 1995b).   
The act of perceiving an environment, comprehending it’s meaning, and 
projecting it forward into a hypothetical, yet actionable future state imposes a heavy load 
on the operator’s working memory (Wickens C. D., 1984; Endsley M. R., 1995a).  This is 
especially true when the operator is rapidly introduced into a novel environment. This 
reliance on working memory creates a crucial attention bottleneck, which is inextricably 
tied to SA (Fracker M. L., 1989). Thus the act of attaining SA induces workload (Adams 
& Pew, 1990; Colombi, Miller, Schneider, McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 2011; Endsley M. 
R., 1993). While the process of SA requires effort, and therefore work, it is not overt in 
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the manner that task-imposed workload is observable. The operator must use untasked 
spare time to acquire SA and perform relevant planning, yet this time may not be 
observable, let alone predictable (Colombi, Miller, Schneider, McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 
2011). 
To mitigate demands on working memory, training, expertise, briefings are used 
to push those demands into the realm of long-term memory for storage and easier access.  
Continued exposure to the environment through training, experience, or mission 
repetition makes the environment routine, reducing the cognitive burden for acquiring 
SA. However, since long-term memory is not available when an individual is confronted 
with a novel situation, the burden of processing must shift back to working memory, 
which consumes more attention resources (Endsley M. R., 1995a; Adams & Pew, 1990).  
Other situations where SA is very low or erroneous, requires significant, if not enormous 
effort (i.e. workload) to correct,  However even with a great expenditure of effort, an 
increase of SA is not guaranteed (Endsley M. R., 1993).  An expert would have a higher 
likelihood of observing a similar situation, thus driving down the number of occurrences 
of novel situations with its attendant workload burden. In another setting, the pre-mission 
briefing sets expectations as to what will happen as well as contingencies that could arise.  
Thus, when an environmental cue appears, the pilot recognizes it faster if it was briefed 
than an unexpected cue.  However, due to confirmation bias, if an element contradicts or 
otherwise disagrees with the preconceived expectation, then there is a higher likelihood 
of delay in perception or comprehension errors (Jones, 1977). Decision bias based on 
prior experience is an issue to SA when expectations cause the operator to ignore or 
misinterpret data to form an inaccurate mental model (Einhorn & Hogwarth, 1981). 
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Both long- and short-term memory play a role in how an operator builds SA 
(Endsley M. R., 1995a; Adams & Pew, 1990).  The more developed memory stores a 
larger database of patterns from which to compare environmental cues.  Better pattern 
recognition allows for faster recognition and perception of an element, or a richer 
comprehension of that element and what it could mean to the operator’s future (Endsley 
M. R., 1995a).  Pattern development can lead to automatic processing which can occur 
with conscious attention and a minimum of resources (Logan, 1988; Adams & Pew, 
1990).  Even basic decisions can be so habitual and automatic that the operator may not 
even recall the decision itself. Patterns and environmental cues can become so automatic 
that the operator may develop perceptional SA without knowing how he obtained that 
knowledge (Endsley M. R., 1995a). 
Even when specific elements of SA are unknown, a pilot can still make decisions 
and predictions based off of very general knowledge and refine his mental model as more 
information becomes available and SA increases (Endsley M. R., 1995a).  The 
confidence level of the information is an important aspect of SA because it determines 
how much more information is required to make a decision and influences the outcome of 
that decision (Endsley M. R., 1995a; Norman D. A., 1989).  For instance, a pilot may 
only have knowledge of generalized enemy weapons systems capabilities and doctrine.  
His pattern of observation might be oriented towards finding the specific location of 
threats, which was refined because he has a better idea where to look (or even where not 
to look).  When something suspicious—a radar return, an aircraft silhouette, or 
movement on the ground—is observed, the range of possibilities is constrained by 
general knowledge allowing for faster processing of that observation.   
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Just like workload capacity theory, expertise, training, and stress affect decision 
quality and SA. When presented with meaningful information, experts perform better, 
have better SA, and make better decisions (Adams & Pew, 1990; Endsley M. R., 1995a).  
Training and experience provide experts with a wider array of historical patterns that may 
closely match the current situation, more mature decision strategies, and require less 
effort to arrive at a given decision compared to the novice (Endsley M. R., 1995a).  
However, when information is meaningless or lacking altogether, or the situation is 
novel, the advantages of expertise are negated and expert versus novice performance 
approaches parity (Secarea, 1990; Hart, 1986; Kramer A. F., 1986; Lanzetta, Warm, 
Dember, & Berch, 1985; Ortega, 1989; Endsley M. R., 1995a).  Stress and distractions 
can adversely affect decision quality (Wickens, Stokes, Barnett, & Hyman, 1988).  Thus, 
external factors can simultaneously affect workload, SA, and decision making similarly.  
Workload and Situation Awareness 
Experienced workload impacts the amount of SA available to the pilot at any 
given time (Endsley M. R., 1993).  It is reasonable to conclude that a pilot in an 
overloaded condition devotes a great deal of mental effort towards task management at 
the expense of observing and perceiving the environment around him.  Workload impacts 
not only SA but the ability to make decisions and perform follow-on actions (Endsley M. 
R., 1988a).  Because acquiring SA requires work, SA is both the result and generator of 
work (Endsley M. R., 1993).  However, just as in workload-performance and attention 
theory, this is not to say that high workload necessarily results in low SA.  While 
overload will result in poor performance, low SA may not necessarily result in poor 
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performance if the element of lost SA is not relevant to the task at hand (Endsley M. R., 
1993). 
If workload and SA are to be measured together, Endsley (1993) suggests that 
using complimentary methods may not be enough, and that the linkage between workload 
and SA are quite complex.  Workload only measures how hard a person is working, not 
to what ends, or benefits, that work accomplishes (Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 
1998).  For example the Subjective Workload Assessment Tool (SWAT) and subjective 
SA tools used together can suggest that an operator expends more effort to maintain a 
constant level of SA when task difficulty increases (Endsley M. R., 1993; Fracker & 
Davis, 1990).  Workload may only impact SA as it approaches overload (Endsley M. R., 
1996).  However, while workload and SA are independent constructs, they show positive 
correlation, as measured in a study with NASA-TLX and the Situation Awareness Rating 
Technique (SART) (Endsley M. R., 1988c; 1993; Selcon, Taylor, & Koritsas, 1991).  
This correlation is not precise, nor is it consistent, partially due to the covariance of 
human performance against workload and SA.  Endsley (1993) found significant 
dissociation between SWAT and the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
(SAGAT, described in the section: Measuring Situation Awareness) similar to 
dissociation found by Fracker & Davis (1990).  During simulated air combat scenarios, 
the six test subjects each experienced workload values differently, but predominantly 
found high SA during periods of low workload and low SA during periods of high 
workload (Endsley M. R., 1993).  SA can also be measured from an adaptation of the 
Subjective Workload Dominance technique (SA-SWORD) (AFRL, 2002). 
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Workload versus SA can exist in four distinct regions (Figure 5), sometimes 
disassociated from each other depending on operator capacity and motivation, system 
designs and the nature of the task itself (Endsley M. R., 1993).  An unmotivated or 
inattentive operator may have low SA despite low workload.  Low SA can also occur 
when the operator is confronted with too many tasks and SA demands are approaching 
overload.  If that same operator experienced high, but attainable workload, it is possible 
to actively maintain high SA.  The ultimate workstation design goal allows the operator 
to attain high SA with low workload, but the greatest challenge is maintaining that high 
SA during unavoidable periods of high workload (Endsley M. R., 1993). 
 
Figure 5: Workload vs. SA(Endsley M. R., 1993) 
 
Cockpit Design, Automation, and Situation Awareness 
Because of the critical effects situation awareness has on mission outcome and 
survivability, designers and operators both have a vested interest in maintaining a high 
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level of SA.  Operators develop procedures and train to maximize the use of all available 
tools and observations to increase SA.  Designers can incorporate heads-up displays 
(HUD), multi-function displays, automation, expert systems, advanced avionics and 
sensors to provide more information in a more useful manner (Endsley M. R., 1988a).  In 
this regard, for a given task, all cockpits are not created equal.  Cockpit design affects 
both the number of required tasks, the workload of those tasks, and the information 
provided to the operator during their completion (Endsley M. R., 1995a). Automation and 
intelligent cockpits can tailor information needs or perform support functions based on 
the required situation (Secarea, 1990).  
In one study pilots strongly preferred the cockpit display setup that was 
subjectively rated to have the best SA (Hughes, Hassoun, & Ward, 1990). Other sources 
of information, such as moving map displays or datalinks add to the quantity and quality 
of data available to aircrew.  Datalinks can take many forms (not all of which are 
compatible), and many datalink programs exist in military aircraft and have been 
considered for the C-130, such as High Power Waveform (HPW), Combat Track II (CT2 
or CTII), Real-Time Information in the Cockpit (RTIC), Situational Awareness Data 
Link (SADL), Link 16, SAMS-ESA, Airborne Broadcast Intelligence System (ABI), 
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), Tactical Digital Information 
Link (TADIL), Military Internet Relay Chat (mIRC), (Linson, 2010; AFTTP 3-3.C-
130E/H, 2010; Monto, 2001; Nielson, 2005; Poole, 2008; Redenius, 2011; Sexton, 1998; 
Talley, 2012).  However, the mere quantity of information is not the only factor in 
developing SA—indeed too much can cause overload where less important information 
precludes the pilot from concentrating appropriate attention on important information —
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but how well the operator perceives and comprehend that data into something meaningful 
(Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998). 
Simply by reducing the number of places a pilot is required to scan within the 
cockpit, increases attention resources available to the remaining scan areas.  Thus a glass 
cockpit that can provide higher information density simultaneously reduces the workload 
required to attain SA but provides more SA in the same field of view.  However, if the 
pilot neglects to maintain a scan elsewhere and becomes dependent or fixates on those 
information sources (namely, the HUD), then SA remains limited (Haynes, 1998; 
Shinaberry, 2013).  Automation, while reducing workload, can place the pilot out of the 
feedback loop, which can result in delayed or missed cues (Endsley M. R., 1996; Norman 
D. A., 1989). Automation can also increase feedback or provide new methods of 
communicating feedback, which may alter how an operator must assimilate that data 
(Endsley M. R., 1996).  Feedback comes in many forms, some of which may not be 
obvious to the designer or operator at the time of development.  For instance, the F-16’s 
fly-by-wire controls prevented vibration feedback that may have been felt in traditional 
mechanical flight controls as the aircraft approaches a stall (Kuipers, Kappers, van 
Holten, van Bergen, & Gosterveld, 1989).  Thus, designers design other feedback 
mechanisms, such as stick-shakers and stick-pushers to augment information already 
present on other displays, such as raw airspeed or angle of attack (Kantowitz & Sorkin, 
1983). 
Pilots who become passive observers miss the SA developed by actively 
gathering and processing information (Endsley M. R., 1996).  Research shows that 
passive information processing is inferior to actively devoting attention resources and 
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Level 2 SA was lower in automated systems despite the similar availability of Level 1 SA 
elements (Slamecka & Graf, 1978; Cowan, 1988; Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  Many of the 
aircraft accidents described earlier in this chapter (and hundreds more) can ultimately be 
attributed to, or prevented by, SA despite the causal role of automation. 
Ideally, a modern glass cockpit (and its attendant automation) must serve to 
support the development of SA (Adams & Pew, 1990).  However, while automation 
might condense the pilot’s scanning region, consolidate information, and reduce 
workload, the associated reduction in attention demand, coupled with a potential for 
complacency and information filtering can reduce SA (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & 
Wickens, 2000). By changing human behavior in the cockpit, automation affects 
vigilance and complacency (related to attention invested), allows the human operator to 
assume a more passive role, and alters the nature of the feedback loop (time, quality, or 
form) (Endsley M. R., 1996).  While this could improve operator SA, depending on the 
tasks and means available to acquire SA, this could also place the operator out of the 
feedback or decision loop. 
Situation Awareness and Decision Making 
While situation awareness reflects a snapshot in time, it is a continuing process or 
cycle to observe, comprehend, and project in order to update and refine the mental model 
(Endsley M. R., 1988a).  This refinement process is closely linked to decision theory, and 
especially the OODA loop. To resolve a complex problem with a preferred outcome 
based on situational responses, a decision maker follows a perceive-plan-act cycle 
(Secarea, 1990).  First and foremost, the decision maker must classify and understand the 
situation (Endsley M. R., 1995a; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986).  Col. 
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John Boyd defined an observe-orient-decided-act (OODA) loop to describe the decision 
making process in an air-to-air engagement (Figure 6).  The pilot who won the 
engagement made better decisions quicker than his opponent could react (Osinga, 2006).  
Thus the winning pilot controlled the initiative and forced his opponent into a less 
organized and ultimately loosing set of reactions.  
 
Figure 6: OODA Loop(Boyd, 1995) 
Simply making decisions faster is not relevant if SA is inaccurate, since the 
resulting decisions, therefore actions, would be inappropriate (Endsley M. R., 1995a; 
Osinga, 2006).  Failure to make adequate decisions can lead to aircraft accidents and 
combat losses. Poor decision making contributed to the shoot-down of Iranian airliner by 
the USS Vincennes (also mentioned in the automation section) because of poor SA due to 
a lack of good information available (Klein G. A., 1989a).  
Perception, or observe and orient, relate to Endsley’s first and second levels of 
SA, respectively. Projection, or level 3 SA formulates the basis of making the actual 
decision which the operator executes in the final step of the OODA Loop.  Perhaps the 
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most crucial aspect in the OODA Loop is the operator’s ability to quickly and accurately 
reassess conditions and iteratively develop his SA once that decision was put into action. 
Indeed time pressure is a significant factor in decision making.  One major 
solution to shortening the cycle (and achieve decision superiority) is to simplify the 
situation, or at least the perception thereof (Secarea, 1990). This can be done through 
pattern substitution, selective use of information, or using information in a more surface-
level or shallow sense (Veltman, 2001).  Another strategy is to shorten the time it takes to 
reach a decision. In a study, 95% of tactical decisions by ground commanders featured 
matching the situation to a memorized pattern instead of a more deliberative decision-
making process (Kaempf, Wolf, & Miller, 1993).  Individuals will try to use pattern 
matching as a heuristic for faster decision making; the results of which could come 
instantly or take considerable effort to reach(Klein G. A., 1989b; Hinsley, Hayes, & 
Simon, 1977).  Furthermore, heuristic decision-making can fall victim to various 
cognitive biases.  A time-constrained decision-maker is more likely to apply the sunk-
cost fallacy to previously made decisions or apply a confirmation bias to evidence 
validating that decision (Veltman, 2001). 
Thus, a pilot with a superior observational (level 1) SA and orientation (level 2) 
of his situation is likely to arrive at a decision sooner and with better quality inputs. 
Conversely, a pilot with poor SA would have poor performance unless the pilot realizes 
this (an act that would take a certain self-awareness) and takes corrective action (Endsley 
M. R., 1995a). Unless of course, the opposing pilot has even lower SA or the element of 
SA is irrelevant to the specific situation (Endsley M. R., 1993). 
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Humans are not apt at effectively reacting to random and unpredictable changes in 
their environment rapidly (Aretz, Guardino, Porterfield, & McClain, 1986). In an often-
changing and dynamic environment, the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining SA is far 
greater than in a more stable and static environment (Endsley M. R., 1995a).  Perfect 
situation awareness would naturally lead to superior decision making, yet obtaining 
perfect SA would require unlimited resources (Endsley M. R., 1988a).  While a common 
set of core SA elements exists across any mission set or any part of a particular mission 
(i.e. aircraft performance, navigation, or system status), the relative priority and 
immediacy (i.e. immediate, intermediate, or long-term) of these elements are  situation 
dependent (Endsley M. R., 1988a). The art of maintaining SA rests with the operator’s 
ability to direct finite attention resources at the appropriate cues, observations and related 
tasks (Adams & Pew, 1990).  This chore can become quite difficult if multiple high-
priority tasks are competing for attention. 
In order to mitigate demands for attention and SA, operators prioritize which 
elements of SA are most relevant to the situation at hand.  During a mission, pilots 
prioritize and re-prioritize where to devote finite resources as the mission evolves 
(McDaniel, 1996). Pilots flying basic missions require SA regarding systems health, fuel 
status, navigational position, other air traffic, weather, and airfield conditions, just to 
name a few.  If a pilot were flying a tactical mission, such as a formation low-level to an 
airdrop, then he requires SA on terrain and obstacle clearance, time status, airdrop 
parameters, formation position, and actions of the lead and following aircraft in addition 
to the aforementioned SA of a basic mission.  If this tactical mission were to occur in 
combat, then SA requirements would grow to include defensive systems status, surface-
 64 
 
to-air threat capabilities and locations, enemy disposition, and actions of applicable 
friendly and enemy forces.  In low-level flight terrain avoidance is the priority element of 
SA for the pilots, but may not be so for other aircrew members.  During a threat 
engagement, defeating the missile becomes the priority with the pilot de-prioritizing or 
ignoring many other elements of SA as his intention becomes focused on defending the 
aircraft. However if the pilot focuses too much of his attention on one element, he loses 
SA on other, often critical elements of SA.  The warning light may be ignored for a short 
while until the threat is defeated, but it may indicate an engine or other critical failure.  If 
a pilot loses SA about his terrain clearance or aircraft performance, then he may place the 
aircraft in an untenable situation or impact terrain.   
The importance of appropriate prioritization of attention resources to capture the 
most relevant SA cannot be overstated.  There are multiple documented cases of pilots 
defending against an enemy threat system only to collide with the ground, therefore doing 
the enemy’s job for them (Kuipers, Kappers, van Holten, van Bergen, & Gosterveld, 
1989; AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 2010; McCarthy, 1988). Many SA failures are caused by 
intentional attention shifts towards other factors that a pilot (erroneously) believes is 
more important due to a false or outdated mental model.  However, the process of 
prioritization requires an understanding of the “big picture” (Endsley M. R., 1999).  
Paradoxically, the pilot must have some overall SA in order to accurately spend attention 
resources to gain and maintain SA. 
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Team Situation Awareness 
Many tactical aircraft, such as the C-130, employ an aircrew team to accomplish 
the mission under the command of a pilot (as aircraft commander).  Even single-pilot 
fighter aircraft employ in formation under a flight lead.  Each member of the team has 
different SA priorities and responsibilities.  Priorities are divided amongst the team for 
specialization, but many tasks will necessarily overlap, and an individual’s SA is not 
neatly confined to just their specialization.  For instance, a pilot may be primarily 
concerned with aircraft performance parameters, formation position, and terrain 
clearance.  The navigator is primarily concerned with navigation, time status, and to some 
extent terrain clearance, but the pilot also shares these concerns to some degree.  A flight 
engineer may primarily concern himself with fuel status, system health, and 
troubleshooting any faults, yet he may also concern himself with terrain clearance and 
aircraft performance as it affects safety of flight (perhaps not to the same level of scrutiny 
as the pilot’s), and to an even lesser extent, processing navigator inputs.  However if there 
is a system fault, then both the engineer’s and pilot’s attention, and thus SA priority, may 
shift to resolving the dealing with the fault, while the copilot and navigator continue to 
fly the mission.  Thus, each member on the aircrew has overlapping areas of SA which 
contribute to a larger, shared team SA (Endsley M. R., 1995a). 
  However, SA is only as strong as the overlaps between required team members 
(Endsley M. R., 1995a).  While a navigator may not require SA on systems health, if that 
navigator had perfect positional SA that was never shared with the pilot, then the pilot is 
still lost.  In another situation one operator may have a critical piece of information (i.e. 
the navigator is the only person who can see the weather radar, or the pilot and copilot 
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have different displays presented at the time) which must be relayed to other relevant 
crew members. The process of relaying information to build team cohesion and SA is 
complex and partially captured in Crew Resource Management (CRM) training.   
The systems designer can significantly change the quantity and quality of 
information sharing in the cockpit or between aircraft.  Mosier and Chidester (1991) 
found that better performing teams actually communicated less than poorer performing 
teams, alluding to an efficiency of communication and group dynamics.  Efficient 
communications result in a much higher signal-to-noise ratio; thus fewer words are 
needed to convey richer context.  One element unique to team SA is that individual 
members have different goals and motivations, as well as capacity to perform work 
(Tremblay, Breton, Vachon, & Allen, 2012).  While the nature of interpersonal 
interactions are complex and nearly impossible to predict, certain conclusions regarding 
team SA can be made.  It is tempting to assume that synergistic SA effects can be 
realized in team settings, but if all members of a team possess identical information, there 
is no net gain in Level 1 SA.  Indeed the shared mental model is distinct from the sum of 
its parts (Cooke, Stout, & Salas).  However, similar information may be present to 
multiple members of a team, but not fully realized (i.e. both pilots have access to 
identical flight instrumentation, but the pilot-not-flying recognizes and reports a deviation 
to the pilot-flying, thus improving his SA).  Ironically, the process of specialization and 
funneling information to the team can consequently degrade individual SA (Tremblay, 
Breton, Vachon, & Allen, 2012). 
Not all members of the team need to be human.  In a sense, automated and 
intelligent systems are part of a pilot’s team.  Just as levels of automation  (discussed 
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earlier) exert different levels of control, decision support automation can serve as an 
assistant, associate, or coach—even changing levels of support and control depending on 
the specific situation (Veltman, 2001).   
Measuring Situation Awareness 
Measuring total SA poses a conundrum.  At first glance measuring SA could be 
done with similar techniques to workload measurement: subjective questionnaires, asking 
a pilot in real-time during a simulation, and physiological measurements.  For instance, 
an electroencephalogram (EEG) can measure electrical brain activity or eye tracking can 
measures if the operator is looking in the right place, but a correlation to perception 
awareness (level 1) is difficult, while comprehension and projection (levels 2 and 3) are 
elusive (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995b).  That is, it may be possible to physiologically 
determine whether information is registered, but not possible to identify comprehension 
(Endsley M. R., 1995b).  Performance measurements are objective and easy to obtain, but 
their potential for dissociation, as described above, makes establishing a 
correlation/causation relationship difficult (Endsley M. R., 1995b).  An externally 
injected task could be used to evaluate SA in a controlled manner: a piece of information 
can be added or removed from an operator, and then both the response time and actions 
taken could be evaluated.  Conversely, any internal observation of deviations from 
prescribed parameters is a specific measure of performance, which has more significance 
than performance measured generically or on the whole. However, performance is highly 
variable and subject to several inputs in addition or not related to SA (Endsley M. R., 
1995b). 
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Questionnaires, while inexpensive and easy to use, are subject to more bias than 
workload measurements, since the experimenter is essentially asking the pilot not 
necessarily what he knew about his environment, but also how many unknowns remained 
unknown (Endsley M. R., 1995b).  The phrase “ignorance is bliss” rings true: a pilot who 
has low SA or lost SA may not realize he has done so until after the fact, if at all (Endsley 
M. R., 1988a).  This is especially true of self-assessments.  If a trial went well, that may 
influence a test subject to report favorable SA, which may or may not be the case.  
Subjects can show biases based on the weight of importance they place on different 
elements of SA (Endsley M. R., 1995b).  Subjective evaluation conducted after the 
experiment can be rationalized or generalized, thus resulting in inaccurate perceptions, 
especially as detail is lost of forgotten (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  However, 
questionnaires can be used objectively and compare perceived SA against measurable 
global data points (Hermann, 1984).  Automatic processing potentially masks reporting 
on comprehension of elements that exist in the operator’s subconscious (Endsley M. R., 
1995a).  Furthermore, SA itself is dynamic and complex involving so many factors that 
an overall assessment of low, medium, or high may be inappropriate.  Real-time 
questioning of a pilot’s SA state, or externally injected tasks, adds more workload and 
could artificially detract from the SA available (Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1995b). One 
subjective workload assessment was used to develop the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-
Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM).  During the AMRAAM Operational Utility Test 
(OUE), SA was self-evaluated by the test subjects and also by a trained observer 
(McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation, 1982).  However in a re-evaluation of the 
OUE data showed a suspected bias between good performance and subject-reported high 
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SA (Venturino, Hamilton, & Dverchak, 1989).  In a similar approach, a third party 
observer can independently rate the workload of a test subject.  While removing some of 
the biases associated with self-assessment techniques, the observer cannot determine the 
subject’s SA level unless some overt act, statement, or response from prompting occurs 
(Endsley M. R., 1995b).   
Another subjective method, the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) 
attempts to connect workload to SA by asking test subjects to rate the supply and demand 
relationship for attentional resources.  As such, a positive correlation has been shown 
between SART and performance measures (Selcon & Taylor, 1990).  SART is also 
highly correlated with subjective assessments of operator confidence levels (Endsley, 
Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998).  SART has 14 components relevant to pilot SA which 
are evaluated on bipolar scales in three categories: demand on operator resources, supply 
of resources, and understanding of the situation.  These categories are summed to provide 
an aggregate SART score (Selcon & Taylor, 1990; Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 
1998).  Thus SART includes a subjective workload assessment as well as an SA 
assessment.  While this linkage is handy, the subjective methodology of SART is 
susceptive to drawbacks commonly associated with subjective means, such as the 
“ignorance is bliss” fallacy(Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998).  Because of the 
combined scales, SART may not provide significant causality to explain the dissociation 
between workload and SA and may leave the experimenter wanting for more data 
(Endsley M. R., 1993; Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998; Selcon, Taylor, & 
Koritsas, 1991). 
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Endsley (1988a) developed an objective method of measuring situation awareness 
called the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT).  SAGAT has 
been used to study human-machine interfaces (Bolstad & Endsley, 1990; Northrop Corp, 
1988; Endsley M. R., 1988a; 1989; 1990a).  In SAGAT, pilots are asked to fly a mission 
scenario in a simulator. At random points in time the simulator is paused and display 
screens are blanked.  The pilot is then asked a series of questions regarding the situation 
at that instant. These questions cover both the immediate, short-term environment and 
elements requiring recall from earlier in the simulation. The process is repeated several 
times with a large question bank selected at random to sample along primary and less 
important elements of SA.  The pilot’s responses are compared to simulator data to 
evaluate his perception against reality(Endsley M. R., 1988a; 2000).  Because questions 
are asked as the simulation is paused, SAGAT is a low-intrusive form of evaluation that 
also samples in real-time without the loss of fidelity of a post-experiment questionnaire.  
The nature of the questions can also evaluate level 1, 2 or 3 SA (Endsley M. R., 2000).  
The stochastic time interval and sampling recall prevents the test subject from 
anticipating responses (Endsley M. R., 1995b). With a statistically significant pool of 
responses and computer-captured performance data, SAGAT becomes an objective 
method of SA evaluation. It addition to being an empirical analysis of existing 
prototypes, SAGAT has predictive validity (Endsley M. R., 1990a).  In a study of fighter 
cockpits comparing SART and SAGAT, it was found that there was no direct correlation 
in results between subjective SART scores and objective SAGAT results (Endsley, 
Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998).  For the same set of conditions, SART evaluations 
indicated higher SA for a given cockpit display, while SAGAT recorded mixed and lower 
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results for Level 1 SA.  In the same test, the new cockpit display showed higher Level 2 
and lower Level 3 SA for both means.  Overall, SART, particularly the “understanding” 
component, correlated well with simple subjective self-evaluations for both sufficiency 
and confidence level.  All SART components were inter-correlated with each other.  Of 
the 13 variables collected during the SAGAT analysis of this experiment, each variable 
was found to be independent, which led the investigators to conclude that compiling a 
total SA score was not of particular value.  Because of this, no clear relationship between 
independent SAGAT variables and the SART rating could be identified.  However, the 
authors found that, despite the lack of correlation, SART was particularly useful for 
determining an overall SA score and would be useful in real-life flight testing, where 
SAGAT could be used to diagnose and detail specific effects at the human-machine 
interface (Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998). 
SAGAT has also been applied to human performance modeling (Plott, Endsley, & 
Strater, 2004).  The SAGAT scoring method was incorporated into a task network for a 
battle station in a future ship design. The task network in question was written to store 
SA-related variables as a reflection of operator working memory.  Various parameters 
were devised as contributing towards SA based on SAGAT questions, and these 
parameters could compose a total SA score.  Because it is a simulation, the simulated 
operator had perfect memory and committed no errors, thus representing a best-case 
scenario(Plott, Endsley, & Strater, 2004). 
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Description of C-130H and C-130J Aircraft 
The C-130H is an upgraded iteration of the C-130E aircraft produced through the 
1960s.  Within the C-130H fleet (produced since 1974) are several sub-variants, known 
as C-130H1, H2, and H3. The C-130H (all sub-variants) requires a basic crew of five: 
aircraft commander (pilot), copilot, navigator, flight engineer, and loadmaster (U.S. Air 
Force, 2003).  The aircraft commander must be a pilot, but may sit in either the left (pilot) 
or right (copilot) seat.  Duties and responsibilities for each crew position are described in 
Chapter 3.  For most tactical missions, a second loadmaster is added to bring the typical 
combat crew compliment to six (AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3, 2010). 
The C-130J, which entered the USAF inventory in 1999, while bearing a similar 
external appearance to the C-130H, features such significant design changes that it is 
considered a different Mission Design Series (MDS) with a separate training and 
qualification program.  The C-130J is a clean break from the iterative C-130 evolution, 
hence the “legacy” moniker applied to the A/B/E/H variants (Musser, 2013).  Modern 
avionics and enhanced automation reduce the crew compliment to three: aircraft 
commander (pilot), copilot, and loadmaster (AFI 11-2C-130J, Vol 3, 2009; TO 1C-130J-
1, 2009).  Just like the C-130H, a typical combat crew adds a second loadmaster (AFI 11-
2C-130J, Vol 3, 2009).  Early operational experience shows the C-130J has an increased 
mission capable rate (93.9% versus 75%) and a reduced preflight time compared to the 
C-130H (Lockheed-Martin, 2005; Burgess, 2005; Oviedo, 2005). 
The C-130J features some performance upgrades: a more efficient propeller, more 
powerful engine, and a Full Authority Digital Engine Controller (FADEC) which can 
command an automatic engine shutdown and/or automatically feather the propellers (TO 
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1C-130J-1, 2009).  However, most of the improvement and upgrades to the C-130J are 
modern avionics.  The C-130J features full color multifunction displays (MFDs), a heads-
up display (HUD), a digital moving map, and integrated threat warning and systems 
monitoring features.  The addition of autothrottles and an improved autopilot allows for 
autopilot-coupled formation flying.  This represents an entirely new cockpit and a radical 
departure from legacy cockpit design.  Conversely, the C-130H features several 
incremental upgrades to avionics subsystems, but still relies heavily on analog gauges.  
For a more detailed qualitative analysis of the C-130 series, refer to Appendix A: 
Description of C-130 Aircraft. 
The two-pilot C-130J was anecdotally assessed by one officer to be 90% as 
capable as the C-130H with the autopilot-coupled SKE formation able to best take 
advantage of the advanced avionics (Burgess, 2005).  Specifically threat detection and 
communications under high workload were considered the most significant limitations to 
a two-person cockpit (Burgess, 2005).  In complex integrated combat environments, all 
aircraft radios are pressed into service, however each person can only effectively manage 
(transmit and receive) on one radio at a time.  Because Pilot SA is built both visually and 
through radio communications, there is a higher possibility of important missed 
communications on smaller aircrews (Burgess, 2005). 
On complex missions, such as an airdrop utilizing the Joint Precision Airdrop 
System (JPADS), another pilot or even a “legacy” navigator must be added to the C-130J  
to operate specific mission equipment (AFI 11-2C-130J, Vol 3, 2009; Hendrickson, 
2008). Adding an additional crew member is not uncommon, as can be seen in 
contingency C-17 operations for both task distribution, ground operations safety, 
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operating extra command and control communications equipment, traffic, and threat 
scanning (Brockman, 2010).  Augmenting a basic combat crew adds extra sets of eyes to 
scan for surface-to-air and air-to-air threats.  This lookout doctrine is highly emphasized 
in the tactical airlift community and involves each member of the crew, including the 
loadmaster.  Thus, because a scanner cannot see in all places at all times, having fewer 
scanners increases the possibility of missing threats, especially when other cockpit tasks 
must be performed (Burgess, 2005). 
Discrete-Event Simulation 
Discrete-event simulation (DES) is a software-driven tool that can analytically 
predict outcomes, or improve existing task flows without requiring the expense or 
existence of an operational prototype (Rusnock & Geiger, 2013; Mitchell, 2000).  
Because of its empirical nature, DES can corroborate other methods of workload 
measurement (Mitchell, 2000).  Instead of a perfectly continuous simulation, DES runs 
many activity-based discrete time increments and calculates an output for each time step.  
Furthermore DES can be dynamic and stochastic, allowing real-world randomness to be 
simulated and dynamic decision pathways to emerge based on different input or 
stochastic conditions.   In human performance modeling, DES is used to evaluate the 
interaction between human operators and machines, especially in measuring mental 
workload (Rusnock & Geiger, 2013). 
The programmer first defines a mission model from a task network, which 
includes all mission tasks in sequence.  Each task has an assigned operator, finite 
execution time distribution (a stochastic variable), and workload demand values assigned 
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to it. From this completed task network, DES can compute a time-based workload score.  
By applying relevant capacity theory and a defined operator capacity, and the overload 
conditions can be determined.   This experienced workload dynamically correlates to a 
predictive human performance value.  When a prototype becomes available for testing, 
the DES results can be reproduced and the DES validated against conventional workload 
measurements. 
IMPRINT (Improved Performance Research Integration Tool) is DES software 
created after merging the functionality of several earlier software tools (WinCrew, MAN-
SEVAL, and CREWCUT) developed by the Army Research Laboratory and is now the 
primary human performance modeling tool for the US Army (Mitchell, 2000; Cassenti, 
Kelley, & Carlson, 2010).  In the IMPRINT software, a modified VACP scoring 
methodology is used (Table 5). Incremental and task workloads are scored with 
cumulative VACP scores (i.e. a task can have any combination of Visual, Auditory, 
Cognitive, etc components). Total workload is calculated by summing the workload 
values for each discrete task and across all tasks performed simultaneously.  In addition 
to computing a time-distributed workload value, IMPRINT can include a multitude of 
user-defined variables that allow for model randomness over multiple runs.  The 
programmer can code different decision pathways to dynamically change the critical path 
based on defined release conditions.  
Table 5: IMPRINT VACP Values (Mitchell, 2000; Alion Science, 2013) 
Scale 
Values  Descriptors 
  Visual 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Visually Register/Detect occurrence of image 
 76 
 
5.0 Discriminate symbols, numbers, words 
3.0 Visually inspect/check (discrete inspection/static condition) 
4.0 Visually locate/align (selective orientation) 
4.4 Visually track/follow 
5.1 Read (symbol) 
6.0 Visually scan/search/monitor (continuous/serial inspection) 
  Auditory 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Detect occurrence of sound 
2.0 Orient to sound (general orientation/attention) 
4.2 Orient to sound (selective orientation/attention) 
4.3 Verify auditory feedback (detect occurrence of anticipated sound) 
3.0 Interpret semantic content (Speech) Simple (1-2 Words) 
6.0 Interpret semantic content (Speech) Complex (sentence) 
6.6 Discriminate sound characteristics (detect auditory difference) 
7.0 Interpret sound patterns (pulse rates, etc) 
  Cognitive 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Automatic (simple association) 
1.2 Alternative selection 
4.6 Evaluation (consider single aspect) 
5.0 Rehearsal 
5.3 Encoding/decoding, recall 
6.8 Evaluation (considering several aspects) 
7.0 Estimation, calculation, conversion 
  Fine Motor 
0.0 No activity 
2.2 Discrete actuation (button, toggle, trigger) 
2.6 Continuous adjustive (fight controls, sensor controls, etc) 
4.6 Manual (tracking) 
5.5 Discrete adjustive (variable dial, etc) 
6.5 Symbolic production (writing) 
7.0 Serial discrete manipulation (keyboard entries) 
  Gross Motor 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Walking on level terrain 
2.0 Walking on uneven terrain 
3.0 Jogging on level terrain 
3.5 Heavy lifting 
5.0 Jogging on uneven terrain 
6.0 Complex Climbing 
  Tactile 
0.0 No activity 
1.0 Alerting 
2.0 Simple Discrimination 
3.0 Complex symbolic information 
  Speech 
0.0 No activity 
2.0 Simple (1-2 words) 
4.0 Complex (sentence) 
 
 77 
 
Algorithms embedded in IMPRINT allow for limited human performance 
measurements primarily based on total workload: time to complete a task, likelihood of 
task success, accuracy penalties, and task initiation time delays.  These performance 
measurements show the effect of Wickens’ Multiple Resource Theory, therefore 
conflicting channels will have different impacts to operator workload and performance 
than tasks that do not cause channel conflicts (Alion Science, 2013; Cassenti, Kelley, & 
Carlson, 2010; Mitchell, 2000).  Operator capacities and overload threshold can be user-
defined, and stressors, such as fatigue, environmental conditions, night vision goggle 
usage, or personal equipment (i.e. chemical warfare gear) can be included to further 
affect capacity.  Finally, the programmer can chose to employ and compare workload 
strategies for each operator for the duration of the model.  Strategy application and 
performance degradation do not have to wait until the operator is overloaded, but can be 
determined as the workload increases prior to overload (Cassenti, Kelley, & Carlson, 
2010). 
Another workload-performance DES is The Workload Index (W/INDEX).  Like 
IMPRINT, it allows a crew station designer evaluate the workload design of a crew 
station layout or procedure.  W/INDEX also made its debut during the Army’s LHX 
scout helicopter in 1983, but was also applied to the Advanced Tactical Fighter and the 
National Aerospace Plane.  It computes total workload by summing discrete tasks along 
the course of a mission profile in a subroutine called the Interface/Activity Matrix.  
However, while IMPRINT calculates workload anytime a task is started or stopped 
(therefore there could be dozens or hundreds of workload calculations per second if the 
task network is complex), W/INDEX displays a five second running average of workload 
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from half-second discrete time iterations.  W/INDEX uses a scale resembling VACP: 
visual, auditory, manual, and verbal with values being assigned on a 1-5 integer scale 
based on the perceived attentional demand.  However, while IMPRINT assigns 
descriptors to VACP values, the W/INDEX values are definition-less and arbitrarily 
assigned by the programmer.  Just like IMPRINT, W/INDEX applies Wickens’ Multiple 
Resource Theory and attention-channel conflict penalties to the performance output 
(North & Riley, 1989).   
Because IMPRINT allows user-defined code and macros, further refinements in 
performance measurements can be made.   Cassenti and Kelley (2006) experimented with 
effects on performance when multiple simultaneous tasks are performed.  Their 
experiment showed that increased workload has a predictive impact on performance 
similar to the arousal and performance-resource function described in Figure 1 and Figure 
2 (Cassenti & Kelley, 2006).  Interestingly, IMPRINT predicted lower performance for 
low workload conditions, presumably showing an underload condition (Cassenti & 
Kelley, 2006; Cassenti, Kelley, & Carlson, 2010).  In another study, a simple evaluation 
or judgment task was set before a group of test subjects and the measured error rate was 
compared against the predictive IMPRINT performance for the same modeled task.  
While the task itself was of constant difficulty, time pressure was varied to affect 
experienced workload.  The task was changed for each experiment to evaluate correlation 
between different cognitive task loads: alternative selection, signal detection, simple and 
complex evaluations.   
One of the earliest applications of IMPRINT for human performance and 
workload modeling was for the Army’s Light Helicopter (LHX) development in the 
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1980s (McCracken & Aldrich, 1984).  IMPRINT’s predictive utility was also used to 
design crew station on the UH-60 helicopter (Bierbaum, Szabo, & Aldrich, 1989).  The 
recent ascendency of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and remotely piloted aircraft 
(RPAs) has drawn considerable attention to pilot workload.  While highly automated in 
basic flight, their mission—predominately Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR)—is highly dynamic and can quickly potentially overload operators when engaged 
in real-time tracking. In several feasibility studies, workload from the control of a system 
of single or multiple RPAs was studied using IMPRINT (Colombi, Miller, Schneider, 
McGrogan, Long, & Plaga, 2011; Hunn, 2006; Hunn & Heuckeroth, 2006; Hunn, 
Schweitzer, Cahir, & Finch, 2008; Pomranky, 2006; Pomranky & Wojciechowski, 
2007)(Scheider & McGrogan, 2011; Wickens, Dixon, & Chang, 2003).  IMPRINT has 
also been used to evaluate robotic systems (Harriott, Zhang, & Adams, 2010; 2011; 
Harriott, Zhuang, Adams, & DeLoach, 2012; Cosenzo, Parasuraman, Novak, & Barnes, 
2006), vehicles (Wojciechowski, 2006; Mao, Xie, Hu, & Su, 2013), and other systems.  
In an intelligence-related simulation, IMPRINT was shown to have good correlation of 
experienced workload with the NASA-TLX evaluation and a better correlation than 
physiological measurements such as EEG, mean flow velocity, and others (Rusnock & 
Geiger, 2013). 
The C-130J has also been analyzed with IMPRINT.  A sample single-aircraft 
airdrop mission was created using basic functions and modeled both the pilot and copilot.  
These functions included navigation to initial point (IP), navigation to the drop zone 
(DZ), the airdrop, and flying away from the DZ, along with sample communication tasks. 
The construction of the task network was derived from phone calls to and observations of 
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USAF C-130J units. Snapshots were used to capture data throughout the mission, such as 
periodic workload values and time spent heads-up versus heads-down (LaVine, 2010).  
This simulation showed during the baseline experiment that the pilot-flying spent 43% 
head’s down managing tasks and 57% head’s up ostensibly flying and observing, while 
the pilot-monitoring (the pilot not flying the aircraft) spend 25% heads-down, 41% heads 
up, and 34% unaccounted for or untasked.  The workload graph depicted a sine wave of 
workload for both the pilot and copilot.  This sine function increments up or down as a 
bloc when the mission moves into the next phase.  While IMPRINT uses a default 
overload condition of 60 dimensionless workload units, the wave amplitude routinely 
exceeds 30 units, and the maximum observed workload value (at the airdrop release) 
exceeds 220 units (LaVine, 2010). 
The next variation of this experiment had the simulated aircrew fly the same 
profile, but a change in drop zone must be programmed into the computer at 8 minutes 
into the simulation.  Another iteration introduced a pop-up restricted operating zone 
(ROZ) that the aircrew must avoid.  Since the pilot monitoring manipulates the computer, 
his workload increases considerably during the data entry phase.  Part of this workload 
increase was the requirement for the pilot monitoring to make an adjustment to a laptop 
computer to display special use airspace, which drove more heads-down time.  The 
experiment was run once again with a hypothetical digital moving map that negated the 
need for a laptop, which resulted in less workload to plot the ROZ and manipulate the 
navigation solution.  In this experiment, IMPRINT proved the value in adding a digital 
moving map display to the C-130J (LaVine, 2010). 
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Summary 
Human performance in aviation is a complex phenomenon.  Performance may be 
simply the ability to maintain certain parameters or successful task completion.  
However, performance is often more nuanced and complex: incorporating proper 
decision making and building situation awareness (SA). Fundamental to performance in 
complex, changing, unpredictable, and lethal tactical environments is decision 
superiority.  The pilot who can make better decisions, faster than his opponent, will likely 
win an engagement, best described by Boyd’s OODA loop. Essential to continued 
decision superiority is SA and having timely and proper feedback.  Because SA 
underpins decision making and actions taken, it is the ultimate currency for performance 
in tactical aviation. 
The relationship between workload and performance is well understood.  Human 
performance modeling using discrete-event simulation has proven useful to predict 
workload, especially in systems where a prototype does not yet exist.  While it’s possible 
to map a task network into DES during the design phase, if done early, the simulation 
results lack resolution.  Furthermore, workload stems not just from overt cockpit tasks, 
but from activities that are not strictly contained within a checklist: operational tactics 
and procedures, maneuvering, communication, and SA building all require cognitive 
resources.   
Specifically, the connection between workload and SA, while variable and 
dissociative, is not quantifiable in the design phase.  Yet, if SA is the ultimate commodity 
to tactical aviation, how does an engineer design a cockpit to assure maximum potential 
SA?  Furthermore, with the incorporation of modern glass cockpits providing more 
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information to aircrews and taking over larger shares of cockpit duties, how does the 
tactical aviator remain in the most optimal level of control instead of becoming 
complacent and outvoted by the machine he flies? Plott, et. al (2004) may have been the 
first to attempt to predict potential SA using DES, but to date, no known attempt has been 
made to deterministically determine SA from both the tasks that create SA and the 
workload levels that reduce it. 
Finally, the C-130, an oft-overlooked workhorse, is at a unique juncture.  
Research on aircrew workload, SA, automation, and cockpit design typically focus on 
commercial aviation or single-seat fighters, yet the C-130 is not fully airliner, nor fighter.  
The ongoing transition of the USAF from the legacy C-130H, one of the last aircraft with 
a flight engineer and a navigator, to the modern C-130J operating with a cockpit crew of 
two pilots, provides a glimpse of how drastically automation has redefined aircrew roles.  
This is a perfect opportunity to contrast a highly automated system with one that 
emphasizes manual operation in a tactical mission profile. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
In order toevaluate the impact of automation on aircrew workload and situation 
awareness, two representative mission scenarios were chosen that adequately reflect the 
flight qualities of the C-130H and C-130J as currently employed.  First, a task analysis 
elicits operators, task flows, and various decision points in order to construct a complete 
task network for each scenario. These task networks were modeled using the Improved 
Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT), a discrete event simulation (DES) 
software tool.  After model creation, the scenario simulations are run through IMPRINT, 
which output a time-dependent distributions for workload, situation awareness, and the 
relationship between the two. From these distributions, a qualitative analysis of the data, 
specifically describing workload “peaks” (i.e. abover normal workload variations) and 
general characteristics about SA can be made.  Running multiple iterations through a t-
test can tell us if the data is statistically significant in order to quantitatively answer our 
investigative questions.  
Phase I: Task Analysis 
The C-130 was chosen as the candidate platform for this experiment because of 
the author’s familiarity with the airframe, cockpit variations, and simultaneous 
employment in the Air Force for identical missions between the legacy C-130H and the 
C-130J.  Being a versatile tactical airlift platform, the C-130 has a wide variety of 
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mission sets that it is capable of performing.  In virtually all missions currently 
employing a legacy C-130, either a C-130J is replacing the legacy platform or is planned 
to replace the legacy in the future.   
For the purpose of this thesis, it would be impractical to study a side-by-side 
comparison of every mission set and special variant of the C-130 family.  Furthermore, it 
would certainly be impossible to conceive and simulate every possible variation and 
scenario facing the aircrew.  Thus, representative mission scenarios depicting a “typical” 
C-130 mission that depicts the differences in cockpit tasks were chosen.  Two tactical 
airlift-unique mission sets stood out: formation airdrop and airland with maximum 
effort/assault procedures.  Both missions encapsulate a significant percentage of tactical 
training time spent by Air Force C-130 aircrews.  
Formation airdrop in inclement weather by use of station keeping equipment 
(SKE) exploits the difference in tasks associated with a pilot manually flying a formation 
position while simultaneously sending commands via push-button (C-130H) versus 
automatic formation position maintenance and control (C-130J).  Maximum effort/assault 
airland demonstrates the unique capability of the C-130 and procedures to utilize austere 
and short airfields as well as the workload required to calculate tactical approach 
parameters and manage aircraft energy during the approach. 
First, two representative mission scenarios were scripted: formation SKE airdrop, 
and single-aircraft maximum effort landing.  Each of these mission scenarios ran parallel 
to a baseline function, “Basic Aircraft Control,” which contained the most common tasks 
related to flying the C-130: manipulating the flight controls, scanning instruments and 
systems, routine navigation and formation position maintenance, scanning for enemy 
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threats, listening to radios, etc.  A task analysis initially written in narrative form was 
diagrammed via UML activity diagrams (Appendix E: UML Activity Diagrams).  This 
task analysis identified several operators, who are internal to the system, as well as 
external actors that influence the system.  From this, task flows between the actors are 
identified, and some decision points can be established.  Thus, a full task network formed 
for each scenario.  Some of these decision points are: 
• Is the aircraft below 10,000 feet? (Can the cabin be depressurized) 
• Is the aircraft in a safe position to drop? 
• Has the aircraft been cleared to drop? 
• Has the aircraft been cleared to land? 
• Has the aircraft met all drop “contracts?” 
• Is the aircraft below design limit speeds for flaps, landing gear, or doors? 
• Is the aircraft in visual or instrument meteorological conditions? 
• System malfunction (either induced or random) 
• Surface-to-air threat engagement 
Operators simulated in each model are the cockpit crew (Pilot, Copilot, Flight 
Engineer, and Navigator for C-130H and the Pilot and Copilot for C-130J).  The Drop 
Zone (DZ) Controller, Air Traffic Control (ATC), Loadmaster, and Formation Leader are 
selectively modeled as external actors.  Actions of external actors are only pertinent 
where they initiate a task performed by an operator. Externally initiating tasks is 
important to show how tasks must be delayed for an external event (i.e. being cleared by 
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ATC to land or a command from the formation lead) or aircraft transit time (the Pilot 
cannot descend the aircraft until it arrives at the descent point). 
The primary task flow is derived from applicable checklists in TO 1C-130H-1 and 
TO 1C-130J-1.  These checklists were the basis for the critical path tasks as it related to a 
verbal challenge-response and cockpit switch actuation.  Checklists were written for 
flight deck aircrew, which conveniently provided a break point for operator-external actor 
interaction. Using AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H and AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, a time-sequenced 
mission flow identifies significant events in timeline format.  This flow also identified 
which tasks could be performed in parallel to the critical path and releases for tasks in the 
critical path.  The aircraft operating procedures provided required employment 
procedures, commands, and procedures not explained in the flight manuals or tactics 
publications.  Finally, in addition to the author, four subject matter experts with 
experience flying each mission scenario (in both C-130H and C-130J) provided a context 
to stitch together tasks gleaned from each publication. 
Phase II: Build Baseline Simulation Model 
This task network is modeled in the discrete event simulation software, IMPRINT 
produced by Alion Science and Technology Corporation for the Army Research 
Laboratory.  Designed as a product for the Army, IMPRINT has three related categories 
of actors, each with their own traits and analyses: Operators, Maintainers, and 
Supply/Support.  However, only the Operators are applicable to this investigation.  The 
cockpit crew represents the actors internal to the system.  In the C-130J, this is the Pilot 
and Copilot, while in the C-130H, this is the Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, and Engineer.   
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In this study, the Pilot (C-130H and C-130J) acts as aircraft commander, flies the 
aircraft, initiates most checklists, and talks on the radio assigned to the formation 
frequency.  The Copilot monitors the Pilot’s flying performance, to include basic 
navigation and formation positioning.  The Copilot manages radio assignments, 
manipulates SKE parameters, actuates the landing gear and flaps, and, in the C-130J, 
program and manipulates the navigation solution and troubleshooting through the 
Communication/Navigation/Identification-Management Unit (CNI-MU).  The C-130H 
Navigator computes the airdrop release point, relays station keeping equipment (SKE) 
commands in conjunction with the Pilot, navigates the airplane (including maintaining an 
on-time status), initiates airdrop checklists, and manages the defensive systems.  The 
Engineer is primarily responsible for monitoring aircraft systems health, troubleshooting 
malfunctions, preflight inspections, calculating takeoff and landing data (TOLD), and 
ensuring checklist completion. Each crew position assumes several overlapping roles that 
are not annotated in checklists or technical orders: threat scanning, basic navigation, 
monitoring aircraft performance, and ensuring safe operating parameters.  Generic duties 
are described in (Table 6).  Tasks performed by the C-130H Navigator and Engineer 
typically are assumed by C-130J avionics with data entry provided by non-flying pilot(s).  
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Table 6: C-130H & C-130J Sample Allocation of Tasks 
Observe weather radar
Monitor ACAWS/systems advisories
***Make changes/update navigation system
Observe weather radar
Monitor ACAWS/systems advisories
Read Checklists
***Troubleshoot system malfunctions
Navigate (observe heading, crosstrack, distance 
remaining, ground speed, calculate time status, 
read chart, ensure terrain clearance)
***Make changes/update navigation system Key
Observe weather radar *Formation Only
Listen to radios
**Applicable in Visual Meterological Conditions 
(VMC) only   
***Direct Pilot corrections ***Applicable only as needed
Scan for threats (look outside**, listen to RWR)
***Call for threat/monitor safety of flight
Monitor aircraft performance (observe attitude, 
altitude, speed parameters)
Monitor systems health (engine, props, electrical, 
fuel, hydraulics, pressurization, etc)
***Troubleshoot system malfunctions
**Scan for threats (look outside) 
***Call for threat/monitor safety of flight
***Direct pilot corrections
Read checklists
***Direct pilot corrections
Manipulate SKE settings
N
av
ig
at
or
En
gi
ne
er
Basic Aircraft Control Tasks
C-130J
Scan for threats (look outside**, listen to Radar Warning Receiver)
***React to threat (call for threat/maneuver)
Co
pi
lo
t
Monitor aircraft performance (observe attitude, altitude, speed parameters)
Co
pi
lo
t
Navigate (observe heading, crosstrack, distance remaining, ground speed, calculate time status, read 
chart, ensure terrain clearance)
Listen to radios
*Monitor formation position (observe position parameters, calculate closure velocity and pursuit 
Scan for threats (look outside**, listen to Radar Warning Receiver)
***Call for threat/monitor safety of flight
C-130H
Pi
lo
t
Actuated flight controls (control yoke, throttles, rudder pedals)
Pi
lo
t
Call for checklists
Taxi aircraft (on ground)
Monitor aircraft performance (observe attitude, altitude, speed parameters)
Monitor navigation (observe heading, crosstrack, distance remaining, ground speed, calculate time 
status, read diagram, ensure terrain clearance)
Listen (radios and aircrew inputs)
*Monitor formation position (observe position parameters, closure velocity and pursuit curve)
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Tasks assigned to internal actors have task durations and workload values because 
they are of primary interest to the analysis.  External actors, such as the Loadmaster, Air 
Traffic Control, Drop Zone Controller, and Formation Lead aircraft are only modeled to 
show interactions and control the release conditions of tasks assigned to internal actors.  
External actor tasks do not have a workload value and only have task durations where 
necessary.  Internal actors each have a programmed workload threshold.  Their capacity 
for work can further be modified through IMPRINT by adding environmental stressors 
such as heat, cold, chemical warfare gear, and night vision goggles, however these 
modifications are beyond the scope of the current research effort. 
A separate Operations Model was constructed for each scenario and as a test bed 
for basic aircraft control.  A model begins with a “START” task and ends with a model 
“END” task.  When a simulation runs, an entity is created and flows through the task 
network until it reaches the model end node.  In order to control large quantities of tasks, 
IMPRINT allows the modeler to nest subtasks into a larger function.  Each function has 
its own start and end nodes.  For both scenarios, each checklist was modeled as a separate 
function.  Some complex task series, such as formation turns and descents, basic aircraft 
control and checklist steps with sub-tasks, are modeled as their own functions or sub-
functions. Each major function for both aircraft and both scenarios are found in Appendix 
F: IMPRINT Task Networks. 
A task begins when any entity reaches the task and a release condition is satisfied.  
This release condition is defaulted to start the task as soon as an entity reaches it, but it 
can be programmed in C# code.  This C# code can release a task based on simulation 
clock time, Boolean logic, or other programmable variables. Because any entity can start 
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the task as soon as the release condition is true, a task can be performed multiple times or 
simultaneously with other tasks. 
As a task is released, it has beginning and ending effects defined in C#, time 
distribution, workload values, and decision paths.  The task duration can be expressed as 
a constant number, C# expression, or one of many possible distribution functions.  To aid 
the programmer, IMPRINT also provides “micromodels” or algorithms of sample task 
durations for very simple task (i.e. look at item inside a field of view or read a set number 
of words).  The micromodel can then be used to stitch together multiple motor and 
cognitive actions and applied to time distribution.  Most task durations in this analysis are 
calculated using rectangular distributions using the micromodel-provided time as the 
mean value and an estimated range. Once a task is released, the beginning conditions are 
applied, the task duration is then executed, and finally any ending conditions are run. 
After a task is completed it uses a decision path to lead to another task.  These 
decision paths can be a single path, multiple (parallel) paths, tactical, or decision paths.  
A single path simply moves entities from the current task to the next one.  Multiple paths 
split the entity into parallel processes.  Tactical decisions release the entity to any of 
several follow-on tasks based on Boolean logic.  Probabilistic decisions route the entity to 
one of several tasks based on a user-defined probabilities.  However, in order to control 
the amount of entities flowing through the model, not all tasks included an exit path.  
Entry pathways and release conditions were coded such that critical path tasks only ran 
once (and when all pre-requisite conditions were met) and all repetitive tasks run an 
appropriate number of times.   
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The task network must be carefully controlled so that each operator only performs 
a reasonable number of tasks (generally 3 or less) at any given time. Thus, the task 
network is structured to show the operator cycling between several tasks instead of 
performing them all in parallel.  For instance, to fly the aircraft, the Pilot must monitor 
several performance parameters, listen to the radio, and operate the throttles and flight 
controls.  Instead of having the Pilot scan all his instruments simultaneously, each 
instrument is scanned individually in a cycle with more viewing time devoted to more 
important instruments.  This greatly reduces repetitive tasks involved with basic aircraft 
control. 
Each task performed by an internal actor (Pilot, Copilot, Navigator or Engineer) 
requires a task workload value.  IMPRINT uses multiple resource theory and the VACP 
model of workload assignment.  These mental resources are divided into seven channels: 
visual, auditory, cognitive, tactile, fine motor, gross motor, and speech.  The assignment 
of resource channels is handled through the use of resource-interface pairs.  Resources 
are VACP-resource channels while interfaces are user-defined areas of the cockpit.  A 
given interface can utilize multiple resource channels and the modeler can assign any 
number of resource channels to a given interface (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: RI Pairing for C-130H 
The interfaces programmed for this analysis break down separate physical areas that are 
either not in the same field of view or are manipulated differently.  A brief explanation of 
each interface follows: 
Control Yoke: operated by the Pilot’s left hand or the Copilot’s right hand.  It is 
used for pitch and roll inputs and radio/intercom transmissions from the pilots. 
CrewStation: generic IMPRINT interface.  This is used for tasks that do not fit 
neatly into one of the other interfaces such as note-taking, map reading, checklist usage, 
etc.  Sometimes this interface is used to simulate the center pedestal. 
Engine Instruments: center engine instrument stack on C-130H or on one of the 
C-130J multifunction displays.  It is used by the Pilot, Copilot, and Engineer (C-130H 
only). 
• Instrument Panel: Flight instruments located directly in front of the operator’s 
seat. 
• Intercom/Radio: Operator’s microphone, headphones, and microphone switch. 
Since the pilots have microphone switch on the Control Yoke, their R-I pairing is 
split between the Control Yoke and Intercom/Radio.  Note: the Engineer and 
Navigator (C-130H only) have pushbutton switches on their intercom cord and 
foot switches located in the floor. 
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• Nav Station: Primary interface for the Navigator (C-130H only) that cannot be 
reached by any other operator. 
• Overhead Panel: panel mounted directly over the heads of the Pilot, Copilot and 
Engineer.  Operated by the Engineer on the C-130H and the pilots on the C-130J. 
• Rudders:  floor-mounted panels operated by the pilots’ feet to control yaw. 
• SCNS: represent the navigation computer on the C-130H or the CNI-MU on the 
C-130J. 
• Side Panel: represents all switches, circuit breakers, and indicators on the Pilot’s 
left side or Copilot’s right side.  Also represents the SKE control panel on the C-
130H. 
• Throttles: operated by the Pilot’s right hand or Copilot’s left hand. 
• Window: represents all tasks involving looking out of the cockpit windows or the 
C-130J Heads Up Display. 
Consistent with Wickens’ multiple resource theory, IMPRINT takes the resource-
interface pairing assigned to each task and determines if a conflict in channels occurs 
when the simulation is run.  IMPRINT can output a report that shows which channels 
conflict when, how many times, and a value showing the intensity of the conflict.  This 
conflict value assigned by IMPRINT adds a workload penalty, which may induce a 
workload strategy. 
Finally, as each scenario is constructed, the task flow is reviewed against the 
checklists, technical orders, regulations, and tactics that created the initial task analysis.  
For many task sequences, there are multiple ways in which a task is prompted or released 
in the real world: a proactive operator, a checklist reminder, or audible cue from the 
radio, aircraft, or other operator.  The simulation is run to identify timing problems (i.e. 
tasks released prematurely or not at all), and eliminate instances where tasks are run too 
many times.   
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Perhaps the most significant challenge in ensuring a valid model involved 
assigning time durations to each task.  The micromodels help calculate time involved in 
looking or pushing a button, but less precise actions, such as verbal responses, 
calculations, and radio calls could only be approximated reasonably.  Most tasks used a 
rectangular distribution to capture a range of possible task times to be sampled randomly 
by the simulation. However, the model could not easily demonstrate random hesitation 
between task completion and the release of the next task.  Scenario delays, such as 
aircraft transit time to a geographic point, could be expressed mathematically, but non-
overloaded human operators are assumed to initiate the next task as soon as the previous 
task is complete and release conditions satisfied.  This works reasonably well for 
completing steps in a checklist, but less so for checklist initiation and briefings (which 
may be completed prior to initiating a checklist or in the course of accomplishing the 
checklist).  In those instances, a random delay variable was built into the release 
conditions to allow task initiation within a reasonable time window.  While the author’s 
own experience flying similar missions provides the bulk of subject matter expertise, 
other C-130 aviators were consulted to validate the procedures that constitute the task 
network.    
Phase III: Perform Simulated Experiments 
The IMPRINT experiments are designed to answer the investigative questions 
from Chapter 1, namely measuring workload and situation awareness (SA). The 
experimental design is a 2x2 factorial design, with the independent variables consisting 
of the two scenarios and two cockpit configurations (aircraft).  The scenario dictates 
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profile parameters (altitudes, distances, and turns) as well as checklists used (landing 
verses airdrop checklists). Automation usage is dependent on the aircraft being used (C-
130J using more automation than the C-130H) and on the scenario.  Workload values 
depend on the task network, which is directly dependent on both scenario and cockpit 
configuration.  SA is dependent on workload and the activities in the task network.  By 
directly comparing the C-130H and C-130J in the same scenario, then using the 
IMPRINT workload output, we can measure how automation affects workload during 
SKE formation airdrop and airland missions (investigative question #1 and 3).  Using the 
novel SA algorithm (described below) to calculate SA in the simulation we can answer 
IQ #2 and 4: How does automation affect aircrew situation awareness (SA) during SKE 
formation airdrop/airland missions?   
The first scenario is a SKE formation to a personnel airdrop (Formation Airdrop), 
and the second scenario is a single-aircraft airland to a landing zone (LZ) using maximum 
effort procedures (Airland).  Each of these scenarios are classic examples of typical C-
130 training or combat missions.  While each scenario involves a different task network, 
each shares a common set of assumptions and variables.  Each scenario (Formation 
Airdrop and Airland) has a different task network, the timing and quantity of task varies 
and thus the distribution of workload varies.  The C-130H and C-130J have different 
cockpits: each with different cockpit configurations, operators (namely, the Navigator 
and Engineer on C-130H), and task networks associated. While the C-130H relies on the 
cockpit crew of four (Pilot, Copilot, Navigator, Engineer), the C-130J has a cockpit crew 
of two (Pilot and Copilot).  This shifts several tasks to the pilots and to the automation 
while also eliminating or adding tasks.  As a result, the C-130J relies on automated 
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features such as the Heads’-Up Display (HUD) and autopilot-coupled formation station 
keeping. 
It is important to note that while in operational practice, it is common for Pilot 
and Copilot to share responsibilities and trade tasks according to who is flying the aircraft 
(pilot flying versus pilot not flying), it becomes increasingly complex to merge and shift 
tasks between duties explicitly assigned to the Pilot and Copilot and assumed tasks based 
on which pilot is flying.  For simplicity, the Pilot is always flying the aircraft or directly 
monitoring the autopilot while the Copilot always performs pilot not flying duties. 
The Air Force treats each airplane as a separate Mission Design Series (MDS), 
and has subsequently developed checklists, tactics, techniques, and procedures in 
separate publications from the C-130H.  Thus, while the overall employment of the 
aircraft remains similar in concept, the flow and allocation of tasks are dramatically 
different and must be programmed into IMPRINT as such.  Table 6 (see previous) 
describes the allocation of tasks for the parallel function of basic aircraft control.  Many 
tasks are automated and therefore not directly performed by either operator in the C-130J.  
Generally speaking, the C-130J Copilot (by the virtue of being pilot not flying) assumes 
most of the tasks from the C-130H Navigator, while the aircraft automation assumes most 
of the Engineer’s tasks. 
Because of the ability to employ automation in the scenario, certain tasks shift 
from the operator to the automation, thus varying the workload distribution.  Attention 
spent on tasks can have a positive, negative, or neutral impact on situation awareness 
(SA), particularly attention devoted to information gathering tasks.  High workload can 
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also have an impact on SA, thus SA is dependent on total workload and the tasks 
themselves. 
Some universal assumptions had to be made to limit variables in the scenario.  
While IMPRINT allows the modeler to incorporate workload strategies based on 
overload thresholds, this investigation deliberately excludes the use of this feature.  Since 
the experiment is focused on the impacts of workload caused by different cockpit 
designs, workload strategies will mask overload and near-overload conditions. This 
ensures that time-dependent task demands manifest themselves as clearly as possible 
without the human’s ability to adapt to maintain a high level of performance.  It is of 
more interest to show where workload peaks occur, and the magnitude of those peaks, 
even if the total experienced workload is impossibly high.  Thus, the reader can clearly 
identify where workload management strategies must be employed and procedural or 
engineering changes need to be made.  To summarize, the following initial assumptions 
were made: 
• Operator workload thresholds initially fixed at 60 units 
• All operators share an equal capacity for work 
• No workload strategies will be employed by any operator 
• Channel conflicts not included 
• For the vast majority of tasks, no degree of hesitation to release and start a task, 
provided requisite release conditions (if any) are met 
• The Pilot is always flying (or monitoring the autopilot), while the Copilot is 
always performing pilot not flying duties 
• Operators do not commit errors, therefore all initiated tasks have a 100% chance 
of successful completion 
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Basic Aircraft Control Model 
The Basic Aircraft Control function was written separately from either baseline 
scenario. This was to ease compiling and troubleshooting since many sub functions 
repeated multiple times during a simulation run. The Basic Aircraft Control function was 
also the most difficult to contain the number of entities to a reasonable quantity (i.e. 
prevent the operator from performing an impractical or impossible number of tasks 
simultaneously). The Basic Aircraft Control Function contains all of the repetitive, 
ongoing tasks that the crew performs while in flight: manually flying the aircraft, 
monitoring performance, navigation, monitoring formation position, monitoring aircraft 
systems, scanning for threats, and listening to radios (Figure 8, Figure 9). When the 
simulation starts, the sub-functions “Listen to Radios” and “Scan for Threats”  run 
independently and loop internally until the simulation is halted or the aircraft is on the 
ground. 
 
Figure 8: Basic Aircraft Control (C-130H) 
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Figure 9: Basic Aircraft Control (C-130J) 
All operators begin the simulation performing their respective monitoring tasks.  
Each operator will continuously monitor an instrument for a short time, then loop back to 
a routing task to monitor a different instrument.  If observed aircraft performance is 
outside of an arbitrary tolerance (the tolerance itself is arbitrary because an operator’s 
threshold for correcting performance is variable depending on the situation and team), 
then that operator executes a correction task, which necessitates an active response from 
the pilot in the Control the Airplane function.  Thus the Pilot is reacting to feedback 
given by the crew and his own observed performance feedback.  Since not each 
performance measure is observed an identical number of times (i.e. the Pilot will observe 
altitude, attitude, and heading more than chart reading), the routing tasks assign a 
probabilistic decision path according to perceived level of importance to that operator.  
Probabilistic decision paths are also used to determine the number of corrections given to 
the pilot versus making no correction (the “Do Nothing” task). 
Some adaptability was built into the Basic Aircraft Control function.  If the 
formation variable is false, then the sub-functions for monitoring and controlling 
formation position were deactivated.  The automation variable controls whether most 
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monitoring, correcting, and controlling tasks need to be performed.  If the aircraft is 
flying in adverse weather (instrument meteorological conditions), the aircrew cannot see 
out of the window, then they are not tasked to visually scan for threats.  Presence of 
weather and altitude dictate how much, if any, time is spent examining the radar or 
performing terrain avoidance tasks (such as chart reading and visually clearing terrain 
through the window).  Finally, the whole function will halt when the aircraft is no longer 
flying (i.e. landing and ground operations in the Maximum Effort Airland scenario).  The 
combination of variables provides necessary flexibility to work in both scenarios and 
several alternative variations. 
 
Scenario 1: Formation SKE Airdrop 
The first mission scenario chosen is a formation personnel airdrop using Station 
Keeping Equipment (SKE). This scenario models an aircrew as an element leader (i.e. the 
third aircraft) in a multi-aircraft formation.  Thus the aircrew must maintain a formation 
position and also relay commands to following aircraft.  SKE Formation captures several 
differences between the C-130H and C-130J: manual versus automatic formation 
commands, manual aircraft control versus autopilot, navigation systems, and information 
presentation.  Most of these differences are from the C-130J’s use of the Coordinated 
Aircraft Positioning System (CAPS) in conjunction with SKE.  In the baseline version of 
this scenario, the C-130H Pilot manually flies the aircraft and the Navigator performs 
required radar updates.  The C-130J Pilot monitors CAPS maintain SKE position and the 
computer performs an automatic drop. 
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The scenario begins 20 minutes prior to the airdrop with the formation at an 
enroute altitude of 11,000 feet and airspeed of 200 knots (Figure 10, Figure 11). The 
formation must descend to 3000 feet and turn at the initial point (IP). During this first 
portion, the aircrew is executing the Preslowdown Checklist. Then, the formation slows 
from enroute airspeed to drop airspeed of 130 knots and descends to 2000 feet while the 
aircrew completes the Slowdown Checklist. When the aircraft crosses the drop zone 
(DZ), the Pilot must maintain a constant heading and a stable formation position as the 
paratroopers jump out of the aircraft and the Release Point checklist is run. At the end of 
the DZ, the aircrew runs Completion of Drop Checklist, and the formation climbs away 
and turns to an escape heading. A detailed narrative describing the SKE Formation 
scenario is found in Appendix B: Detailed Scenario Narratives.  
 
Figure 10: SKE Formation Airdrop scenario Plan View 
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Figure 11: SKE Formation Airdrop scenario Profile View 
 
Scenario 2: Single Aircraft Tactical Arrival/Maximum Effort Airland 
This scenario features a penetration descent: a steep, high-speed descent profiles 
with minimum slowdown distances and steep final approaches into the landing zone 
(LZ).  The penetration descent requires precise obstacle awareness and is difficult to 
assess and correct energy deviations (AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 2010; AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 
2010).  The C-130J and C-130H have different tools to evaluate energy state and progress 
along this profile but construct them in the same manner.  Aircrews construct an energy 
profile (altitude vs. distance) working backwards from the approach end of the LZ until 
enroute altitude (Figure 12).  This profile consists of a high-speed penetration segment, a 
level slowdown, and a final approach to landing. While both aircrews must calculate their 
approach parameters, they monitor performance differently.  The C-130J incorporates 
more sophisticated data through the multifunction display (MFD), moving map, and 
heads-up display (HUD), the C-130H crew relies more on “eyeballing” out of the 
window, basic instrumentation, and raw computer data. 
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Figure 12: Sample Penetration Descent Profile 
The baseline simulation starts at an enroute altitude of 18,000 feet with the 
autopilot engaged.  After computing performance data, the aircrew descends to 6,000 
feet, levels-off, then slows down and configures the aircraft for landing.  The 
configuration and final approach phase exploit the different internal crew 
communications for checklists and advisories, as well as the Pilot’s ability to judge 
touchdown point using the HUD or the window.  After landing, the aircraft taxis and 
parks to conduct an offload.  The scenario ends with completion of offload and clearance 
to taxi. 
Measuring Workload and Situation Awareness 
Of primary importance to this experiment is the measurement of workload 
distribution.  IMPRINT measures operator experienced workload by computing the 
combined VACP scores for each task being performed by the operator at that time. As 
each simulation is run, a time-based workload distribution is computed in table and 
graphical form.  From this output, statistically significant workload peaks can be 
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identified and measured.  The total number of significant peaks, their magnitude and 
duration, as well as tasks associated with these peaks provide context for why these 
periods experience high workload.  Due to the complexity of the task networks and 
cycling of basic tasks from the Basic Aircraft Control function, considerable workload 
noise should be expected to develop in the form of a sine wave.  This wave measures the 
average experienced workload for each operator, and when compared with the workload 
peaks, conclusions are drawn regarding which aircraft works harder on average and 
which aircraft is more prone to overload conditions. 
Corresponding to Endsley’s research (1993) and Figure 5 (from Chapter 2), there 
exists a real and dependent but dissociate connection between workload and SA.  Similar 
to Plott, Endsley, and Strater’s study of predictive SA and human performance modeling 
(2004), human error is excluded from the model, thus resulting in a best case or 
optimistic estimation of potential SA.  This experiment assumes that some of the 
operator’s available cognitive resources are utilized to gain a strategic awareness of the 
environment.  Thus, available cognitive resources up to a point of overload, represent the 
potential to gain SA.  This potential SA remains high until the operator approaches 
cognitive overload, which this study is defining as a workload threshold of 60 to be 
consistent with other IMPRINT studies, including the sample IMPRINT models for the 
AH-64, CH-47, and UH-60 helicopters (Bierbaum, Szabo, & Aldrich, 1989; Mitchell, 
2000; Alion Science, 2013).  In this model, SA degrades as workload increases.  Note 
that there is no degradation of SA for an underloaded or bored operator.  Potential SA 
reflects the operator’s perception of the environment (Level 1 SA) and is not directly 
attributed to any specific task in the task network, but rather this strategic SA metric is a 
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separate task represented by the SA function (Figure 13).  This function captures strategic 
SA acquired from non-scripted attention or SA drawn from stored memory. It is desired 
that this scoring methodology be compatible with a SAGAT evaluation that could be 
conducted in a simulator or in-flight experiment, but validation using specific SAGAT 
questions is beyond the scope of the current effort.  Instead, these tasks measure strategic 
SA generically by attempting to describe the untasked capacity that the operator uses to 
devote attention to the operator-determined SA priorities at that time.    
 
Figure 13: Strategic Situation Awareness Function 
To measure Strategic SA, a separate SA function was created to reflect workload-
based SA in three levels: high, medium, and low (Figure 13).  The operator will only 
occupy one of these levels of SA at a time.  High SA is when workload is less than 40 
(out of 60), Medium SA occurs when workload is between 40 and 45, and Low SA is 
when workload is between 45 and 50.  Above a workload of 50, the operator is close 
enough to overload that a potential for strategic SA will not register.  These workload 
threshold were chosen based on the workload experienced from the baseline basic aircraft 
control activities and the IMPRINT default overload threshold of 60 and to mirror the 
structure of Endsley’s SA/Workload function (Figure 5).  These SA tasks assign a generic 
strategic component to the SA variable assigned to each operator.  Since SA is both a 
result and generator of workload, the strategic SA function also induces cognitive 
workload according to the amount of SA.  Using the VACP scoring method, High SA 
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incurs a cognitive workload score of 6.8 (Evaluation/Judgment considering multiple 
factors), Medium SA incurs a workload of 4.6 (Evaluation/Judgment considering a single 
factor), and Low SA incurs a workload of 1.2 (Alternative selection).  
In addition to available cognitive resources contributing to strategic SA, specific 
tasks add to specific elements of SA.  These tasks increment the SA of the operator 
performing them for the time that the task is being performed.  To distinguish task-
specific SA with generic, strategic SA, these SA values are referred to as “tactical SA.”  
While it is possible for the operator to retain that SA in short-term memory, to control the 
SA score, each task is de-incremented after completion, thus emphasizing attention 
devoted to tasks that increase SA.  Theoretically, any tactical SA gained by completing a 
given task, should become part of the immediate strategic SA once the task is complete.  
However, modeling the decay rates of tactical SA due to memory loss is beyond the 
scope of this current research, and thus tactical SA is assumed to end immediately as 
attention shifts away from the current task contributing to tactical SA. Relevant elements 
of tactical SA can then be stored as strategic SA. 
In order to quantify the relative contributions that each individual task contributes 
to tactical SA, a survey (Appendix C: Situation Awareness Task Assessment) was sent to 
15 aviators representing pilots, navigators, engineers, and special mission aviators in a 
host of platforms, but with emphasis on past or current C-130 or HUD experience.  This 
survey distilled the 1200+ task nodes in the IMPRINT model into 19 main categories.  
Respondents were asked to rate the relative impact to SA for accomplishing each task 
(compared to a baseline of flying with one’s eyes closed) on a scale from -3 to +3, where 
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negative values detract from SA, zero equals no affect on SA, and positive values 
contribute to SA.  Results of this survey are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7: SA Survey Results 
Questions/Tasks Average
Std 
Dev Average Std Dev Average
Std 
Dev
1.       Reading instrument or gauge 1.46 0.88 1.60 0.55 1.60 0.55
2.       Reading MFD/moving map/digital display 2.23 0.83 2.40 0.55 2.40 0.55
3.       Viewing Head’s Up Display (HUD) 1.40 0.55 2.00 1.00 2.00 1.00
4.       Looking out of window 1.77 1.09 2.00 0.71 2.00 0.71
5.       Reading raw computer data -0.31 1.18 -0.40 1.34 -0.40 1.34
6.       Radar/sensor interpretation 1.46 0.78 1.20 1.10 1.20 1.10
7.       Keyboard/data entry -1.08 0.76 -1.20 0.84 -1.20 0.84
8.       Writing (data cards, kneeboard, etc.) -0.31 1.03 -0.40 1.34 -0.40 1.34
9.       Reading charts, “sticks,” approach plates 1.15 1.07 1.00 0.71 1.00 0.71
10.    Manual computations (whiz wheel, TOLD, tab data, etc) -1.08 1.38 -1.20 1.30 -1.20 1.30
11.    Talking, simple (advisory calls, responses) 0.62 0.96 -0.20 0.84 -0.20 0.84
12.    Talking, complex (briefings, radio calls, etc) 0.00 1.68 -1.20 1.30 -1.20 1.30
13.    Listening, simple (alerts, advisory call) 1.23 0.73 0.40 0.89 0.40 0.89
14.    Listening, complex (radio, crew feedback) 1.15 1.21 0.60 1.14 0.60 1.14
15.    Background listening (monitoring RWR, radio)   -0.15 1.14 -0.60 1.14 -0.60 1.14
16.    Simple  maneuvering (maintaining parameters) 0.15 0.80 -0.60 0.55 -0.60 0.55
17.    Complex maneuvering (defensive reactions)       -1.31 0.63 -1.80 0.45 -1.80 0.45
18.    Simple button/switch actuation -0.08 0.49 -0.40 0.55 -0.40 0.55
19.    Cumbersome button/switch actuation -1.00 1.08 -1.80 0.84 -1.80 0.84
Cruise Formation Airdrop Max Effort Airland
 
 
It is important to note that survey participants were not explicitly briefed on the 
difference between tactical and strategic SA, however they were asked to disregard the 
effects of workload on their SA scores.  In reporting SA scores, some participants 
provided negative SA scores, which we hypothesize represents an opportunity cost that 
most likely trades off tactical and strategic SA.  Thus performing task A (tactical task) 
consumes attentional resources that may have been spent on a hypothetical task B 
(strategic task) that would have yielded more SA.  In reality, a negative tactical SA score 
would imply that by accomplishing a task, false SA would be gained leading to an 
incorrect mental model.  It is hypothesized that the participants were not suggesting that 
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any activities were actually contributing to incorrect mental models.  These negative 
values are deliberately not incorporated into the tactical SA scoring because the 
opportunity costs are already accounted for by decrementing the operator’s strategic SA 
score since those tasks are typically high-workload tasks.  Furthermore, several tasks 
were coded in IMPRINT to pass an “(operator)_busy” variable which would hold the 
release condition of other SA-gaining tasks (i.e. an Engineer doing performance 
calculations would not be monitoring systems).  
The total SA score is the sum of a strategic SA value plus all of the tactical SA 
values at that given time.  Using a total SA benchmark of 1.0, strategic SA has individual 
scores from 0.25-0.75.  The Low SA task adds 0.25, Medium SA equals 0.5, and High 
SA equals 0.75.  At the completion of each task, the increment assigned (0.25, 0.5, or 
0.75) is de-incremented and the function repeats.  Because multiple tasks can be 
performed simultaneously, the tactical SA scoring for individual elements are set lower 
than strategic SA to balance their effects on total SA.  Thus, the highest individual 
tactical SA score was set equal to 0.25, which is also the lowest strategic SA score.  Since 
decrementing strategic SA accounted for negative scores in the SA survey, the minimum 
reported tactical SA scores were rounded up to zero.  All of the survey results were 
rounded to the nearest 0.5 and divided by 10 as shown in the adjustment table (Table 8), 
to achieve individual tactical SA values between 0 and 0.25. 
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Table 8: IMPRINT Tactical SA Adjustments to SA Survey Results 
Raw Average
if Avg <.25
if .25 < Avg < .75
if .75 < Avg < 1.25
if 1.25 < Avg < 1.75
if 1.75 < Avg < 2.25
if 2.25 < Avg
0.20
0.25
Tactical SA 
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
 
Applying these scores to the generalized list of 19 tasks allows the assignment of 
tactical SA values to be used in IMPRINT (Table 9).  Some tasks, such as viewing the 
HUD and looking out of the window, yielded lower values for cruise flight than for the 
tactical events.  Thus, a lower tactical SA value is programmed into IMPRINT when the 
aircraft is at cruise altitude and a higher tactical SA value when the aircraft is at low 
altitude or executing tactical events.  For an exhaustive list of tactical SA scores assigned 
to all tasks in each scenario, consult Appendix D: Task Listings and Tactical SA 
Assignments. 
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Table 9: IMPRINT Tactical SA Values 
Questions/Tasks
1.       Reading instrument or gauge 0.15
2.       Reading MFD/moving map/digital display 0.25
3.       Viewing Head’s Up Display (HUD) .15/.2*
4.       Looking out of window .15/.2*
5.       Reading raw computer data 0
6.       Radar/sensor interpretation 0.15
7.       Keyboard/data entry 0
8.       Writing (data cards, kneeboard, etc.) 0
9.       Reading charts, “sticks,” approach plates 0.1
10.    Manual computations (whiz wheel, TOLD, tab data, etc) 0
11.    Talking, simple (advisory calls, responses) 0
12.    Talking, complex (briefings, radio calls, etc) 0
13.    Listening, simple (alerts, advisory call) 0.05
14.    Listening, complex (radio, crew feedback) 0.05
15.    Background listening (monitoring RWR, radio)   0
16.    Simple  maneuvering (maintaining parameters) 0
17.    Complex maneuvering (defensive reactions)       0
18.    Simple button/switch actuation 0
19.    Cumbersome button/switch actuation 0
Tactical 
SA Score
 
*First value indicates cruise altitude and second value indicates tactical events 
By combining the strategic and tactical SA scores, a total SA score for each 
operator is calculated.  The time-distributed value of each operator’s SA shows how 
operator SA changes throughout the scenario in much the same way as the workload 
distribution described earlier.  It is important to note that the SA scores reflect only the 
potential for Level 1 SA.  It is up to the reader to make implications on the effects of 
higher SA levels, since there is no method to predict comprehension ability through 
IMPRINT. 
Comparing Total SA between aircrews as a whole poses some problems.  While 
individuals maintain SA in their own right, how do we measure the collective SA for the 
aircrew as a whole?  As discussed in the Chapter 2, Team SA is a product of the 
overlapping SA between individuals.  This requires a degree of communication, but also 
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is affected by each operator’s priorities.  If all members posses the same information, 
then there is no net gain in SA.  Team SA is not simply the sum of individual SA.  
If one were to simply average individual SA scores, then the operator with lower 
SA would drag down the team score.  This does not fully describe the advantage of 
working in a team setting: specialization and redundancy allows individuals to put 
together different pieces of information together to form a better mental model.  The 
adage, “one of us is not as smart as all of us,” captures this concept.  While Team SA 
may not be perfectly synergistic, perhaps it the advantage in team settings is that one 
person can fill gaps in SA left by other operators.  That is, the team SA at any given point 
in time is not the sum of individual SA scores, nor is it the average of the individuals, but 
the value of the individual who has the highest SA at that given moment in time.  
Therefore the individual contributing most towards team SA changes as the situation 
evolves.  This captures the dynamic nature of SA in team settings, but only the potential 
for team SA.  Clearly, if the individual with the highest SA withholds that information 
from the team, then that benefit is lost. 
Figure 14 illustrates this team SA concept versus taking an average of individual 
SA scores.  With three hypothetical operators (A, B, and C), the team’s average SA 
would always be lower than someone’s individual Total SA.  However, when the Team 
SA function (heavy black line) uses the highest individual Total SA score at each given 
moment in time, then different members of that team are contributing towards Team SA. 
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Figure 14: Team SA Example 
However, even this method of measuring Team SA is not without drawbacks.  
Since it only considers the total SA value of the individual with the highest total SA at 
that instant in time, it discounts the contributions of every other member in that team with 
lower SA.  This ignores contributions and gaps in SA filled by the rest of the team and 
the complex interaction between team members.  By not factoring in the required 
communication (or lack thereof) between team member, the team SA formula ignores the 
possibility that an individual with lower SA might make a crucial contribution towards 
the team as a whole.  While not ideal, measuring SA for the group is still a relevant and 
important metric to capture the effects of removing humans from the cockpit. 
Phase IV: Analyze Results  
First, one trial run for each of the 4 conditions (C-130H Formation Airdrop, C-
130J Formation Airdrop, C-130H Airland, and C-130J Airland) is run.  A detailed 
IMPRINT output allows for careful study of the characteristics for each simulation.  The 
single-iteration output provides graphical identification and qualitative determination of 
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where significant workload peaks occur that can be quantitatively described.  IMPRINT 
easily outputs large data files of time-based workload values.  By running 14 iterations of 
the model through pair wise t-tests and examining the comparing the family-wise error 
rate to a Bonferroni post hoc test, a comparison of the data and it’s statistical significance 
can be made.  These two methods will answer investigative questions #1 and 3: how 
automation affects workload during SKE formation airdrop and an airland mission.  
Similarly, charting the time-based distribution of the situation awareness variables, 
another single iteration qualitative analysis of SA can be made.  Measuring total SA over 
multiple iterations and interpreting through another t-test and Bonferroni test answers 
questions #2 and 4: how automation affects SA during SKE formation airdrop and an 
airland mission. 
Summary 
This research employs IMPRINT, a discrete-event simulation human performance 
modeling tool, to calculate a time-based distribution of workload.  Workload distributions 
are calculated by creating task networks from operating procedures for each aircraft 
according to SKE formation airdrop and maximum-effort airland scenarios.  By creating 
scenarios for each aircraft, the differences in cockpit configuration (automation, switches, 
displays, and crew compliment) and scenario events serve as independent variables to 
show differences in workload.  IMPRINT generates the workload profile, which allows 
the experimenter to observe and measure the timing and duration of workload peaks, 
which answers the first investigative question.  The author has created a situation 
awareness function to measure workload-dependent degradation of strategic SA under 
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high workload conditions.  When combined with task-specific SA contributions, a total 
score for potential SA is computed, thus answering the second investigative question 
regarding the impact of automation on SA.   
This experiment distinguishes itself because it focuses heavily on using checklists 
and operational procedures of the C-130 instead of higher-level observations of C-130 
operational practices.  It seeks to model the cockpit task network on a very fine level of 
detail.  Predictive methods of determining SA are nascent.  By developing a novel 
method of establishing a generic strategic SA component, which is dependent on 
experienced workload, and combining that with task-specific “tactical” SA elements, this 
research seeks to establish an SA measurement that could potentially be evaluated later 
with other methods such as SAGAT.  Finally, the author proposes one method to estimate 
potential team SA.
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
Two scenarios were modeled in IMPRINT: SKE Formation Airdrop and 
Maximum Effort Airland.  For each scenario, IMPRINT models representing both the 
automated system (C-130J) and non-automated system (C-130H) were run to output 
workload and situation awareness profiles.  Inspecting the results of a single iteration 
leads to qualitative analysis of overall trend and a more focused analysis of identified 
workload peaks.  Collecting data from multiple iterations and using pair-wise t-tests 
identified the quantitative difference between the C-130H and C-130J.  Finally, this 
analysis is compared to the test hypotheses outlined in Chapter I to answer the original 
investigative questions. 
Results of Simulation Scenarios 
Workload Analysis 
SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario 
 Each scenario was run for a single iteration in order to obtain a detailed, 
continuous IMPRINT workload profile.  This is used as the basis for the qualitative 
analysis.  For the C-130H SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario, a level sine wave develops 
and remains centered on approximately 20 workload units throughout the duration of the 
workload run (Figure 15).  The Engineer’s workload sine amplitude of about 3-4 units 
(centered on 21 units), while the Pilot and Navigator experience the largest sine 
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amplitude of about 10 units (centered on 19 units). While the workload sine wave 
remains remarkably consistent, several peaks stand out as significant.  
Figure 15: C-130H, SKE Formation Airdrop scenario Workload Distribution 
 
To take a qualitative look at those peaks, all workload values below 40 were 
omitted and all workload values above 40 were grouped together in similar time brackets 
(Table 10).  Generally, any gap exceeding 30 seconds between any two high workload 
values was considered as separate peaks.  After this grouping, the peak start time (defined 
as the time where workload exceeded 40 units) and duration (time elapsed from start until 
workload is less than 40) are identified and compared with corresponding tasks in the 
Operator Workload Detail output from the IMPRINT simulation run.  Note that some of 
the durations are less than one second, which represents a random instantaneous spike in 
operator workload. 
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Table 10: SKE Formation Airdrop Workload Peaks (C-130H) 
00:00:02.42 00:00:27.95 76.4 Preslowdown
00:01:31.65 0 43.50 Formation Descent
00:02:03.63 00:00:21.48 40.10 Basic Aircraft Control
00:08:04.90 0 43.5 Basic Aircraft Control
00:09:31.02 00:00:30.01 40.9 Formation Descent
00:12:10.59 0 40.1 Basic Aircraft Control
00:13:24.55 00:00:32.20 55.2 Formation Turn at IP
00:14:48.43 0 44.8 IP to DZ Run In
00:16:14.39 00:02:03.81 70.5 Slowdown
00:19:24.88 00:00:23.85 40.1 Release Point
00:21:38.60 00:01:14.54 61.9 DZ Escape
00:01:09.93 00:00:00.07 41.4 Preslowdown
00:14:10.85 0 40.3 Basic Aircraft Control
00:16:19.24 00:00:25.39 49.9 Slowdown
00:21:38.99 00:00:13.53 59.3 DZ Escape
00:00:00.00 00:01:00.52 56.9 Preslowdown
00:10:00.71 00:00:15.07 48.9 Preslowdown
00:12:21.41 00:00:08.59 53.9 Formation Turn at IP
00:14:19.80 00:00:28.63 52.3 IP to DZ Run In
00:16:54.30 00:00:01.33 44.7 IP to DZ Run In
00:20:28.67 0 41.8 Release Point
00:21:24.42 00:00:24.11 75.4 Release Point
00:00:08.46 00:00:15.45 52.7 Preslowdown
00:13:37.93 00:00:00.61 42 Preslowdown
00:16:16.72 00:00:35.39 45.1 Slowdown
00:21:51.29 00:01:13.71 50.2 Escape
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Since there was no workload strategy employed during this simulation run, 
workload was allowed to exceed the IMPRINT default overload threshold of 60 units.  
All tasks, therefore, were initiated on-time (as soon as release conditions were met).  A 
recurring trend in for each workload peak were common parallel tasks such as: scanning 
for threats, listening to radios, monitoring aircraft, and flying (Pilot only) tasks. It would 
be logical to assume that some of these tasks would be prioritized (i.e. flying) and others 
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suspended based on evolving prioritization (i.e. not scanning for threats when running 
checklists or at higher altitudes). 
Not surprisingly, the Pilot had both the most workload peaks (11 total, 4 of which 
were momentary spikes), and the highest instantaneous workload value (76.4 units) 
among the crew.  Because the Pilot must manually fly the aircraft, maintain a formation 
position, and pass commands via the push-button Flight Command Indicator (FCI), 
workload can elevate easily when other tasks are introduced.  Indeed, even the Basic 
Aircraft Control function occasionally spiked above 40 units when the Pilot mentally 
evaluated his performance while conducting other parallel tasks.  Several significant 
peaks stand out: 
• The highest workload value (76.4) occurred during a 27 second peak at the 
beginning of the scenario when calling for the Pre-slowdown checklist and 
executing the checklist while flying at enroute altitude.  
• While executing the SKE formation turn and leveling off from the first 
descent, there are 30-32 second peaks with workload values of 41 and 55.  
This is due to tasks associated with talking on the radio, sending commands, 
and increased effort to monitor and evaluate the formation turn. 
• The slowdown-drop zone-escape sequence resulted in several long workload 
peaks (24 seconds to over 2 minutes) in succession with high maximum 
values (70.5 for slowdown, 40.1 for the drop zone, and 61.9 for the escape 
maneuver).  This sequence best captures the demands of flying the SKE 
formation airdrop since the Pilot assumes control for FCI commands from 
slowdown until escape, while making large airspeed changes, configuring the 
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aircraft, executing checklists, and flying to tighter positional tolerances as the 
aircraft nears the release point. 
The Navigator was the second-busiest operator on the aircrew with 7 workload 
peaks above 40 units (2 momentary spikes).  Surprisingly, approaching the release point, 
the Navigator only had one momentary workload spike when evaluating drop parameters.  
The Navigator’s two busiest times occurred at the beginning of the simulation (1 minute 
long, peak of 56.9) while writing data on the drop briefing card, briefing the airdrop and 
accomplishing the Pre-slowdown checklist, and also completing the drop (24 seconds 
long, 75.4 maximum workload), directing the escape maneuver and responding to the 
Completion of Drop checklist.  Other notable peaks include the formation turn at the 
Initial Point (IP) which lasted 9 seconds and peaked at 53.9, and updating computer drop 
information in the Self Contained Navigation System (SCNS) which lasted 58 seconds 
and peaked at 52.3.  During this run only Navigator and the Pilot experienced overload 
conditions. 
The Copilot and Engineer were considerably less busy.  Both experienced four 
peaks (two and one momentary spikes, respectively).  The Copilot’s workload peaks 
occurred while responding to the Slowdown checklist and extending flaps (25 seconds, 
49.9 maximum) and again during the escape maneuver while reconfiguring the SKE 
secondary control panel and responding to the Completion of Drop checklist (13.5 
seconds, 59.3 maximum).  The Engineer’s workload peaks correlated directly with 
running the Pre-slowdown (15 seconds, 52.7 maximum), Slowdown (35 seconds, 45.1 
maximum) and Completion of Drop checklists (1 minute 14 seconds, 50.2 maximum). 
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The C-130J iteration of the SKE Formation Airdrop scenario, with its improved 
automation, glass cockpit, head’s-up display (HUD), and reduced crew compliment (the 
Navigator and Engineer have been replaced with automation), has the aircraft flying on 
autopilot and autothrottles until the aircraft was at drop altitude.  Then, the Pilot 
maintained formation position until the escape maneuver was nearly completed, where 
the autopilot was re-engaged.  Because the crew is much smaller, fewer advisory calls 
and intra-cockpit communication occurred.  The C-130J SKE automatically relayed most 
FCI commands with little to no input from either Pilot or Copilot.  Finally increased 
automation reduced the volume of checklist tasks to a handful of items, along with the 
associated call-and-response found heavily in the C-130H checklist.  As a result, the C-
130J exhibited a linear sine wave centered between approximately 17 and 18 units and 
amplitudes of around 4 units, both lower in average and amplitude than the C-130H 
(Figure 16).   
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Figure 16: C-130J SKE Formation Airdrop scenario Workload Distribution 
 
Viewing Figure 16, one can identify when the Pilot reverted to a lower level of 
automation (i.e. increased manual control) when the aircraft was established at drop 
altitude (approximately 00:17:00.00).  While the sine wave is centered at a lower average 
than the C-130H model, a cutoff of 40 units is still useful to remain consistent with the C-
130H analysis and to mitigate noise for the qualitative analysis (Table 11).  Notably, the 
magnitude and quantity of workload peaks decreased from the C-130H simulation.   
 122 
 
Table 11: SKE Formation Airdrop scenario Workload Peaks (C-130J)  
00:00:20.16 00:00:27.82 46.9 Drop Preparation
00:13:04.85 00:00:01.11 54.6 Formation Turn at IP
00:16:18.56 00:00:00.47 40.6 Slowdown
00:17:28.27 0 40.7 Slowdown
00:18:20.74 0 44.1 Slowdown
00:19:36.71 00:00:24.07 55.9 Release Point
00:21:39.25 00:00:09.62 50.9 Escape
00:00:20.81 00:00:00.58 49.2 Drop Preparation
00:11:39.27 0 45.1 Basic Aircraft Control
00:13:33.70 00:00:04.32 64.7 IP to DZ run in
00:17:23.86 00:00:00.33 40.8 Slowdown
00:21:38.32 00:00:45.62 50.3 Escape
Max 
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The Pilot experiences 7 workload peaks, of which only 3 are sustained much 
longer than one second (compared to the C-130H Pilot who had 11 peaks, of which 7 
were sustained).  These sustained peaks occurred while responding to the Drop 
Preparation (28 seconds, 46.9 maximum), executing the airdrop at the Release Point (24 
seconds, 55.9 maximum) and Completion of Drop checklists (10 seconds, 50.9 
maximum).  Nearing the release point, the Pilot experienced a 24 second peak with a 55.9 
unit maximum, which is of the same duration but higher than the C-130H Pilot’s peak 
near the release point (24 seconds, 40.1 maximum).  However, the C-130J Pilot does not 
experience the same degree of workload in the final minutes leading to the drop, nor the 
overload during the escape maneuver.  Of note, the formation turn at the Initial Point (IP) 
spikes briefly, but at 54.6 units, is nearly of same intensity as the C-130H Pilot’s 
workload during the formation turn (32 seconds, 55.2 maximum). 
The C-130J Copilot, however, had somewhat similar workload peaks to his C-
130H counterpart (5 peaks vs. 4 peaks, both with 2 sustained peaks). However the C-130J 
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Copilot only experienced sustained workload peaks while copying drop zone winds 
during the IP-inbound leg (4 seconds, 64.7 maximum) but was overloaded when 
attempting to listen, write, and perform Copilot duties.  The other sustained peak 
occurred during the escape maneuver (46 seconds, 50.3 maximum) while listening and 
recording drop scores and executing the Completion of Drop checklist. 
Summarizing the single-iteration analysis, the C-130J Pilot experiences a 
significant drop in quantity, magnitude, and duration of workload peaks, while the C-
130J Copilot experiences a slight increase in quantity, magnitude and duration of 
experienced peaks (Table 12).  When the Navigator and Engineer are averaged in, the C-
130J crew experiences a slight reduction in quantity and magnitude but a noticeable 
decrease in duration when high workload is encountered. 
Table 12: Summary of Workload Peaks, SKE Formation Airdrop scenario 
H Pilot 11 05:33.8 00:30.3 48.47 76.4
H Copilot 4 00:39.0 00:09.7 47.13 59.3
H Aircrew 6.5 02:39.1 00:24.5 47.91 50.45
J Pilot 7 01:03.1 00:09.0 45.73 55.9
J Copilot 5 00:50.8 00:10.2 48.52 64.7
J Aircrew A 6 00:57.0 00:09.5 47.12 48.65
# of 
Peaks
Total 
Duration
Avg 
Duration
Avg 
Workload
Max 
Workload
 
After running 14 iterations of the SKE Formation Airdrop scenario, statistical 
analysis can determine which aircrew sustains higher average levels of workload (Table 
13) and higher maximum workload (Table 14).   
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Table 13: SKE Formation Airdrop Average Workloads 
Iteration H Navigator H Engineer H Pilot H Copilot H Aircrew J Pilot J Copilot J Aircrew
1 19.19 22.97 19.02 17.95 19.78 17.17 17.93 17.55
2 19.92 22.89 19.32 18.44 20.14 17.10 17.51 17.30
3 18.96 22.74 19.32 18.22 19.81 17.55 17.10 17.33
4 20.03 23.02 19.06 18.29 20.10 17.24 17.09 17.17
5 19.16 22.59 18.98 18.06 19.70 17.36 17.68 17.52
6 19.80 22.96 19.28 18.30 20.09 17.26 17.21 17.23
7 19.62 23.13 19.14 18.21 20.03 16.90 17.60 17.25
8 19.35 23.07 19.02 18.72 20.04 17.35 17.43 17.39
9 19.81 23.09 19.23 18.17 20.08 17.57 16.91 17.24
10 19.50 23.18 19.54 18.18 20.10 17.26 17.11 17.18
11 18.81 22.75 19.00 18.24 19.70 17.43 16.61 17.02
12 19.15 22.96 19.29 18.37 19.94 17.26 17.09 17.17
13 18.87 23.03 19.30 18.51 19.93 17.00 17.85 17.42
14 18.79 22.85 19.15 18.25 19.76 17.44 16.78 17.11
Averages 19.35 22.95 19.19 18.28 19.94 17.28 17.28 17.28
C-130H Average Workloads C-130J Average Workloads
 
Table 14: SKE Formation Airdrop Maximum Workloads 
Iteration H Navigator H Engineer H Pilot H Copilot H Aircrew J Pilot J Copilot J Aircrew
1 67.80 49.70 89.50 57.80 66.20 59.90 64.70 41.53
2 70.90 49.70 83.80 68.30 68.18 57.60 64.70 40.77
3 69.70 45.80 83.80 57.70 64.25 54.80 67.90 40.90
4 83.90 49.70 70.50 59.30 65.85 54.60 64.70 39.77
5 67.70 45.50 79.2 68.30 65.18 58.60 64.70 41.10
6 76.70 49.70 79.20 57.50 65.78 54.60 64.70 39.77
7 68.80 49.70 77.50 68.30 66.08 54.60 64.70 39.77
8 75.50 49.70 81.30 75.10 70.40 54.80 58.10 37.63
9 77.60 49.70 81.30 57.70 66.58 61.60 54.10 38.57
10 79.10 49.70 81.30 75.10 71.30 54.80 55.50 36.77
11 77.60 49.70 79.60 61.50 67.10 58.80 64.70 41.17
12 67.00 53.10 79.60 57.50 64.30 54.60 64.70 39.77
13 72.00 53.10 79.20 59.30 65.90 53.40 64.70 39.37
14 77.60 50.20 72.40 57.70 64.48 53.40 64.70 39.37
Averages 73.71 49.64 79.87 62.94 66.54 56.15 63.04 39.73
C-130H Maximum Workloads C-130J Maximum Workloads
 
Conducting a t-test of these data shows that there exists a statistically significant 
difference within a 95% confidence interval (α = 0.05) between the C-130H and C-130J 
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for average workloads. Data that satisfies the t-test also meets the stricter significance 
criteria of the Bonferroni post hoc test to account for the family-wise error rate (m = 3, α 
Bonferroni = 0.017).  Examining the difference in averages from Table 13, the C-130J 
clearly has lower average workload for the Pilot, Copilot and aircrew as a whole 
(includes Navigator and Engineer) while performing SKE Formation Airdrop.  
Examining the maximum workload values, the C-130J Pilot and aircrew sustain lower 
maximum workload than the C-130H, but there is no statistically significant difference 
between the Copilots.  Thus, while average workload results are clear, the maximum 
workload results for SKE formation airdrop are mixed, but increased automation does not 
do worse in this scenario. 
Table 15: T-test results for SKE Formation Airdrop Workload data 
α=0.05 Pilot Copilot Aircrew Pilot Copilot Aircrew
p- value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.966 <0.001
Lower Workload J J J J Neither J
Average Workload Maximum Workload
 
Maximum Effort Airland Scenario 
Similar to SKE Formation Airdrop, the first iteration of the Maximum Effort 
Airland scenario was run for a single iteration with the detailed IMPRINT output for a 
qualitative analysis.  While the SKE Formation airdrop workload approximated a linear 
sine wave, the Airland scenario data in Figure 17 more closely resembles a bell curve 
with considerable oscillation superimposed on it.  All C-130H operators peaks during the 
slowdown and final approach phase and diminish rapidly after touchdown and during the 
cargo offload. 
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Figure 17: C-130H Maximum Effort Airland Workload Distribution 
 
Again a workload of 40 units was used as a cutoff to qualitatively evaluate 
workload peaks (Table 16).  This scenario generated far fewer workload peaks than the 
SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario.  The C-130H Pilot encountered two sustained peaks: 
the first one occurring during level off and slowdown from high speed to final approach 
speed (3 minutes 53 seconds in duration, 66.4 maximum) and again while in the landing 
flare (10 seconds, 57.4 maximum).  The C-130H Copilot encountered three workload 
peaks, of which the only sustained workload peak (20 seconds, 50,2 maximum) occurred 
early in the scenario while the Copilot was coordinating with air traffic control (ATC) on 
the radio, copying weather information, and scanning for threats.  The other brief spikes 
were associated with configuring the landing gear and searching/identifying the landing 
runway.  The Navigator only encountered one sustained peak (4 seconds, 50.0 
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maximum).  Finally, the Engineer had two momentary spikes (<2 seconds) both 
associated with running checklists while monitoring aircraft performance. 
Table 16: Maximum Effort Airland Workload Peaks (C-130H) 
00:10:28.37 00:03:52.89 66.40 Slowdown
00:17:06.74 00:00:09.69 57.40 Landing
00:01:09.85 00:00:20.15 50.20 Enroute
00:09:28.84 00:00:01.16 48.00 Descent
00:11:12.35 0 42.10 Slowdown
00:06:55.80 00:00:04.20 50.00 Descent
00:11:33.22 0 42.00 Slowdown
00:11:15.79 00:00:01.79 51.70 Slowdown
00:16:54.22 00:00:00.78 43.60 Before Landing
Max 
Worload Phase of Mission
Pi
lo
t
Co
pi
lo
t
N
av
.
En
g.
Start Time 
(hh:mm:ss)
Duration 
(hh:mm:ss.ss)
 
Inspecting the workload profiles for the C-130J (Figure 18), the same oscillating 
bell curve appears, albeit at higher workload levels.  Noticeably, the C-130J Copilot 
overloads very early in the scenario, while the Pilot overloads twice during slowdown 
and configuration. 
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Figure 18: C-130J Maximum Effort Airland Workload Distribution 
 
Table 17 shows that the C-130J Pilot encounters three workload peaks.  Of the 
two sustained peaks, the first one (2 minutes 25 seconds, 79.5 maximum) occurs during 
the level off and slowdown. Compared to the C-130H Pilot during slowdown and 
configuration, the C-130J Pilot experienced a higher peak (79.5 versus 66.4) but high 
workload occurred in a shorter duration (2:25 versus 3:53).  The second workload peak 
(50 seconds, 63.9 maximum) occurred just prior to and during landing, which was of 
longer duration and higher peak workload than the C-130H Pilot (10 seconds, 57.4 
maximum). 
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Table 17: Maximum Effort Airland Workload Peaks (C-130J) 
00:01:18.91 0 40.80 Enroute
00:09:26.25 00:02:24.50 79.50 Slowdown
00:12:54.82 00:00:50.18 63.90 Landing
00:01:33.86 00:00:11.14 65.20 Enroute
00:06:23.62 0 41.40 Descent
00:10:23.25 00:01:13.58 48.40 SlowdownC
op
ilo
t
Start Time 
(hh:mm:ss)
Duration 
(hh:mm:ss.
Max 
Worload 
Phase of 
Mission
Pi
lo
t
 
The C-130J Copilot also observed three workload peaks, of which two were 
sustained.  At the beginning of the scenario, the Copilot becomes overloaded while 
communicating with ATC, copying weather, monitoring aircraft performance and 
scanning for threats.  This first peak was shorter (11 versus 20 seconds) than the C-130H 
Copilot’s peak, but resulted in a higher maximum workload value (65.2 versus 50.2) for 
the C-130J Copilot. 
Summarizing the peak workload measurements in Table 18: the C-130J Pilot 
experiences only one more workload peak than the C-130H Pilot, while the Copilot 
experienced the same number of peaks. But, while the C-130J Pilot spends less time 
under high-workload conditions, the magnitude of those peaks were consistently greater 
than the C-130H Pilot’s peaks. Thus, neither pilot held a conclusive advantage over the 
other.  On the other hand, the C-130H Copilot had significantly shorter workload peaks 
with lower magnitudes, whereas the C-130J Copilot experienced overload.  When the 
Navigator and Engineer are averaged into the Team SA, the C-130H aircrew experienced 
slightly fewer peaks, but spent noticeably less time operating in high workload and with a 
lower overall magnitude. 
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Table 18: Workload Peak Summary, Maximum Effort Airland 
H Pilot 2 04:02.6 02:01.3 46.62 66.40
H Copilot 3 00:21.3 00:07.1 45.86 50.20
H Aircrew Avg 2.25 01:07.7 00:30.1 46.51 50.16
J Pilot 3 03:14.7 01:04.9 51.40 79.50
J Copilot 3 01:24.7 00:28.2 47.29 65.20
J Aircrew Avg 3 02:19.7 00:45.6 50.86 56.53
# of 
Peaks
Total 
Duration
Avg 
Duration
Avg 
Workload
Max 
Workload
 
Just as in SKE Formation Airdrop scenario, 14 iterations of both the C-130H and 
C-130J Maximum Effort Airland models were run.  Both average workload and 
maximum workload datasets were compiled as shown in Table 19 and Table 20.   
Table 19: Maximum Effort Airland Average Workload Values 
Iteration H Navigator H Engineer H Pilot H Copilot H Aircrew J Pilot J Copilot J Aircrew
1 15.87 21.03 21.55 12.93 17.84 22.09 18.85 20.47
2 15.87 20.28 21.75 12.60 17.62 21.81 18.78 20.29
3 15.18 19.85 21.73 12.17 17.23 21.77 17.68 19.72
4 14.73 18.84 20.86 11.62 16.51 22.26 18.23 20.25
5 15.19 20.37 22.05 11.71 17.33 22.41 19.79 21.10
6 14.23 19.45 21.55 11.85 16.77 22.47 18.58 20.52
7 14.66 20.14 21.59 12.19 17.15 21.81 18.50 20.16
8 15.37 20.95 22.30 12.45 17.77 21.85 19.01 20.43
9 15.00 18.97 21.75 11.72 16.86 21.04 16.95 18.99
10 14.26 18.95 21.34 11.00 16.39 21.80 18.34 20.07
11 14.33 19.31 21.35 11.25 16.56 21.76 18.04 19.90
12 14.71 18.38 21.23 11.48 16.45 21.05 17.14 19.09
13 14.90 19.72 21.75 12.05 17.07 21.91 18.41 20.09
14 14.59 20.27 21.95 12.57 17.34 21.69 18.90 20.29
Averages 14.92 19.75 21.62 11.97 17.06 21.84 18.37 20.10
C-130H Average Workloads C-130J Average Workloads
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Table 20: Maximum Workload Values, Maximum Effort Airland Scenario 
Iteration H Navigator H Engineer H Pilot H Copilot H Aircrew J Pilot J Copilot J Aircrew
1 57.70 51.70 65.30 56.90 57.90 80.30 61.00 70.65
2 47.10 51.70 65.30 50.20 53.58 75.80 50.60 63.20
3 48.70 51.70 65.30 50.20 53.98 86.30 49.60 67.95
4 47.80 41.10 65.30 50.20 51.10 71.60 56.90 64.25
5 45.70 51.70 65.30 50.20 53.23 89.20 55.00 72.10
6 51.50 51.70 65.30 60.70 57.30 82.40 53.50 67.95
7 47.80 51.70 65.30 56.90 55.43 77.90 61.00 69.45
8 47.80 47.60 66.40 50.20 53.00 71.20 66.90 69.05
9 46.10 51.70 60.70 56.90 53.85 79.50 50.60 65.05
10 46.70 51.70 66.20 50.20 53.70 76.40 61.00 68.70
11 46.10 52.20 64.30 50.50 53.28 75.30 52.00 63.65
12 57.70 43.60 65.30 56.90 55.88 75.80 50.40 63.10
13 49.10 51.70 65.30 50.20 54.08 77.90 56.90 67.40
14 57.70 51.70 64.30 61.10 58.70 71.20 55.00 63.10
Averages 49.82 50.11 64.97 53.66 54.64 77.91 55.74 66.83
C-130H Maximum Workloads C-130J Maximum Workloads
 
Conducting t-test evaluation of these data, the results are mixed.  Data that 
satisfies the t-test also meets the stricter significance criteria of the Bonferroni post hoc 
test to account for the family-wise error rate (m = 3, α Bonferroni = 0.017).  The Pilot has an 
insignificant difference in average workloads while the Copilot has an insignificant 
difference in maximum observed workload.  When factoring in the Navigator and 
Engineer, the C-130H team experiences lower average and maximum workload peaks 
than the C-130J team.  Thus automation appears to increase or have no effect on 
workload in this scenario depending on the operator. 
Table 21: T-test results for Maximum Effort Airland data 
α=0.05 Pilot Copilot Aircrew Pilot Copilot Aircrew
p- value 0.170 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.293 <0.001
Lower Workload Neither H H H Neither H
Average Workload Maximum Workload
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Situation Awareness Analysis 
SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario 
The situation awareness assessment began by running a single iteration of the 
scenario and exporting the resulting charts for qualitative analysis.  Strategic SA (Figures 
19 and 20), which is not connected to any particular task or element, ran as a dedicated 
function in the task network (III.  Methodology, Figure 13), computed a strategic SA 
value dependent on total experienced workload.  The workload thresholds for High 
(0.75), Medium (0.75), and Low SA (0.25) were set to correspond with Endsley’s 
theoretical SA-Workload Function (II. Literature Review, Figure 5).  Thus, each operator 
would maintain high strategic SA until approaching overload, then strategic SA would 
diminish until it reached zero immediately prior to overload. Of note is that high strategic 
SA is maintained by all operators for the vast majority of the simulation run.  These 
momentary dips correspond well to the workload peaks shown in Figures 15 and 17.   
 
Figure 19: C-130H SKE Formation Airdrop Strategic SA Distribution 
 
 133 
 
 
Figure 20: C-130J SKE Formation Airdrop Strategic SA Distribution 
 
Tactical SA, which is SA linked to specific tasks, was coded into each IMPRINT 
task in both scenarios and both aircraft.  When a given task was run, the beginning effect 
incrementally increased tactical SA to the applicable operators, and the ending effect 
incrementally decreased tactical SA by that same amount.  Any elements of tactical SA 
important enough to store become represented by the strategic SA function. Not all tasks 
had an effect on tactical SA.  Of those tasks that did positively increment tactical SA, 
their values were normalized to a range of 0-0.25 in order to fit with strategic SA scoring 
(Chapter III.  Methodology: Measuring Workload and Situation Awareness).  Note that 
more than one Tactical SA task can be accomplished simultaneously, thus permitting 
instantaneous Tactical SA to exceed 0.25. Tactical SA (Figures 21 and 22) was charted in 
a similar fashion to strategic SA. 
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Figure 21: C-130H SKE Formation Airdrop Tactical SA Distribution 
 
 
Figure 22: C-130J SKE Formation Airdrop Tactical SA Distribution 
 
Inspecting Figure 21 reveals a sine wave centered on 0.20 units with amplitudes 
between 0.15-0.20.  The sine wave increases as the scenario progresses possibly 
suggesting that as the aircraft nears the objective area and/or descends, there is an 
increase in SA-additive tasks.  However, this effect is not observed in the C-130J (Figure 
22).  Of note, there are frequent FCI commands and verbal communications (both 0.05 
tactical SA for the listener) and numerous gauge or instrument readings (0.15 tactical SA) 
in the C-130H iteration.  Comparatively, the C-130J passes FCI commands transparently, 
Formation Turn at IP 
Escape Maneuver 
Formation Descent 
Drop       . 
Slowdown 
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but both pilots refer to a HUD (0.15 in cruise and 0.20 in low level) and color 
multifunction display or moving map (0.25 tactical SA) which appears to have a 
significant effect on tactical SA.  The C-130J maintains a more consistent linear sine 
wave centered on 0.35 with an amplitude of 0.15.  The two formation turns: one at the 
Initial Point (IP) and the other while flying the escape maneuver, markedly improve 
tactical SA to the C-130J crew, since the pilots reference a multifunction display.  Thus, 
it appears upon inspection that the crew of the C-130J has more tactical SA. 
Simply adding tactical SA to strategic SA produces total SA.  The C-130H shows 
that total SA remains relatively constant throughout the SKE formation airdrop with an 
increase in Copilot and Engineer total SA during the escape maneuver at the end of the 
simulation because their tactical SA increases significantly (Figure 23). Strategic SA 
negatively impacts total SA during the previously identified workload peaks: particularly 
during the formation turn, slowdown and escape maneuver (Pilot only).  Conversely, C-
130J total SA peaks during the formation turn and escape maneuver, but similarly 
declines during the slowdown (Figure 23).  All total SA distributions are centered near 
1.0, and no discernible advantage to either aircraft can be gathered by qualitatively 
comparing Figure 23and Figure 24. 
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Figure 23: C-130H SKE Formation Airdrop Total SA Distribution 
 
 
Figure 24: C-130J SKE Formation Airdrop Total SA Distribution 
Because the SA outputs impose significantly higher computational effort, only 
five simulation runs were conducted to examine SA (Table 22, Table 23). Despite the 
limited number of iterations, standard deviation between data was low.  Similar to the 
workload analysis, data that satisfies the t-test also meets the stricter significance criteria 
of the Bonferroni post hoc test to account for the family-wise error rate (m = 3, α Bonferroni 
= 0.017).  Examining the quantitative data from these five iterations, the C-130H 
exhibited higher strategic SA for both the Pilot and Copilot (Table 24).  However results 
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were mixed for tactical SA: the C-130J Pilot had more tactical SA while the C-130H 
Copilot had more tactical SA.  Thus, total SA was inconclusive for the Pilot, but the C-
130H Copilot and aircrew (Navigator and Engineer included) had more total SA. 
Table 22: SKE Formation Airdrop Average SA Data (C-130H) 
Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Team
1 0.674 0.694 0.685 0.697 0.280 0.274 0.371 0.468 0.954 0.969 1.056 1.166 1.220
2 0.677 0.698 0.683 0.700 0.299 0.271 0.361 0.470 0.976 0.969 1.043 1.170 1.219
3 0.676 0.697 0.687 0.698 0.285 0.274 0.381 0.494 0.962 0.971 1.068 1.192 1.241
4 0.675 0.699 0.683 0.698 0.295 0.261 0.375 0.490 0.969 0.959 1.058 1.188 1.238
5 0.671 0.697 0.684 0.696 0.277 0.258 0.385 0.476 0.948 0.955 1.069 1.171 1.226
Average 0.675 0.697 0.684 0.698 0.287 0.268 0.374 0.480 0.962 0.965 1.059 1.177 1.229
Iteration
Strategic SA Tactical SA Total SA
 
Table 23: SKE Formation Airdrop Average SA Data (C-130J) 
Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Team
1 0.659 0.658 0.308 0.221 0.967 0.879 1.009
2 0.664 0.661 0.303 0.226 0.967 0.887 1.019
3 0.654 0.651 0.302 0.210 0.956 0.861 0.995
4 0.660 0.660 0.300 0.220 0.960 0.880 1.006
5 0.649 0.652 0.306 0.211 0.955 0.863 1.001
Average 0.657 0.657 0.304 0.218 0.961 0.874 1.006
Iteration
Strategic SA Tactical SA Total SA
 
Table 24: T-test results for SKE Formation Airdrop SA Data 
Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Team
0.001 <0.001 0.036 <0.001 0.869 <0.001 <0.001
H H J H Neither H H
Total SAStrategic SA Tactical SA
 
Maximum Effort Airland Scenario 
The Maximum Effort Airland scenario incorporated the same situation awareness 
(SA) algorithms found in SKE Formation Airdrop scenario.  A single iteration run of this 
scenario on both C-130H and C-130J model is shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26.  Not 
surprisingly, most operators spend of their time with high strategic SA (0.75) with the 
entirety of both simulations showing high SA for all operators after landing and while the 
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aircraft is on the ground.  Inspecting both figures shows sustained excursions to lower 
levels of SA commensurate with increased setting up for the descent and the demanding 
slowdown/configuration phase following the 600-second mark.  No clear qualitative 
strategic SA comparison between the C-130H and C-130J can be made for the Pilot or 
Copilot, but it appears that the C-130H has slightly higher team strategic SA. 
 
Figure 25: C-130H Maximum Effort Airland Strategic SA Distribution 
 
 
Figure 26: C-130J Maximum Effort Airland Strategic SA Distribution 
 
Tactical SA trends follow similar patterns for the C-130H (Figure 27) and C-130J 
(Figure 28): a steadily increasing sine wave with a momentary spike in Pilot tactical SA 
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immediately prior to touchdown and low tactical SA for all operators while the aircraft is 
on the ground.  The first 400 seconds of the simulation show no conclusive advantage in 
tactical SA, however, the C-130J appears to have slightly more tactical SA than the C-
130H (C-130J: sine centered on 0.30, amplitude 0.2; C-130H: sine centered on 0.20, 
amplitude 0.15-0.2) from 400 seconds until touchdown.  Once on the ground the C-130J 
had almost no tactical SA, while the C-130H Navigator maintained a constant 0.10 while 
standing in the safety observer position and watching the offload occur in the back of the 
aircraft. 
 
Figure 27: C-130H Maximum Effort Airland Tactical SA Distribution 
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Figure 28: C-130J Maximum Effort Airland Tactical SA Distribution 
 
When computing total SA, it is interesting to note that the average total SA 
distribution remains relatively constant while the aircraft is on the ground and few 
tactical SA tasks are being accomplished (Figure 29, Figure 30).  In both C-130H and C-
130J, the Pilot’s total SA declined after landing, as expected, when tasks diminished, but 
the Copilot’s and Engineer’s total SA remained high while the aircraft was on the ground.  
Strategic SA appears to have had the largest negative impact on total SA, which 
corresponds to high-workload periods associated with preparing for the tactical approach, 
slowdown/configuration, and final approach.  However, once the autopilot is disengaged 
and the tactical approach begins, the amplitude of the sine wave increases due to tactical 
SA associated with basic aircraft control tasks. 
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Figure 29: C-130H Maximum Effort Airland Total SA Distribution 
 
 
Figure 30: C-130J Maximum Effort Airland Total SA Distribution 
 
Similar to the SKE Formation Airdrop scenario, five iterations were run to build a 
dataset on SA for both aircraft (Table 25, Table 26).  Despite the limited number of 
iterations, standard deviation between data was low.  Similar to the workload analysis, 
data that satisfies the t-test also meets the stricter significance criteria of the Bonferroni 
post hoc test to account for the family-wise error rate (m = 3, α Bonferroni = 0.017).  
Examining the data (Table 27), the C-130J Pilot experienced similar strategic SA, but 
higher tactical and higher total SA than the C-130J Pilot.  The Copilot experienced lower 
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strategic SA in the C-130J, but the higher tactical SA which offset and led to higher total 
SA than the C-130H Copilot.  Thus, while the C-130J Pilot and Copilot had higher total 
SA than their C-130H counterparts, the aircrew as a team experienced no significant 
difference in total SA because the C-130H Navigator and Engineer made sufficient 
contributions to even the differences. 
Table 25: Maximum Effort Airland Total SA Data (C-130H) 
Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Pilot Copilot Navigator Engineer Team
1 0.627 0.680 0.684 0.657 0.223 0.157 0.220 0.270 0.849 0.837 0.904 0.927 1.041
2 0.615 0.680 0.682 0.655 0.211 0.151 0.219 0.261 0.826 0.831 0.901 0.916 1.028
3 0.621 0.681 0.681 0.662 0.164 0.186 0.213 0.255 0.786 0.867 0.895 0.917 1.018
4 0.620 0.680 0.682 0.659 0.166 0.186 0.219 0.212 0.786 0.866 0.901 0.871 1.015
5 0.621 0.677 0.675 0.656 0.172 0.149 0.259 0.206 0.793 0.827 0.934 0.862 1.023
Average 0.621 0.680 0.681 0.658 0.187 0.166 0.226 0.241 0.808 0.846 0.907 0.898 1.025
Iteration
Strategic SA Tactical SA Total SA
 
Table 26: Maximum Effort Airland Total SA Data (C-130J) 
Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Team
1 0.625 0.678 0.290 0.285 0.914 0.963 1.048
2 0.639 0.668 0.263 0.239 0.902 0.907 1.004
3 0.625 0.676 0.262 0.247 0.887 0.923 1.013
4 0.644 0.671 0.256 0.247 0.899 0.918 1.017
5 0.635 0.667 0.257 0.253 0.892 0.920 1.012
Average 0.633 0.672 0.266 0.254 0.899 0.926 1.019
Iteration
Strategic SA Tactical SA Total SA
 
Table 27: T-Test results for Maximum Effort Airland SA data 
α=0.05 Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Pilot Copilot Team
p- value 0.075 0.015 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 0.316
Higher SA Neither H J J J J Neither
Total SAStrategic SA Tactical SA
 
Situation Awareness-Workload Relationship 
While not a direct requirement to answer the investigative questions, a 
relationship between SA and workload can easily be measured. The strategic SA 
functions were programmed to be dependent variables of their operator’s workload.  
Therefore, there was an intentionally direct (negative) correlation between strategic SA 
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and total workload.  However, tactical SA remained independent of workload to an 
extent, although performing additional key tactical tasks will increase both tactical SA 
and workload.  It was possible for the operators to maintain high SA under high 
workload, provided the operator’s tasks also contributed towards SA.  As a result, a 
scatter plot (Figure 31 and Figure 33) of total SA and workload revealed no discernible 
trend.  This dissociation corresponds well with Endsley’s (1993) experimental findings. 
 
Figure 31: C-130H SA-Workload Distribution, SKE Formation Airdrop 
 
 
Figure 32: C-130J SA-Workload Distribution, SKE Formation Airdrop 
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The Maximum Effort Airland data exhibits high variance, however a loose trend 
begins to emerge that shows somewhat less dissociation than the SA-Workload 
relationship generated during the SKE Formation Airdrop scenario.  The C-130H Pilot, 
Copilot, and Navigator (Figure 33) have total SA centered between approximately 0.90 
and 1.00 until workload exceeds 32 units.  At higher workloads, SA decreases and 
increases in variance.  The C-130J Pilot and Copilot (Figure 34) have total SA centered at 
approximately 1.10 until workload exceeds 30 units, after which SA decreases and 
variance increases in an identical pattern to the C-130H’s distribution.  As an outlier, the 
Engineer has low total SA at lower workload and increases total SA as workload 
increases.  Interestingly, these loosely correlate to Endsley’s SA-Workload theory shown 
in Figure 5 (found in Chapter II. Literature Review). 
 
Figure 33: C-130H Maximum Effort Airland SA-Workload Distribution 
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Figure 34: C-130J Maximum Effort Airland SA-Workload Distribution 
  
Summary 
After examining the data, results were mixed and depended on both the situation 
and the aircraft.  No particular operator or aircraft emerged as distinctly advantageous 
across both scenarios.  The C-130J Pilot experienced less severe workload peaks (lower 
frequency, duration and intensity), lower average and maximum workload than the C-
130H Pilot for airdrop, however this did not result in any difference in total SA.  The 
Pilot’s peak workload analysis and average workload were inconclusive for the airland 
scenario, but the C-130J Pilot experienced a lower maximum workload, yet maintained 
higher total SA than the C-130H Pilot.   
The C-130J Copilot did not benefit from the increased automation as much as the 
airdrop scenario: workload peaks increased very slightly in frequency, duration, and 
intensity, while average workload decreased.  Furthermore, the C-130H Copilot had 
higher total SA.  During the airland scenario, the C-130J Copilot experienced the same 
frequency of workload peaks, but those peaks were of longer duration and higher 
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intensity, which also contributed to a higher average workload than the C-130H Copilot.  
Despite this, the C-130J Copilot had higher total SA than the C-130H Copilot. 
As a crew, the C-130J experienced the same number of workload peaks, but of 
shorter duration and slightly lower intensity which contributed towards lower average 
and maximum workload values than the C-130H aircrew during the airdrop scenario.  
During the airland scenario, the C-130J averaged the same number of workload peaks, 
but thanks to the Copilot interface and task distribution, their duration and intensity were 
higher.  Similarly, the C-130J aircrew experienced higher average workload throughout 
the scenario. However, the C-130J team SA was never higher than the C-130H.  During 
the formation airdrop, neither the C-130J Pilot or Copilot experienced higher SA than 
their C-130H counterparts, so when Navigator and Engineer contributions towards team 
SA are considered, the C-130H actually had more total SA.  However, while the C-130J 
Pilot and Copilot had higher total SA than the C-130H Pilot and Copilot, this was 
sufficiently offset by the contributions by the Navigator and Engineer to the point where 
both aircraft had identical team SA on average. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter answers the hypotheses created by the investigative questions and 
draws research conclusions of this thesis based on the analysis performed in Chapter IV.  
The significance of these conclusions is discussed along with recommendations for 
actions and recommendations for future research.  
Investigative Questions Answered 
Investigative Question #1 
How does the use of automation affect workload during station keeping 
equipment (SKE) formation airdrop?  To answer this question the following hypothesis 
was developed: automated cockpits (C-130J) result in lower workload than non-
automated cockpits (C-130H) during SKE formation airdrop.  In this scenario automation 
significantly reduced average workload, maximum workload, the occurrence of workload 
peaks, their duration and magnitude for the Pilot.  Automation in the C-130J reduced the 
Copilot’s average workload, had no significant change in maximum workload, and 
resulted in a slight increase in the occurrence and duration of workload peaks.  When 
averaging the entire crew, automation significantly reduced average and maximum 
workloads, and reduced the occurrence and duration of workload peaks slightly.  
Therefore this research rejects the null hypothesis and finds support for increased 
automation reducing workload during the times the automation is performing to 
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expectation. During the SKE Formation Airdrop scenario the aircraft configuration, with 
the caveat that while Copilot average workload decreased with automation, had a 
negligible effect on peak workload. 
Investigative Question #2 
How does the use of automation affect situation awareness during SKE 
formation airdrop?  To answer this question the following hypothesis was developed: 
automated cockpits (C-130J) result in higher SA than non-automated cockpits (C-130H) 
during SKE formation airdrop.  Three measures of SA were created to measure this: 
strategic, tactical, and total with total SA becoming the test statistic.   
Due to the high level of variation in the SA graphs, no difference between the 
automated and non-automated SA could be qualitatively determined.  However a 
quantitative analysis over five iterations showed that the Pilot experienced no significant 
difference in SA in the automated cockpit of the C130J.  The Copilot and aircrew team 
SA was higher in the C-130H cockpit during the SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario. 
Because the difference in average total SA was either insignificant (Pilot) or lower in the 
automated cockpit (Copilot team), this research fails to find sufficient evidence that 
automation improves situation awareness. 
Investigative Question #3 
How does automation affect aircrew workload during an airland mission? 
To answer this question the following hypothesis was developed: automated 
cockpits (C-130J) result in lower workload than non-automated cockpits (C-130H) during 
airland missions.  In the Maximum Effort Airland scenario, automation did not 
significantly affect Pilot workload by any of the measures used (automation only reduced 
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the duration of Pilot workload peaks).  However Copilot average workload increased on 
the automated system as well as the occurrence, magnitude, and duration of Copilot and 
crew workload peaks.  Maximum observed workload increased for Pilot, Copilot, and the 
crew average.  Because automation had either neutral or negative effects on workload, 
this research fails to find sufficient evidence to support the alternative hypothesis that 
increased automation reduces workload for Maximum Effort Airland missions. 
 
Investigative Question #4 
How does automation affect aircrew situation awareness during an airland 
mission? 
To answer this question the following hypothesis was developed: automated 
cockpits (C-130J) result in higher average SA than non-automated cockpits (C-130H) 
during SKE formation airdrop.  Three measures of SA were created to measure this: 
strategic, tactical, and total with total SA becoming the test statistic.  The automated 
cockpit had mixed results for total SA: both Pilot and Copilot had higher total SA as 
individuals, however the contributions made by the Navigator and Engineer offset those 
differences such that no statistically significant difference emerges.  Thus, while the 
automation effectively replaces the Navigator and Engineer, there is insufficient evidence 
to support the alternative hypothesis that increased automation improves situation 
awareness for airland missions. 
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Conclusions of Research 
Workload Conclusions 
The effects of automation on aircrew workload depend significantly on the 
situation at hand.  Automation is far more complex than a simple on/off switch.  Even 
though automated cockpits can take over several tasks from the human operator, the 
human operator is not necessarily left idle.  Task burdens can shift from manipulating and 
doing to programming and supervising.  While critical points exist in generally similar 
locations and times for both scenarios, automation can reduce workload peaks associated 
these critical times, but it also has the potential to create new critical points with high 
workload. 
In this experiment, the highly automated C-130J showed significant reduction in 
all aspects of Pilot workload during the SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario by automating 
a majority of formation position maintenance and relaying formation commands.  This 
was especially true during formation turns and the critical slowdown-airdrop-escape 
phase surrounding the drop zone.  The C-130J Copilot had lower average workload, but 
slight increases in the number, duration, and intensity of workload peaks when no 
workload strategy was employed.  Overall, the C-130J reduced the average workload and 
duration of peak workload, while having little to no effect on the number or intensity of 
those workload peaks.  Thus, for the formation airdrop, the C-130J effectively reduces 
workload when substituting automation for the Navigator and Engineer. 
Because the C-130J Pilot typically manually flies the descent and landing during a 
tactical approach to a landing zone in a fashion similar to the C130H, there was a 
negligible difference in average workload and the number of workload peaks between 
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cockpit designs for the Maximum Effort Airland Scenario.  However, the C-130J Pilot 
experienced shorter workload peaks but of much greater intensity when no workload 
strategy was employed.  The C-130J Copilot experienced higher average workload, and 
longer, more intense workload peaks.  Overall the C-130J slightly increased average 
workload, and increased the intensity of peak workload beyond the overload threshold.  
Thus, for the airland scenario, the C-130J does not reduce workload by substituting 
automation for the Navigator and Engineer and requires the use of workload strategies to 
mitigate peak workload. 
Situation Awareness Conclusions 
Situation awareness depends not only on the situation, how the human operator 
interacts with that situation and whether the tasks performed contribute to or degrade SA 
and by how much.  Certain tasks can add to SA when they provide information to the 
operator or utilize working memory.  The automation of the C-130J was shown to 
increase total Pilot SA during both the formation airdrop and the airland scenarios. Since 
the Pilot was able to focus more effort on tasks that provide information, the quantity of 
information increased.  Design improvements to the C-130J, namely the multifunction 
display, automated systems alerts, heads-up display, and better computing power 
improved the quality of data.  The C-130J Copilot also experienced increased SA during 
the airland scenario (for the same reasons) but did not see an improvement over the C-
130H Copilot during formation airdrop.  Overall the C-130J provides a higher potential 
for SA than the C-130H for individuals (namely the Pilot), but this improvement does not 
extend towards team SA.  While the C-130J effectively compensates for the replacement 
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of the Navigator and Engineer in the airland mission, it actually has lower team SA 
during the formation airdrop than the C-130H despite the legacy aircrew working harder. 
Finally, the relationship between SA and workload model outputs was examined 
for potential trends.  In the formation airdrop scenario, the relationship between workload 
and SA was highly dissociated and did not reveal any trends.  This corresponds well to 
Endsley’s SAGAT test data (1993).  However, the airland scenario revealed that SA 
could be maintained at a high level (albeit with a large variance) until workload increases 
to a large level.  This corresponds to Endsley’s theoretical SA-workload function (II. 
Literature Review, Figure 5) from her same 1993 study. 
Significance of Research 
Situation awareness is of prime importance to tactical and combat aviation, 
however measuring it typically occurs with prototypes, test articles, and real operators 
after the aircraft has been designed or even built.  Perhaps of greatest significance to the 
research community is the development of a predictive workload algorithm that 
distinguishes between tactical SA and strategic SA and attempts to measure total SA in 
team settings of different sizes.  While there have been limited previous attempts to 
model SA potential with discrete-event simulation, this thesis presents the most detailed 
analysis to deterministically predict SA and distinguish its origins between task-centric 
tactical SA and workload-limited strategic SA. 
Because this study compares a four person cockpit crew of the C-130H with a 
more automated, two-person cockpit crew of the C-130J, it examines how workload and 
resultant SA changes when a human is removed from the cockpit and replaced with 
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automated systems.  Predictive analysis of this phenomenon was not possible a 
generation ago when debates raged over reducing airline cockpits to a two-person affair.  
The research presented here confirms anecdotal evidence that the benefits of one system 
over the other depends on circumstance.  The impact of removing two crewmembers 
from the cockpit and replacing them with automation has mixed results in both workload 
and situation awareness.  This is probably not what the systems engineers intended when 
designing the C-130J. 
The scenarios examined here are a staple of tactical airlift, both in training and in 
combat.  While comprehensive data was not publicly available at the time of this writing, 
SKE formation airdrop represents approximately 35-40% of squadron-level tactical 
training and is typical in large exercises such as RED FLAG and the USAF Weapon’s 
School Mobility Air Forces Exercise (MAFEX).  More broadly, formation airdrop (both 
using SKE and visual procedures) may occur on up to 75% of training missions 
(Shinaberry, 2013).  The Air Force mandates that pilots fly at least 12 SKE missions a 
year (AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 1, 2010).  While formation airdrop (including the use of SKE) 
has been used in combat (Panama, 1989; Haiti, 1994; Iraq, 2014), based on this author’s 
experience it represents perhaps less than 1% of deployed airlift missions. Single-aircraft 
airdrop missions were more prevalent in Afghanistan, reaching their peak in 2012.  
However, the mainstay of tactical airlift missions during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM 
and ENDURING FREEDOM has been single-aircraft airland.  Perhaps 90% of airland 
missions in both theaters begin with some kind of tactical arrival as simulated in the 
Maximum Effort Airland scenario, with perhaps 30-40% of landings in Afghanistan 
 154 
 
requiring maximum effort procedures.  The remainder may use normal landing 
procedures or mix the two. 
Further, while SA and workload affect each other, their correlation is not direct.  
In fact, the aircraft with higher workload also experienced higher total SA.  This 
downplays the impact that sophisticated avionics would have on enhancing SA at all 
times.  Put simply: it depends.  However, this complex interplay between workload and 
SA further supports the complexity shown by Endsley (1993). 
Recommendations for Action 
Systems Engineers and cockpit architects should carefully consider task allocation 
and information available to the aircrew.  Reducing the size of the cockpit crew must 
correspond with an appropriate redesign of procedures to accommodate a reduction in 
required tasks and cumulative workload.  This analysis shows that a workload reduction 
in one mission does not necessarily translate to reduced workload in all missions.  Since 
the C-130J’s much more sophisticated avionics (with increased data available to the 
pilots) did not result in a guaranteed increase in SA, engineers must also consider that 
total SA is not simply reflective of the total quantity of data, but also how and when it 
might be used.  Clearly, the autopilot and autothrottles are advantageous when used (SKE 
Formation Airdrop), but only for the Pilot.  Workload, however, increased heavily when 
one of the operators had to manipulate a keyboard or write data, thus adversely affecting 
operators other than the Pilot.  Designers must consider small choices, such as whether to 
use a switch, button, dial, or computer entry when manipulating aircraft systems.  While 
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multi-function and heads-up displays provided much richer SA, their utility was best 
realized at low-level.  Still, there is no substitute for looking out of the window.  
Finally, designers must consider not only technical procedures in the checklists, 
but how the aircraft might be employed operationally.  This thesis included lookout 
doctrine, intra-cockpit communication, tactical employment, and procedures developed at 
the operational level into both workload and situation awareness analysis.  The feedback 
from other crewmembers both added to workload and situation awareness which 
benefited the C-130H.  Thus, operators should continue to learn how to best exploit the 
strengths of the systems design and provide copious feedback to avionics and cockpit 
designers to iterate the design process. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Since predictive SA modeling is an immature science, further experiments are 
needed to validate the novel approach taken here.  Ideally a SAGAT or other similar 
objective SA measurement technique could be used to validate this experiment’s output.  
Specifically, experiments are required to determine which tasks add to tactical SA, by 
how much, and if it is possible for a task to detract from tactical SA.   Another study into 
tactical SA should be conducted.  Another survey should be produced which explains 
tactical versus strategic SA, quantity/quality of information versus priority of 
information, and opportunity costs versus incorrect SA.  The rating scale should very 
carefully explain negative SA scores and consider not including them at all.  Phases of 
flight may require more detail than cruise, airdrop, or airland, as SA values may change 
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with altitude, proximity to objective area, or other mission factors.  Also, more survey 
respondents should be used in a future survey in order to reduce variability. 
The thresholds for high, medium, and low strategic SA should be established 
experimentally as well as the cognitive workload required to maintain strategic SA.  The 
relative weight of strategic and tactical SA on total SA requires further study.  While this 
experiment seeks to model Level 1 SA some tasks in both networks included a 
component of evaluation (i.e. evaluate aircraft performance, “is aircraft safe to drop?” 
etc), Level 2 and Level 3 SA could potentially be simulated in future experiments.  
Further research should look into possible methods to predicatively model higher SA 
levels. 
Team SA, as described in this thesis, may be the first and best existing attempt at 
quantifying such a complex concept, but it still leaves much to be desired. Further 
research should be devoted towards understanding and capturing the complex interactions 
between team members in order to build collective team SA.  While the current method 
of setting team SA equal to the individual with the highest SA, this ignores how the 
information is shared between individuals on that team and how their attention is 
prioritized, which effectively eliminates any positive contribution from lower SA 
individuals.  Further research should seek to establish a measureable relationship between 
individual SA and SA for the collective team. 
The experiments described in this thesis are based on “normal” operations.  That 
is, a baseline scenario with few perturbations and no abnormal situation or unanticipated 
change.  These baseline models could be manipulated to introduce unanticipated changes 
such as in-flight emergencies, threat reactions, and off-course maneuvering. For example, 
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how would automation affect workload and situation awareness during formation airdrop 
or maximum effort airland differ when unanticipated change or abnormal situations are 
introduced?  Further studies could examine other C-130 missions as described in 
Appendix A: Description of C-130 Aircraft. 
Finally, to what extent does automation reliance have in terms of mission 
effectiveness and performance (beyond workload and situation awareness directly) versus 
a legacy system with larger crew compliments?  Drop accuracy and time over target data 
are regularly collected by operational units.  Subjective evaluations from exercises and 
after action reports could be qualitatively analyzed to compare C-130J and C-130H 
performance.  Further analysis must be conducted to determine how automation, 
workload and SA affect those results instead of individual proficiency level or other 
factors. 
Summary 
This thesis describes a novel method to predict aircrew situation awareness in an 
attempt to determine the effects of automation on aircrew workload and situation 
awareness during two specific tactical airlift missions.  The analysis results indicate that 
automation generally reduces workload and increases situation awareness, especially for 
the Pilot, but results are somewhat mixed and highly dependent on scenario and crew 
position.  The significance of these results (and the novel methodology) are discussed, as 
well as recommended actions.  Finally recommendations for continued research are 
made: chiefly, validation of the predictive situation awareness methodology via 
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experimentation and running similar discrete-event simulations with unanticipated 
abnormal situations injected to force aircrew reaction. 
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Appendix A: Description of C-130 Aircraft and Missions 
C-130 Roles and Missions 
As a tactical airlifter, the primary mission of the C-130 is movement of cargo and 
passengers over relatively short distances (i.e. intra-theater) via airland (landing on 
established runways and landing zones) or airdrop (parachute delivery to a drop zone).  
Cargo may consist of loose items, vehicles and rolling stock, or palletized cargo that 
interlocks into rails located on the left and right side of the cargo compartment.  The C-
130 can simultaneously carry both passengers and cargo in both airland and airdrop roles 
and quickly off-load them through a rear-loading ramp and side-facing paratroop doors.  
Rollers mounted to the cargo floor allow for easy roll-on/roll-off of cargo pallets and the 
cargo compartment can be quickly reconfigured to accommodate a new load. 
The C-130 can accomplish a wide variety of special mission sets in both modified 
and unmodified aircraft.  Aeromedical evacuation of wounded patients requires is a 
common mission performed with regular C-130s in combat zones.  Selected Air National 
Guard and AF Reserve units perform specialized airborne firefighting services with the 
Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS): a roll-on/roll-off pallet train and 
specialized training in MAFFS employment.  Antarctic resupply is accomplished on ice 
runways with ski-equipped LC-130H aircraft from the New York Air Guard.  The Air 
Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) employs highly modified C-130 aircraft to 
perform close air support (CAS) and interdiction fires, infiltration/exfiltration of special 
operations forces, helicopter and tilt-rotor air refueling.  C-130s have also been tasked for 
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search and rescue (SAR), served as radio relays, electronic warfare platforms, and 
command and control assets. However, the bulk of conventional C-130 missions are 
airland and airdrop, both in formation and as a single aircraft. 
The C-130J, with its two-person cockpit (Pilot and Copilot) relies on a modern 
glass cockpit and automation to replace the duties performed by the Navigator and 
Engineer found on the C-130H.  The C-130J avionics are capable of automatic systems 
monitoring and provide both an enhanced quantity and quality of data available to the 
aircrew.  The C-130J avionics system is radically different than the C-130H.  The H-
model “steam gauges” of analog round-dial instruments are replaced by pilots’ heads-up 
displays (HUD), color multi-function displays (MFD), and an upgraded mission 
computer and software.  This mission computer (Communications, Navigation, Intercom-
Multipurpose Unit, or CNI-MU), monitors aircraft systems health, plots the navigation 
solution, controls the primary flight displays (MFD and HUD), tunes radios, manages, 
provides circuit protection, controls defensive system settings, computes performance 
data, and manages station keeping (SKE) formation parameters (TO 1C-130J-1, 2009). 
All of this is done through a keyboard and monochromatic interface. Conversely, the 
Self-Contained Navigation System (SCNS) in the C-130E/H primarily plots the 
navigation solution and tunes radios (TO 1C-130H-1, 2010).  Prior to the SCNS upgrade 
in the 1990s, the C-130 depended heavily on having a pilot tune each radio separately and 
a navigator manually plotting position and manipulating the aircraft steering solution.  
Both SCNS and the CNI-MU function as a Flight Management System (FMS) to varying 
extents: the CNI-MU integrates more sensors and performs more function than SCNS. 
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Because so many features are built into the CNI-MU’s control layers, the C-130J 
eliminated dozens of mechanical circuit breakers, analog gauges, and switches. Some of 
these circuit breakers were located outside of the cockpit, and some functions, such as 
loading cryptographic data into radios required the copilot to crawl under the flight deck 
ladder or scramble through the cargo compartment in order to load.  Systems monitoring 
moved from the Flight Engineer to the aircraft, and many switches and gauges located on 
the C-130H navigator station and overhead panel (even out of the pilots’ reach) were 
consolidated into the CNI-MU or moved to be within reach of the pilots (TO 1C-
130E(H), 2009; TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-130J-1, 2009). While MFDs are 
manipulated via the CNI-MU and other soft-keys surrounding them, the C-130H utilizes 
more toggle switches, push buttons, and dials to manipulate the cockpit. 
Each aircraft presents information differently. The color MFDs can be customized 
to the pilot’s preference, whereas analog gauges have a very limited ability to display 
different data. Analog gauges may use some logic to trip a warning light when an 
operational limitation is exceeded, or they may have a painted marker defining a normal 
operations range. Unless there is a warning light to capture the operator’s attention, it is 
entirely incumbent upon that operator to identify when a system has malfunctioned. In 
the case of a loss in propeller hydraulic fluid (“Prop Low Oil” light), a warning light 
illuminates on the engine instrument stack to indicate that any one of the four propellers 
is losing fluid, but the Copilot or Engineer must look to the Copilot’s side shelf to 
identify the problematic propeller (TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-130(K)H-1, 2010). The 
C-130H3 includes Mode Advisory, Caution and Warning System (MACAWS) panels 
which track multiple system parameters, consolidate warning lights in fewer locations, 
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and alerts the aircrew with a flashing “Master Caution” when certain MACAWS alerts 
are triggered(TO 1C-130(K)H-1, 2010). While this serves to call greater attention to 
malfunctions, MACAWS treats major and minor malfunctions with the same level of 
primacy. This can be distracting when a relatively minor malfunction diverts attention 
during critical phases of flight. 
The C-130J integrates even more systems monitoring than the C-130H3. Alerts 
are generated by the mission computer and cued on the HUD (TO 1C-130J-1, 2009). This 
draws the pilots’ attention to one of the MFDs for the computer-diagnosed problem. The 
pilots can thus run a checklist that shares the same name as the computer-diagnosed 
problem, versus staring at a series of instruments and gauges and manually deducing the 
origin and name of the problem (Shinaberry, 2013). Therefore, a pilot could theoretically 
all but remove systems monitoring from their instrument scan. 
Because of the size and complexity of the C-130H cockpit, several instruments 
are hidden by the flight controls.  Even the SKE Plan Position Indicator Scope occupies a 
significant portion of the center windscreen and obscures forward visibility (TO 1C-
130E(H), 2009). The C-130H3 and C-130J incorporate the SKE display into existing 
glass displays. Since MFDs and other “glass cockpit” displays can incorporate more 
complex data displays and layer that data, a significant number of gauges disappeared 
from the pilots’ instrument panel, resulting in a “cleaner” appearance and fewer places to 
search for information.  
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C-130J airdrops are primarily automatic, computer-releases, whereas C-130E/H is 
capable of a computer-released airdrop, but it is almost always done manually. That is, 
one of the pilots must actuated the “green light” and ADS button (if applicable) at the 
navigator’s “green light” call. Furthermore, because pre-SCNS C-130s did not have a 
computer-derived Computer Air Release Point (CARP), C-130H crews extensively rely 
on the navigator to manually determine a preflight CARP and update the SCNS CARP 
during the mission.  As a result, the navigator can verbally direct the pilot to make 
adjustments to the CARP based on last minute observations in ballistics.  This judgment 
skill allows the navigator to command “green light” visually by manually sighting the 
desired point of impact against a known reference in the aircraft and using timing (AFI 
11-231, 2005).  While the C-130J can drop visually at extremely low altitude, regular 
employment of these “sight-angle” drops are largely unique to the legacy C-130H.  
Frequently, the only known data points in the ballistic wind profile are surface winds 
reported by the drop zone and the winds sensed by the aircraft at drop altitude.  Because 
this can lead to errors in ballistic data, the C-130H navigator can make adjustments based 
on visual cues such as smoke or correct from prior strike reports, whereas the C-130J 
pilots are very reluctant, if not restricted from making slight windage adjustments 
(Shinaberry, 2013).  Also, any changes to the Point of Impact (target on the DZ) or major 
CARP adjustments require reprogramming the navigational solution.  Manipulating the 
mission computer (SCNS or CNI-MU) drives significant workload for the operator 
assigned to it (pilot not flying in the C-130J or the C-130H navigator). However, in some 
cases, changes in PI can be handled quicker in the C-130H because the aircrew can rely 
on visual means to manually release the airdrop load, but the C-130J must reprogram the 
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CNI-MU to accommodate dependence on computer guidance and release (Frampton, 
2009).  Although, as the C-130J matures, tactics to drop visually and improve 
responsiveness are being developed (Frampton, 2009). 
Parachute drops are very sensitive to wind due to their extended time of fall 
compared to an object falling purely ballistically (such as a bomb).  Thus, minor 
variations caused by DZ reporting error, old data, or low level wind shear have 
measurable effects on accuracy.  While a purely computer-derived drop is more likely to 
drop with the same or higher accuracy when ballistic wind data is good, when the input 
data is poorer quality, the human operator must use judgment to apply a correction factor.  
C-130H aircrews do this routinely, and while a C-130J aircrew could also apply a 
correction factor, in practice they adhere strictly to computer-generated CARPs, provided 
that data is judged reasonable and safe (Kennedy, 2015; Shinaberry, 2013). 
Because the C-130J’s autopilot and autothrottles can be coupled Computed 
Aircraft Positioning System (CAPS) SKE formation position, the aircraft can be flown in 
formation enroute through the drop completely on autopilot. The C-130H, however, is 
not equipped with autothrottles, and the SKE formation must be flown manually based on 
a scope return and gauge needles. Once exception: the C-130H Pilot could engage 
“altitude hold” on the autopilot, while manually flying lateral and longitudinal position 
with the control yoke and throttles.   
The C-130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) represents another 
significant overhaul of C-130H cockpits to include a glass cockpit, new radios, data-
links, FMS, air data system and even a HUD to improve mission capability and ensure 
future compliance with communications, navigation and air traffic management required 
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to operate in high-density airspace, such as Europe (Nelson, Dunavold, & Dickson, 
2010).  Converting all C-130Hs to the AMP standard would eliminate differences 
training and qualifications to aircraft that are superficially similar (for instance, the author 
was required to maintain differences training and separate qualifications on the C-130E, 
H1, H2, and H3 aircraft simultaneously)(GAO, 2014). AMP aircraft replaced analog 
gauges from the C-130H with six color MFDs, a FMS, pilot and copilot HUDs, and new 
system alerting interfaces.  The AMP represents a major upgrade to the avionics 
architecture while retaining legacy SKE, propulsion and most other systems, while 
automating the position of navigator yet retaining the flight engineer.  While the AMP 
has not been operationally fielded to the C-130H fleet (due to costs and widespread 
conversion to the C-130J), test results reinforce the demands of tactical aviation: 
formation flying, low level terrain avoidance, and frequent time and course adjustments 
to respond to airspace and threats. 
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Figure 35: C-130 AMP cockpit(GAO, 2014) 
 
Test results showed a satisfactory performance of SKE enroute and airdrop 
without a navigator present, yet airspace and terrain display data limitations caused an 
unsatisfactory increase in workload and poor time control performance using the 
available FMS.  Furthermore, flight management duties, such as route changes (i.e. off 
course maneuvering and flight plan modifications) and time control resulted in 
unacceptably high workloads due to poor automation of navigator functions (Nelson, 
Dunavold, & Dickson, 2010).  Further studies conducted by the Government 
Accountability Office showed that while the C-17 and C-130J do not include the 
navigator, certain airlift and combat missions are augmented with a third pilot.  Thus, if 
workload overburdens a two-pilot cockpit to the point where a third pilot is required to 
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mitigate workload, the savings offset by removing the navigator from the aircraft are 
significantly offset (GAO, 2014). 
The C-130 AMP tests were conducted as tactical training missions using both 
visual and SKE formation airdrops, both in leader and wingman positions, employed with 
C-130H procedures.  Test aircrew evaluated workload using the Bedford scale (similar to 
the Cooper-Harper scale) and a post-mission interview with a human factors expert 
(Nelson, Dunavold, & Dickson, 2010).  During these tests, it was found that the AMP 
could attain a time over target (TOT) within required tolerances, but only with 
considerable pilot effort.  During most phases of flight, the flight engineer workload was 
satisfactory with enough time to complete primary and additional tasks.  In many phases 
of flight the pilots reported instances where workload was tolerable and only a small 
amount of time was available to complete additional tasks.  However for the lead aircraft 
in formation during airdrop, cruise, and general formation flight created some instances 
where workload was marginally possible with minimal time remaining for additional 
tasks(Nelson, Dunavold, & Dickson, 2010).   
While some of the higher workload ratings were to be expected (task demands of 
coordinating with air traffic control, for example), the requirement to plot and avoid 
threats, make subsequent adjustments to time control in order to meet a desired TOT 
drove workload to unacceptable levels.  Primarily this was due to the requirement to 
program the FMS with each required changed coupled with the FMS’ inability to 
accommodate multiple complex parameter changes (altitude, speed, course). 
Furthermore, the test participants reported high levels of workload associated with the 
mission that was shared between legacy C-130H and AMP aircraft.  Specifically, the 
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simultaneous demands during a SKE airdrop to send SKE commands, monitoring and 
making radio calls, obtaining clearances, completing checklists, searching for and visual 
evaluation of the drop zone, setting up the navigation solution, and wingman 
considerations (Nelson, Dunavold, & Dickson, 2010). 
Technology, such as Missile Warning Systems (MWS) and Radar Warning 
Receivers, exist on both the H and J to detect threats, and in some instances, dispense 
countermeasures, but aircrew are trained and expected to augment these systems in both 
threat detection and reaction.  One advantage the C-130J has is the incorporation of threat 
symbology in the HUD, whereas the C-130H crew must look inside the cockpit to 
determine the source of the threat.  However, with increase speed of recognition comes a 
trade in dependency and fixation on the HUD’s limited field of view—neglecting scanner 
duties in positions other than 12 o’clock (Burgess, 2005; Kennedy, 2015; Shinaberry, 
2013). 
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Appendix B: Detailed Scenario Narratives 
Scenario 1: Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) Formation Personnel Airdrop 
A formation uses Station Keeping Equipment (SKE) to maintain formation 
position when conditions do not permit visual formation procedures and can be quite 
large (up to 36 airplanes on a single channel) (TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-130(K)H-1, 
2010; TO 1C-130J-1, 2009).  Flying SKE has a rather extensive set of “contracts” that 
aircraft maintain with each other(AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 2010; AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 2010; 
AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3, 2010).   These contracts include allowable deviations in airspeed, 
altitude, heading, and position error over the drop zone. Over the drop zone alone, the 
formation and element lead aircraft each have a maximum cross-track deviation and a 
timing window, and the wingman and element lead aircraft have a maximum formation 
(track-while-scan) lateral deviation (AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 2010; AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 
2010).  Finally each element drops 50 feet higher than the preceding element to ensure 
parachutes do not contact following aircraft (AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3, 2010). 
Because it has the most restrictive contracts, element lead in a SKE formation is 
considered one of the more difficult formation positions to maintain in the C-130H, 
especially when over the drop zone.  Element lead must maintain his formation position 
relative to the formation lead, maintain positional awareness of the wingman in front of 
him (if the preceding wingman drifts back too far, he is a conflict with element lead), 
manually relay SKE computer commands via push button on the Flight Command 
Indicator (FCI), while maintaining a stable platform for his wingman and following 
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element.  However, CAPS (Coordinated Aircraft Positioning System) coupled to the 
autopilot and autothrottles has largely relieved the C-130J crew of manual formation 
position maintenance and sending most FCI commands (TO 1C-130J-1, 2009).   
C-130J pilots have described an easier ability to maintain an accurate formation 
position.  C-130E/H crews describe SKE as flying an hour-long ILS (precision 
instrument approach) because of the concentration of chasing and centering multiple 
needles (Delgado, 2014; Shinaberry, 2013; Kennedy, 2015; Pedersen, 2015). The C-130J 
uses CAPS (Coordinated Aircraft Positioning System), which can be coupled to the 
autothrottles(TO 1C-130J-1, 2009).  Even C-130J formation slowdowns (i.e. slowing 
from enroute airspeed to drop airspeed) are normally done with autothrottles (AFTTP 3-
3.C-130J, 2010).  SKE must be manually hand-flown in the C-130H (exception: can use 
only altitude hold function of the autopilot) (TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-130(K)H-1, 
2010).  
On C-130H aircraft, crews fly SKE formation positions by referencing a Plan 
Position Indicator scope (PPI) (large stand-alone CRT on top of pilots’ instrument panel 
of E/H1/H2 or AN/APN-241 radar display mode for upgraded H1/H2 aircraft and all H3 
aircraft).  The PPI displays a circle blip for the lead aircraft and a square blip for all other 
SKE formation members  Also, SKE airplanes have a Track While Scan (TWS) function 
that shows formation position with mechanical needles.  Left and right cross track 
deviation take the place of the pilots’ flight director, a vertical deviation carat is in lieu of 
glide slope indication, and a stand-alone in-track deviation/range. TWS works in 
conjunction with the PPI to aid the pilot in maintaining formation position (TO 1C-130H-
1, 2010; TO 1C-130(K)H-1, 2010). 
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CAPS displays other SKE formation members as separate aircraft shapes in plan 
view on a Heads-Down-Display which, unlike the C-130H PPI (including H3, can also 
overlay flight planned route, other airborne traffic, tactical information and other 
navigational information on the same screen.  The pilot can incorporate CAPS 
symbology into the Heads-Up-Display (HUD), and has new symbology not available to 
the C-130H pilot: speed carets, desired path box (TO 1C-130J-1, 2009).  The C-130J 
presents “fly-to” symbology in addition to deviation symbology (i.e. the cross-track, 
elevation and range deviation needles on the C-130H1). CAPS enables 35 degrees of 
bank coupled to autopilot (TO 1C-130J-1, 2009), thus removing the hard bank angle limit 
of 20 degrees imposed on formation and element leaders in the C-130H(AFI 11-2C-130, 
Vol 3, 2010).  
A significant part of SKE procedure and training is how to execute turns, climbs, 
descents, airspeed changes, and airdrop as a formation.  The SKE computer is capable of 
transmitting and receiving simple commands  through the Flight Command Indicator 
(FCI) panel. The C-130H Navigator and Pilot share FCI tasks, where CAPS 
automatically sends most FCI commands in the C-130J.  SKE (C-130E/H) requires two 
preparatory commands (at 30 and 5 seconds to go) and one execute (“E”) FCI command, 
range, and true airspeed for a computer turn.  A properly formatted SKE computer turn 
command from the lead aircraft automatically starts a timer in the wingman’s SKE 
computer to command the wingman to turn over the same geographic point as lead.  
Furthermore the TWS needle transitions from cross track deviation to commanding a 
bank angle to maintain formation position in the turn.  (TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-
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130(K)H-1, 2010).  As the wingman approaches the rollout point the TWS needle returns 
to cross track deviation. 
CAPS (C-130J) can automatically send SKE commands to wingman C-130J 
aircraft or manually push SKE commands to C-130H aircraft (AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 2010).  
A C-130J SKE formation is primarily flown with autopilot and autothrottles engaged 
(AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 2010). Since there are continuously computed “fly-to” commands 
on the HUD and on the CAPS display, and CAPS automatically sends position 
commands, there are considerably fewer procedures for flying SKE with CAPS.  This is 
manifested in C-130 Initial Qualification courses.  While both the C-130H and C-130J 
both devote six simulator events to SKE training, the C-130H requires at least three SKE 
missions performed in the aircraft versus only one SKE mission for the C-130J (Delgado, 
2014). 
 The workload impact of manually sending FCI commands have been described 
by pilots as significant (Kennedy, 2015; Shinaberry, 2013; Delgado, 2014).  While 
enroute the Navigator relays initial commands (30 seconds before execution) and any 
numerical information (such as wind/drift information, altimeter settings, etc.).  The Pilot 
(C-130H) relays “5 second” and “execute” commands while flying the aircraft.  Nowhere 
is this workload more apparent than the slowdown, airdrop, and escape sequence.  After 
the Navigator relays “30 seconds to slowdown” via the FCI, the Pilot is responsible for 
the next nine FCI commands until completion of the escape maneuver.  This slowdown-
drop-escape sequence involves a significant change in airspeed, descent to drop altitude, 
aircraft configuration, precise formation and course maintenance, numerous checklist 
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responses, and radio calls.  This shift in FCI tasks to the Pilot occurs during an already 
high-taskload phase in the mission. 
In order to execute airdrops in inclement weather, C-130E/H formation and 
element lead aircraft are required to be equipped with AWADS (Adverse Weather Aerial 
Delivery System) and trained in order to guide “dumb” (non-AWADS) wingmen across a 
drop zone(AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3, 2010).  AWADS is a high-resolution ground mapping 
radar (i.e. the AN/APN 241 low power color radar) that requires the navigator to analyze 
multiple radar targets and update the navigational solution to fine tune system position on 
the terminal leg for the airdrop.   Because C-130E/H aircraft were initially equipped with 
the lower resolution AN/APN-59 radar (which is only viewable at the navigator’s station 
when the SKE PPI is installed), AWADS was considered a special qualification and 
dependent on having precision radar-equipped aircraft available. However, the C-130J is 
equipped with the AN/APN-241 radar as standard, and since it is intended to 
automatically guide the aircraft to the release point and automatically drop, AWADS-like 
capabilities are already build into the aircraft and the special-qualification is superfluous.  
Thus, provided that the aircraft’s navigation solution is “tight,” no update is 
required(Delgado, 2014).  
Instead of a separate SKE Control Panel  blocking copilot lower windows, the 
CAPS/SKE controls is integrated into the CNI-MU (Communication/Navigation/ 
Identification-Management Unit) interface pages.  The SKE Control Panel uses rotary 
thumb wheels and push buttons as a user interface and is only accessible to the copilot, 
while the CNI-MU uses a keyboard and is the same primary interface used for most 
avionics data manipulation.  Both interfaces control formation parameters (range, lateral, 
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and vertical position), designation of the leader and other formation members, SKE 
frequency, clock synchronization, and proximity alarm settings. While legacy SKE 
provides the crew with a proximity alarm if another formation aircraft is closer than a 
user-defined value CAPS will sound the proximity alarm if the closure rate with another 
formation aircraft is judged to be excessive or another aircraft is inside the user-defined 
proximity range(TO 1C-130H-1, 2010; TO 1C-130J-1, 2009). 
This scenario twenty minutes before the formation leader’s time over target 
(TOT) to the drop zone (DZ) with the “20 minute advisory” and the beginning of the 
Preslowdown Checklist.  Throughout the scenario, the pilot and navigator (C-130H) or 
CAPS (C-130J) is relaying required SKE FCI commands.  The formation begins at an 
enroute altitude and airspeed and must initialize a descent, then execute a turn to align 
with the DZ axis over the initial point (IP).  Proper alignment is to ensure the entire 
“stick” of paratroopers land along the long axis of a rectangular DZ.  After completion of 
the turn at the IP, the Copilot must reset the lateral position in the SKE Control Panel (C-
130H) or CNI-MU (C-130J).  Then, the formation slows from enroute airspeed to drop 
airspeed (Slowdown Checklist) then descends to drop altitude.  The C-130H Navigator 
performs terminal AWADS updates to tighten the navigational solution.  The Pilot fine 
tunes formation and navigation position closer to the DZ and the crew verifies that the 
aircraft has met all formation airdrop contracts and is in a safe position to drop. 
When the aircraft reaches the Computed Air Release Point (CARP), the Navigator 
(C-130H) or Copilot (C-130J) calls for “green light,” the troop jump light is illuminated, 
and the jumpers exit the aircraft (Release Point Checklist).  The aircrew then delays to 
allow follower aircraft before climbing and executing the formation escape maneuver.  
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This scenario ends with the formation established at enroute airspeed and altitude and the 
Completion of Drop checklist finished. 
Scenario 2: Maximum Effort Airland 
A penetration descent is achieved by reducing power to idle at a precisely 
calculated distance and diving at high speed to a desired configuration altitude.  The 
aircrew might plan to use the penetration descent to one of many high-speed, low altitude 
tactical arrivals, each with their own entry and exit parameters. Either at configuration 
altitude or during a low altitude tactical arrival, the aircraft must level off and slow down 
to lower gear and flaps. When approach speed is reached, the aircraft makes a steep final 
approach to the runway.  Ideally, the throttles would remain at idle from enroute altitude 
until less than one nautical mile from landing.   
In many parts of Afghanistan, Air Traffic Control (ATC) radar coverage is non-
existent and consists only of the “tower” or LZ control team.  Aircraft avoid each other 
procedurally using a coded position report.  Traffic avoidance and terrain clearance is at 
the pilots’ own risk and ATC can only give advisories of other known aircraft that have 
checked in on that given frequency.  The aircrew must avoid tactical Restricted Operating 
Zones (ROZ), high terrain, and weather. There may be no useable instrument approach, 
yet cloud layers from a passing thunderstorm require negotiation.   
   Remote FOBs may have short (as little as 3000 feet, or about a third the length 
and width of a normal runway), narrow, or unpaved, landing zones (LZ) that require 
maximum effort (assault) procedures(AFI 11-2C-130, Vol 3, 2010; AFI 11-2C-130J, Vol 
3, 2009; AFI 13-217, 2007).  The LZ may have a significant uphill/downhill gradient or 
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even a hump. Frequently, the runway is gravel or dirt or is in fair to poor condition. This 
type of landing is done at speeds below normal approach and landing speeds (with 
reduced stall margins) and touchdowns in a zone as little as 500 feet long (~2.5 seconds 
of flight time) and lit by only five infrared lights (AFI 13-217, 2007).  The increased level 
of precision upon landing drives a more stabilized approach (i.e. tighter parameters) and 
is less forgiving than landing on a 10,000 foot long runway common at many Air Force 
bases. This forces the crew to maintain a carefully controlled, but aggressive descent 
profile, and it highlights the difference made by incorporating a heads-up display (HUD). 
First, a configuration or ingress (if using a random tactical approach) altitude is 
chosen.  From this altitude, a final approach point (point where aircraft descends from 
configuration altitude with landing gear and flaps extended) and minimum slowdown 
distance is determined.  These two distances are manually calculated from established 
rules of thumb or extracted from tabulated data.  The altitude to lose from enroute altitude 
to determines the length of the high-speed penetration segment.  This is calculated by 
rules of thumb, tabulated data, or charts from the aircraft performance manual.  The 
length of the penetration segment is added to the slowdown distance and final approach 
segment to obtain the total approach length.  This number is adjusted for aircraft weight, 
winds aloft, terrain, and airspace considerations (AFTTP 3-3.C-130E/H, 2010; AFTTP 3-
3.C-130J, 2010). 
The C-130H aircrew manually calculates several altitude vs. distance “gates” 
(Figure 12) and compares SCNS (Self Contained Navigation System) distance-to-go and 
altimeter against are determined to evaluate energy management.  The Navigator 
programs the final approach glideslope into SCNS which aides the Pilot in determining 
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energy and aim point on the LZ touchdown zone.  While there are many techniques to 
manipulate SCNS and evaluate the energy state, this data is displayed only as course 
deviation and distance on the Horizon Situation Indicator and as raw numerical data on 
the SCNS control panels located outside of the normal field of view from the pilots’ 
instrument panel. The C-130J aircrew enters a computed flight path angle into the CNI-
MU (Communication/Navigation/Identification-Management Unit), which is displayed 
on the flight director and heads-up display (HUD).  Based on current descent 
performance, the navigation display will show where the aircraft will arrive at the 
programmed altitude on the flight plan route.  While SCNS will provide a numerical 
output for the winds experienced at that moment, the CNI-MU will apply wind-correction 
logic to the flight path.  If the pilots’ input a waypoint for the slowdown point, then the 
CNI-MU will calculate the vertical error to that waypoint, thus providing a real-time 
evaluate the aircraft’s energy state (AFTTP 3-3.C-130J, 2010).   
If the aircraft is descending too rapidly (ahead of profile) then the pilot may glide 
at a slower airspeed, proceed on a more direct routing to the LZ, or, as a last option, add 
power.  If the aircraft is not descending quickly enough (behind profile), the pilot must 
choose a more indirect routing (adding travel distance), slowdown and configure the 
aircraft at a higher altitude, or change the type of tactical arrival (i.e. overhead pattern 
instead of high-speed straight-in). 
Finally, on final approach with the LZ in the HUD field of view, the HUD flight 
path vector shows exactly where the aircraft is pointing, thus enabling an instantaneous 
decision whether or not the aircraft can make the LZ or will overshoot and go around.  
While C-130H pilots must visually evaluate the aircraft aim point on the LZ touchdown 
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points using the relative motion of the runway against the window, the C-130J HUD 
flight path vector precisely shows where the aircraft is going. 
This scenario starts with the autopilot engaged and the aircraft at enroute altitude 
and airspeed some distance away from the landing zone (LZ).  The pilots calculate 
penetration descent data for the airfield.  The Copilot contacts air traffic control (ATC) to 
obtain latest weather conditions.  The Navigator (C-130H) or Copilot (C-130J) makes 
updates the navigation solution to the landing runway and informs the tactical airspace 
controller and is released to ATC control.  The Engineer (C-130H) calculates by hand, or 
Pilot/Copilot (C-130J) enter into the CNI-MU, takeoff and landing data (TOLD).  The 
non-flying pilot checks the TOLD accuracy. After briefing the approach and landing, the 
Pilot calls for the Descent checklist.   
Then the Pilot reduces the throttles to flight idle and begins a high-speed descent 
as close as possible to the airfield, circumnavigating the largest mountains visually with 
the help of the Copilot, Navigator (C-130H), or moving map displays.  Both pilots 
evaluate the aircraft energy state and make corrections (lateral or vertical), as necessary, 
to maintain or regain the appropriate descent profile.  ATC may desire periodic position 
reports and identify air traffic that the aircrew must avoid.  At the calculated slowdown 
point, the Pilot levels the aircraft, while keeping the throttles at idle, commands for flaps 
“on speed” (incrementally lowering flaps at their design limit speed), gear, and the 
Before Landing checklist. When the LZ is visually identified, the Copilot reports “Field 
in sight” to ATC and requests permission to land. 
On final approach the aircrew flies a steep 6-9 degree glide slope (compared to 3 
degrees for a commercial airliner) until 150 ft, then adds power and reduces descent rate.  
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The Copilot advises the Pilot where he assesses the aircraft aim point is (left/right, 
long/short) and airspeed deviations (5 knots fast/3 knots slow).  The Navigator (C-130H) 
reads radar altimeter settings to the Pilot in the last 50 feet, while the Copilot states sink 
rate and airspeed as the Pilot’s scan transitions entirely outside. The aircraft touches 
down firmly inside the marked 500-foot long touchdown zone and the Pilot moves the 
throttles from flight idle to ground idle.  After a quick verification from the Copilot of 
true airspeed (C-130J) or from the Engineer that there is no propeller malfunction, the 
Pilot, applies maximum braking and reverse thrust while slowing the aircraft to taxi 
speed.   
During the ground roll, the Pilot reaches the tiller wheel and transfers control of 
the yoke to the Copilot.  Meanwhile, the Loadmaster, upon command from the Pilot, 
opens the cargo ramp and door and prepares for the engines-running offload (ERO) as the 
Pilot executes a 180 degree turn in the pothole-riddled ramp on the far side while the rest 
of the crew assists the Pilot to avoid the ditch and numerous obstacles parked on the 
confined ramp.  After setting the parking brake, the Loadmasters offload old cargo and 
upload new cargo while the Engineer (C-130H) or Copilot (through the CNI-MU—C-
130J) computes TOLD.  Maximum effort TOLD includes takeoff ground run, 
acceleration-check time, refusal speed, maximum effort takeoff speed, Fifteen minutes 
after landing, the offload and subsequent upload and ERO checklist is complete.  The 
Pilot taxis to the runway then calls for the Before Takeoff checklist while the Copilot 
obtains a departure clearance.   
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Appendix C: Situation Awareness Task Assessment 
Situation Awareness Task Assessment 
Name: __________________________________ Airframe(s)/MDS: ____________ Crew Position: __________ 
Please rate the following generic aircrew tasks according to their effect on situation awareness (SA) for the operator performing those tasks.  
Consider whether the following tasks increase or decrease SA compared to a hypothetical state where the operator has his/her eyes closed.  
Columns are provided for three phases: normal cruise, airdrop, and airland mission events. SA is the operator’s perception (or mental model) of 
elements in the environment around him/her within a volume of space and time, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status into the future1. Note: SA should not be misconstrued with the workload associated with that task. 
Rating scale: -----------------Degraded------------------Neutral------------------------------Improved------------------------------- 
Significant  Noticeable Slightly  No Effect Slightly  Noticeable Significant 
       -3          -2      -1          0      +1         +2          +3 
  MISSION EVENT:  
CRUISE 
FLIGHT 
FORMATION 
AIRDROP 
ASSAULT 
LANDING 
1 Reading instrument or gauge       
2 Reading MFD/moving map/digital display       
3 Viewing Head’s Up Display (HUD)       
4 Looking out of window       
5 Reading raw computer data       
6 Radar/sensor interpretation       
7 Keyboard/data entry       
8 Writing (data cards, kneeboard, etc.)       
9 Reading charts, “sticks,” approach plates       
10 Manual computations (whiz wheel, TOLD, tab data, etc)       
11 Talking, simple (advisory calls, responses)       
12 Talking, complex (briefings, radio calls, etc)       
13 Listening, simple (alerts, advisory call)       
14 Listening, complex (radio, crew feedback)       
15 Background listening (monitoring RWR, radio)          
16 Simple  maneuvering (maintaining parameters)        
17 Complex maneuvering (defensive reactions)              
18 Simple button/switch actuation       
19          Cumbersome button/switch actuation       
 
Remarks: 
                                                          
1 Endsley, M. R. (1988a). Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique. Proceedings of the IEEE 1988 National Aerospace and Electronics Conference: NAECON 
1988. 3, pp. 789-795. Dayton: IEEE. 
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Appendix D: Task Listings and Tactical SA Assignments 
Table 28: Task Listing and Tactical SA for Basic Aircraft Control (C-130H) 
Tac SA 
Value  Task ID Function Task 
0 0 (Root) START Flying 
0 1_0 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130H) START 
0 1_1_0 Control the Airplane (P) START 
0 1_1_2 Control the Airplane (P) Adjust throttles 
0 1_1_3 Control the Airplane (P) Move Rudder Pedals 
0 1_1_4 Control the Airplane (P) Move control yoke 
0 1_1_5 Control the Airplane (P) Wait 
0 1_1_999 Control the Airplane (P) END 
0 1_2_0 Scan for threats (All) START 
0 1_2_10 Scan for threats (All) Delay3 
0.15/.2 1_2_11 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (E) 
0 1_2_12 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (N) 
0 1_2_13 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (P) 
0 1_2_14 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (LM) 
0 1_2_15 Scan for threats (All) Dispense counter- measures (N) 
0 1_2_16 Scan for threats (All) Maneuver  airplane (P) 
0 1_2_17 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (CP) 
0 1_2_18 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (E) 
0.2 1_2_19 Scan for threats (All) Monitor safety  of flight (CP) 
0 1_2_2 Scan for threats (All) Report threat (CP) 
0 1_2_20 Scan for threats (All) Dispense counter- measures (LM) 
0 1_2_21 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (LM) 
0.2 1_2_22 Scan for threats (All) Monitor safety  of flight (N) 
0.15/.2 1_2_23 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (P) 
0.2 1_2_24 Scan for threats (All) Monitor safety  of flight (E) 
0.05 1_2_3 Scan for threats (All) Listen RWR1 
0.05 1_2_4 Scan for threats (All) Listen RWR 
0.15/.2 1_2_5 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (CP) 
0.15/0.2 1_2_6 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (N) 
0 1_2_7 Scan for threats (All) Delay 
0 1_2_8 Scan for threats (All) Delay1 
0 1_2_9 Scan for threats (All) Delay2 
0 1_2_999 Scan for threats (All) END 
0 1_3_0 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) START 
0 1_3_1_0 Navigate the Airplane (P) START Navigating 
0.1 1_3_1_2 Navigate the Airplane (P) Read stick diagram 
0.15 1_3_1_3 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor SCNS Distance to Go 
0.15 1_3_1_4 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor SCNS Xtrck 
0.15 1_3_1_5 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor Heading 
0 1_3_1_6 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor Ground Speed 
0.1 1_3_1_7 Navigate the Airplane (P) Ensure terrain clearance 
0 1_3_1_8 Navigate the Airplane (P) Calculate time status 
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0 1_3_1_9 Navigate the Airplane (P) Routing 
0 1_3_1_999 Navigate the Airplane (P) END 
0 1_3_10 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Nothing 
0 1_3_11 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Calculate Pilot correction 
0 1_3_12 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Autopilot? 
0 1_3_13 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Delay 
0 1_3_2_0 Formation Position (P) START Formation Flying 
0 1_3_2_2 Formation Position (P) Calculate Pursuit Curve 
0 1_3_2_3 Formation Position (P) Calculate Closure velocity 
0.15 1_3_2_4 Formation Position (P) Monitor SKE in-track distance 
0.15 1_3_2_5 Formation Position (P) Monitor Elevation WRT Lead 
0.15 1_3_2_6 Formation Position (P) Monitor SKE Xtrack 
0 1_3_2_7 Formation Position (P) Routing 
0 1_3_2_999 Formation Position (P) END 
0.15 1_3_4 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor pitch 
0.15 1_3_5 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor airspeed 
0.15 1_3_6 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor bank angle 
0.15 1_3_7 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor altitude 
0.15 1_3_8 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor Vertical velocity 
0 1_3_9 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Routing 
0 1_3_999 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) END 
0 1_4_0 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) START 
0 1_4_1_0 Navigate the Airplane (CP) START Navigating 
0.1 1_4_1_2 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Read chart 
0.15 1_4_1_3 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor SCNS Distance to Go 
0.15 1_4_1_4 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor SCNS Xtrck 
0.15 1_4_1_5 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor Heading 
0.15 1_4_1_6 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor Ground Speed 
0.1 1_4_1_7 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Ensure terrain clearance 
0 1_4_1_8 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Calculate time status 
0 1_4_1_9 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Routing 
0 1_4_1_999 Navigate the Airplane (CP) END 
0.15 1_4_10 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor airspeed 
0 1_4_11 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Autopilot? 
0 1_4_12 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Delay 
0 1_4_2_0 Formation Position (CP) START Formation Flying 
0 1_4_2_2 Formation Position (CP) Calculate Pursuit Curve 
0 1_4_2_3 Formation Position (CP) Calculate Closure velocity 
0.15 1_4_2_4 Formation Position (CP) Monitor SKE in-track distance 
0.15 1_4_2_5 Formation Position (CP) Monitor Elevation WRT Lead 
0.15 1_4_2_6 Formation Position (CP) Monitor SKE Xtrack 
0 1_4_2_999 Formation Position (CP) END 
0.15 1_4_4 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor bank angle 
0.15 1_4_5 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor altitude 
0.15 1_4_6 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor Vertical velocity 
0 1_4_7 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Provide Feedback to Pilot 
0.25 1_4_8 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Evaluate Aircraft Performance 
0.15 1_4_9 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor pitch 
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0 1_4_999 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) END 
0 1_5_0 Navigate the Airplane (N) START Navigating 
0.15 1_5_10 Navigate the Airplane (N) Monitor Heading 
0.15 1_5_11 Navigate the Airplane (N) Monitor Ground Speed 
0.1 1_5_12 Navigate the Airplane (N) Ensure terrain clearance 
0.15 1_5_13 Navigate the Airplane (N) Observe weather radar 
0 1_5_14 Navigate the Airplane (N) Autopilot? 
0 1_5_15 Navigate the Airplane (N) Delay 
0 1_5_2 Navigate the Airplane (N) Direct Pilot corrections 
0 1_5_3 Navigate the Airplane (N) Calculate time status 
0 1_5_4 Navigate the Airplane (N) Do nothing 
0 1_5_5 Navigate the Airplane (N) Routing 
0.1 1_5_6 Navigate the Airplane (N) Read chart 
0 1_5_7 Navigate the Airplane (N) Routing task 
0.15 1_5_8 Navigate the Airplane (N) Monitor SCNS Distance to Go 
0.15 1_5_9 Navigate the Airplane (N) Monitor SCNS Xtrck 
0 1_5_999 Navigate the Airplane (N) END 
0 1_6_0 Monitor systems (E) START 
0 1_6_10 Monitor systems (E) Do nothing 
0 1_6_11 Monitor systems (E) Autopilot? 
0 1_6_12 Monitor systems (E) Delay 
0.05 1_6_2 Monitor systems (E) Listen (P) 
0.05 1_6_3 Monitor systems (E) Listen (CP) 
0.05 1_6_4 Monitor systems (E) Listen (N) 
0 1_6_5 Monitor systems (E) Decide/Observe 
0 1_6_6 Monitor systems (E) Troubleshoot 
0.15 1_6_7 Monitor systems (E) Monitor Acft performance 
0 1_6_8 Monitor systems (E) Routing 
0.15 1_6_9 Monitor systems (E) Monitor system health 
0 1_6_999 Monitor systems (E) Report problem 
0 1_7_0 Listen to Radios (All) START 
0.05 1_7_2 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (P) 
0.05 1_7_3 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (CP) 
0.05 1_7_4 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (N) 
0.05 1_7_5 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (FE) 
0 1_7_999 Listen to Radios (All) END 
0.05 1_9 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130H) Listen (P) 
0 1_999 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130H) END 
0 2_0 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130J) START 
0 2_1_0 Control the Airplane (P) START 
0 2_1_2 Control the Airplane (P) Adjust throttles 
0 2_1_3 Control the Airplane (P) Move Rudder Pedals 
0 2_1_4 Control the Airplane (P) Move control yoke 
0 2_1_5 Control the Airplane (P) Wait 
0 2_1_999 Control the Airplane (P) END 
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0 2_2_0 Scan for threats (All) START 
0.2 2_2_11 Scan for threats (All) Monitor safety  of flight (CP) 
0 2_2_12 Scan for threats (All) Report threat (CP) 
0 2_2_13 Scan for threats (All) Dispense counter- measures (LM) 
0 2_2_14 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (LM) 
0.15/.2 2_2_16 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (P) 
0.05 2_2_18 Scan for threats (All) Listen RWR1 
0.05 2_2_19 Scan for threats (All) Listen RWR 
0.15/.2 2_2_20 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (CP) 
0 2_2_22 Scan for threats (All) Delay 
0 2_2_23 Scan for threats (All) Delay1 
0 2_2_24 Scan for threats (All) Dispense counter- measures (P) 
0 2_2_5 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (P) 
0 2_2_6 Scan for threats (All) Scan outside (LM) 
0 2_2_7 Scan for threats (All) Dispense counter- measures (CP) 
0 2_2_8 Scan for threats (All) Maneuver  airplane (P) 
0 2_2_9 Scan for threats (All) Call threat (CP) 
0 2_2_999 Scan for threats (All) END 
0 2_3_0 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) START 
0 2_3_1_0 Navigate the Airplane (P) START Navigating 
0.1 2_3_1_2 Navigate the Airplane (P) Read stick diagram 
0.15/.2 2_3_1_3 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor SCNS Distance to Go 
0.15/.2 2_3_1_4 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor SCNS Xtrck 
0.15/.2 2_3_1_5 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor Heading 
0.15/.2 2_3_1_6 Navigate the Airplane (P) Monitor Ground Speed 
0 2_3_1_7 Navigate the Airplane (P) Ensure terrain clearance 
0 2_3_1_8 Navigate the Airplane (P) Calculate time status 
0 2_3_1_9 Navigate the Airplane (P) Routing 
0 2_3_1_999 Navigate the Airplane (P) END 
0.15/.2 2_3_10 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor Vertical velocity 
0 2_3_11 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Routing 
0 2_3_13 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Form Routing 
0 2_3_14 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Autopilot? 
0 2_3_15 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Delay 
0 2_3_2_0 Formation Position (P) START Formation Flying 
0 2_3_2_2 Formation Position (P) Calculate Pursuit Curve 
0 2_3_2_3 Formation Position (P) Calculate Closure velocity 
0.15/.2 2_3_2_4 Formation Position (P) Monitor SKE in-track distance 
0.15/.2 2_3_2_5 Formation Position (P) Monitor Elevation WRT Lead 
0.15/.2 2_3_2_6 Formation Position (P) Monitor SKE Xtrack 
0 2_3_2_7 Formation Position (P) Routing 
0 2_3_2_999 Formation Position (P) END 
0 2_3_4 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Nothing 
0 2_3_5 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Calculate Pilot correction 
0.15/.2 2_3_6 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor pitch 
0.15/.2 2_3_7 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor airspeed 
0.15/.2 2_3_8 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor bank angle 
0.15/.2 2_3_9 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Monitor altitude 
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0 2_3_999 Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) END 
0 2_4_0 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) START 
0 2_4_1_0 Navigate the Airplane (CP) START Navigating 
0.1 2_4_1_2 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Read chart 
0.15/.2 2_4_1_3 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor  Distance to Go 
0.15/.2 2_4_1_4 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor SCNS Xtrck 
0.15/.2 2_4_1_5 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor Heading 
0.15/.2 2_4_1_6 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Monitor Ground Speed 
0 2_4_1_7 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Ensure terrain clearance 
0 2_4_1_8 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Calculate time status 
0 2_4_1_9 Navigate the Airplane (CP) Routing 
0 2_4_1_999 Navigate the Airplane (CP) END 
0.15/.2 2_4_10 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor pitch 
0 2_4_12 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Form Routing 
0 2_4_13 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Autopilot? 
0 2_4_14 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Delay 
0 2_4_2_0 Formation Position (CP) START Formation Flying 
0 2_4_2_2 Formation Position (CP) Calculate Pursuit Curve 
0 2_4_2_3 Formation Position (CP) Calculate Closure velocity 
0.15/.2 2_4_2_4 Formation Position (CP) Monitor SKE in-track distance 
0.15/.2 2_4_2_5 Formation Position (CP) Monitor Elevation WRT Lead 
0.15/.2 2_4_2_6 Formation Position (CP) Monitor SKE Xtrack 
0 2_4_2_999 Formation Position (CP) END 
0.15/.2 2_4_4 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor airspeed 
0.15/.2 2_4_5 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor bank angle 
0.15/.2 2_4_6 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor altitude 
0.15/.2 2_4_7 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Monitor Vertical velocity 
0 2_4_8 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Provide Feedback to Pilot 
0.25 2_4_9 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Evaluate Aircraft Performance 
0 2_4_999 Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) END 
0 2_6_0 Monitor systems (CP) START 
0 2_6_10 Monitor systems (CP) Monitor system health 
0 2_6_12 Monitor systems (CP) Delay 
0.05 2_6_3 Monitor systems (CP) Listen (P) 
0 2_6_6 Monitor systems (CP) Decide/Observe 
0 2_6_7 Monitor systems (CP) Troubleshoot 
0 2_6_999 Monitor systems (CP) Report problem 
0 2_7_0 Listen to Radios (All) START 
0.05 2_7_2 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (P) 
0.05 2_7_3 Listen to Radios (All) Listen to Radios (CP) 
0 2_7_999 Listen to Radios (All) END 
0.05 2_9 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130J) Listen (P) 
0 2_999 Basic Aircraft Control (C-130J) END 
0 3_0 Situation Awareness (C-130J) START 
0 3_1_0 Pilot SA START 
0 3_1_2 Pilot SA Low SA 
0 3_1_3 Pilot SA High SA 
0 3_1_4 Pilot SA Medium SA 
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0 3_1_5 Pilot SA Delay 
0 3_1_999 Pilot SA END 
0 3_2_0 Copilot SA START 
0 3_2_2 Copilot SA Low SA 
0 3_2_3 Copilot SA High SA 
0 3_2_4 Copilot SA Medium SA 
0 3_2_5 Copilot SA Delay 
0 3_2_999 Copilot SA END 
0 3_999 Situation Awareness (C-130J) END 
0 4_0 Situation Awareness (C-130H) START 
0 4_1_0 Pilot SA START 
0 4_1_2 Pilot SA Low SA 
0 4_1_3 Pilot SA High SA 
0 4_1_4 Pilot SA Medium SA 
0 4_1_5 Pilot SA Delay 
0 4_1_999 Pilot SA END 
0 4_2_0 Copilot SA START 
0 4_2_2 Copilot SA Low SA 
0 4_2_3 Copilot SA High SA 
0 4_2_4 Copilot SA Medium SA 
0 4_2_5 Copilot SA Delay 
0 4_2_999 Copilot SA END 
0 4_3_0 Navigator SA START 
0 4_3_2 Navigator SA Low SA 
0 4_3_3 Navigator SA High SA 
0 4_3_4 Navigator SA Medium SA 
0 4_3_5 Navigator SA Delay 
0 4_3_999 Navigator SA END 
0 4_4_0 Engineer SA START 
0 4_4_2 Engineer SA Low SA 
0 4_4_3 Engineer SA High SA 
0 4_4_4 Engineer SA Medium SA 
0 4_4_5 Engineer SA Delay 
0 4_4_999 Engineer SA END 
0 4_999 Situation Awareness (C-130H) END 
0 999 (Root) Model END 
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Table 29: Task Listing and Tactical SA Values for SKE Formation Airdrop (C-130H) 
Tac SA 
Value  Task ID Function Task 
0 0 (Root) Model START 
0 19_0 Preslowdown Checklist START 
0 19_1 Preslowdown Checklist Crew, 20 min advisory (N) 
0 19_10 Preslowdown Checklist Load is off headset (LM) 
0 19_11 Preslowdown Checklist Brief Airdrop card (CP) 
0 19_12 Preslowdown Checklist Reviewed, Pilot (P) 
0 19_13 Preslowdown Checklist Copilot (CP) 
0 19_14 Preslowdown Checklist Nav (N) 
0 19_15 Preslowdown Checklist set radar altimeter (P) 
0 19_16 Preslowdown Checklist Set Radar altimeter (N) 
0 19_17 Preslowdown Checklist Radar  altimeter (E) 
0.05 19_18 Preslowdown Checklist Set  xxx, Pilot 
0 19_19 Preslowdown Checklist Set  xxx, Nav (N) 
0 19_2 Preslowdown Checklist Post drop information on card (N) 
0 19_20_0 Depressurize (E) Is altitude appropriate? 
0 19_20_2 Depressurize (E) Set cabin rate knob 
0 19_20_3 Depressurize (E) Set pressure controller 
0 19_20_4 Depressurize (E) set air cond master switch 
0 19_20_999 Depressurize (E) Cabin diff press =0 
0 19_21 Preslowdown Checklist Red Light (E) 
0 19_22 Preslowdown Checklist Turn on  Troop Caution (CP) 
0 19_23 Preslowdown Checklist On (CP) 
0 19_24 Preslowdown Checklist (Jumpers stand) 
0 19_25 Preslowdown Checklist Drift and  Altimeter setting (E) 
0 19_26 Preslowdown Checklist Relayed  xx L/R (N) 
0 19_27 Preslowdown Checklist Compute SKE run-in XTRK (CP) 
0 19_28 Preslowdown Checklist Computer  Airdrop Information (E) 
0.05 19_29 Preslowdown Checklist Pass Airdrop drift FCI 
0 19_3 Preslowdown Checklist Preslowdown Checklist (N) 
0.05 19_30 Preslowdown Checklist Relay Altimeter FCI 
0.05 19_31 Preslowdown Checklist Relay drift (N) 
0.05 19_32 Preslowdown Checklist Relay altimeter (N) 
0 19_33_0 Check  computer info (N) START 
0 19_33_1 Check  computer info (N) Enter/verify TOT 
0 19_33_2 Check  computer info (N) Program ballistic winds 
0 19_33_3 Check  computer info (N) Verify Ballistic data 
0 19_33_4 Check  computer info (N) Confirm drop reference 
0 19_33_5 Check  computer info (N) Set Altitude gate 
0 19_33_6 Check  computer info (N) Program wind factor 
0 19_33_999 Check  computer info (N) Checked (N) 
0 19_34 Preslowdown Checklist SKE secondary  control panel (E) 
0 19_35 Preslowdown Checklist Reset SKE XTRK (CP) 
0.05 19_36 Preslowdown Checklist Set  xxx L/R (CP) 
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0 19_37 Preslowdown Checklist Adjust lateral position 
0 19_38 Preslowdown Checklist AD/TJ  switch (E) 
0.1 19_39 Preslowdown Checklist Verify  switch (CP) 
0.05 19_4 Preslowdown Checklist Crew, 10  min advisory (N) 
0.05 19_40 Preslowdown Checklist AD/TJ  Manual (CP) 
0 19_41 Preslowdown Checklist Preslowdown  checks (E) 
0.05 19_42 Preslowdown Checklist Load is back up (LM) 
0.05 19_43 Preslowdown Checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0 19_44 Preslowdown Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM)1 
0.05 19_46 Preslowdown Checklist Listen to brief (P) 
0.05 19_47 Preslowdown Checklist Listen to brief (N) 
0.05 19_48 Preslowdown Checklist Listen to brief (E) 
0 19_5 Preslowdown Checklist Personnel  Checklist (P) 
0 19_6 Preslowdown Checklist Open checklist (E) 
0 19_7 Preslowdown Checklist Post stall speeds  on drop card (E) 
0 19_8 Preslowdown Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM) 
0 19_9 Preslowdown Checklist Slowdown, drop zone , and escape (E) 
0.05 19_999 Preslowdown Checklist Complete,  Engineer (E) 
0 20_0 Formation descent Approaching  top of descent 
0.05 20_1 Formation descent Pass new  altitude (FCI) 
0.05 20_10 Formation descent Next altitude xxxx (N) 
0.05 20_11 Formation descent Relay 30 sec FCI (N) 
0.05 20_12 Formation descent 5 sec (N) 
0.1 20_13 Formation descent Verify clear of terrain 
0.05 20_14 Formation descent Clear of terrain (N) 
0.05 20_15 Formation descent Relay 5 sec FCI (P) 
0.05 20_16 Formation descent Passed 
0.05 20_17 Formation descent Relay "E" FCI (P) 
0.05 20_18 Formation descent Passed (P)1 
0.05 20_2 Formation descent Pass 30 sec FCI 
0 20_20 Formation descent Descend 1000 ft/min 
0 20_21 Formation descent Level off (P) 
0.05 20_24 Formation descent 1000 above (CP) 
0.05 20_3 Formation descent Pass 5 sec FCI 
0.05 20_4 Formation descent Pass Execute FCI 
0 20_5 Formation descent Level out 
0.05 20_6 Formation descent Lead is level @ xxxx 
0.05 20_7 Formation descent 2 is level 
0.05 20_8 Formation descent Relay Altitude (FCI) 
0.05 20_9 Formation descent Lead's 30 sec  downprep (N) 
0 20_999 Formation descent 3 is level 
0 21_0 Formation turn at IP Approaching turn point 
0.05 21_1 Formation turn at IP Pass TAS (FCI) 
0.05 21_10 Formation turn at IP Pass 5 sec (FCI) 
0.05 21_11 Formation turn at IP Pass execute (FCI) 
0.05 21_12 Formation turn at IP 30 sec, passed (N) 
0.05 21_13 Formation turn at IP Relay FCI (N) 
0 21_14 Formation turn at IP Compute time delay (N) 
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0.05 21_15 Formation turn at IP State time delay (N) 
0.15 21_16 Formation turn at IP Read in-track dist (CP) 
0.05 21_17 Formation turn at IP State in track dist (CP) 
0 21_19 Formation turn at IP Compute PPI offset (CP) 
0.05 21_2 Formation turn at IP Pass present hdg (FCI) 
0.15 21_20 Formation turn at IP Reset PPI ref line (CP) 
0.05 21_21 Formation turn at IP 5 sec (N) 
0.05 21_22 Formation turn at IP Relay FCI (P) 
0.05 21_23 Formation turn at IP Passed (P) 
0.05 21_24 Formation turn at IP begin turn (N) 
0.05 21_25 Formation turn at IP Relay "E" FCI (P) 
0.05 21_26 Formation turn at IP Passed (P)1 
0 21_27 Formation turn at IP begin turn (P) 
0.1 21_28 Formation turn at IP Begin turn (Lead) 
0.1 21_29 Formation turn at IP Roll out (Lead) 
0.05 21_3 Formation turn at IP Pass next hdg (FCI) 
0.15 21_30 Formation turn at IP Observe Lead's  turn (CP) 
0.05 21_31 Formation turn at IP Lead is in the turn (CP) 
0.05 21_32 Formation turn at IP Provide trend  info (CP) 
0.05 21_4 Formation turn at IP Lead is loading  computer turn (N) 
0.05 21_5 Formation turn at IP Relay TAS (N) 
0.05 21_6 Formation turn at IP Relay present hdg (N) 
0.05 21_7 Formation turn at IP Relay next hdg (N) 
0.05 21_8 Formation turn at IP Box is loaded (N) 
0.05 21_9 Formation turn at IP Pass 30 sec (FCI) 
0 21_999 Formation turn at IP Roll out (P) 
0 22_0 Slowdown checklist Approach SD point 
0.05 22_1 Slowdown checklist Pass 30  sec SD (FCI) 
0.05 22_10 Slowdown checklist Passed (P) 
0.05 22_11 Slowdown checklist Slowdown,  slowdown, now (N) 
0.05 22_12 Slowdown checklist Relay "E" FCI (P) 
0.05 22_13 Slowdown checklist Flaps 50,  on speed (P) 
0 22_14 Slowdown checklist Retard throttles (P) 
0.05 22_15_0 Move flaps 50% (CP) Flaps tracking  50%, on speed (CP) 
0 22_15_10 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0.15 22_15_11 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (CP) 
0.15 22_15_12 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (E) 
0.15 22_15_3 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (CP) 
0 22_15_4 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 20% (CP) 
0.15 22_15_5 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (CP) 
0 22_15_6 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 30% (CP) 
0.15 22_15_7 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (CP) 
0 22_15_8 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 40% (CP) 
0.15 22_15_9 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (CP) 
0 22_15_999 Move flaps 50% (CP) END 
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0 22_16 Slowdown checklist Silence warning horn (CP) 
0 22_17 Slowdown checklist Slow to  140 KIAS (P) 
0.15 22_19 Slowdown checklist Observe  <150 KIAS (E) 
0.05 22_2 Slowdown checklist 30 sec to  slowdown (N) 
0 22_20 Slowdown checklist Air  deflector doors (E) 
0 22_21 Slowdown checklist throw switch (CP) 
0.05 22_22 Slowdown checklist observe light (CP) 
0.05 22_23 Slowdown checklist Indicate open (CP) 
0 22_24 Slowdown checklist Open  paratroop door (LM) 
0 22_25 Slowdown checklist Drift and  wind information (E) 
0 22_26 Slowdown checklist Add power  to maintain  140 KIAS (P) 
0 22_27 Slowdown checklist Contact Drop zone 
0.05 22_28 Slowdown checklist Recieve DZ winds 
0.05 22_29 Slowdown checklist Pass updated  drift data (FCI) 
0.05 22_3 Slowdown checklist Pass 5  sec SD (FCI) 
0 22_30 Slowdown checklist Lead is 140 KIAS 
0.15 22_31 Slowdown checklist Arrive @ earliest descent point 
0 22_32 Slowdown checklist IFF/TCAS (E) 
0 22_33 Slowdown checklist Flaps (E) 
0.05 22_34 Slowdown checklist 50% (CP) 
0.1 22_35 Slowdown checklist verify STBY (CP) 
0.05 22_36 Slowdown checklist Set,  standby (CP) 
0.05 22_37 Slowdown checklist Pass 5 sec (FCI) 
0.05 22_38 Slowdown checklist Pass "E" (FCI) 
0 22_39_0 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Update CARP (N) 
0.1 22_39_1 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Verbalize new CARP (N) 
0.05 22_39_2 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Repeat new CARP (P) 
0 22_39_3 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Compute new GS (N) 
0 22_39_4 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Program new CARP in SCNS (N) 
0 22_39_5 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Compute in-track timing (N) 
0.05 22_39_6 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) Relay drift FCI (N) 
0 22_39_999 
Compute  independent  ballistic info 
(N) END 
0.05 22_4 Slowdown checklist Relay 30 sec FCI (N) 
0.05 22_40 Slowdown checklist Relayed (N) 
0.05 22_41 Slowdown checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0 22_42 Slowdown checklist Lead descends  to drop altitude 
0 22_43 Slowdown checklist Lead slows  to 130 KIAS 
0.05 22_44 Slowdown checklist Lead's  down prep (N) 
0.05 22_47 Slowdown checklist Relay 5 sec FCI 
0.05 22_48 Slowdown checklist relay FCI (P) 
0.05 22_49 Slowdown checklist descend now (N) 
0.05 22_5 Slowdown checklist Passed (N) 
0.05 22_51 Slowdown checklist confirm  clear of terrain (N) 
0 22_52 Slowdown checklist Retard throttles (P)1 
0 22_53 Slowdown checklist Descend to  drop alt +50ft (P) 
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0 22_54 Slowdown checklist Slow  to 130 KIAS 
0 22_55 Slowdown checklist Adjust  formation position (P) 
0 22_56 Slowdown checklist stop descent /level (P) 
0 22_57 Slowdown checklist Slowdown  Checks (E) 
0.05 22_58 Slowdown checklist Complete, Eng (E) 
0 22_59 Slowdown checklist Pull hot  mike knob (P) 
0.05 22_6 Slowdown checklist Pass execute (FCI) 
0 22_60 Slowdown checklist Pull hot  mike knob (CP) 
0.05 22_61 Slowdown checklist Pilot is  hot mike (P) 
0.05 22_62 Slowdown checklist Copilot is  hot mike (CP) 
0.1 22_63 Slowdown checklist Clear to drop (DZ) 
0.05 22_64 Slowdown checklist Acknowledge (P) 
0.05 22_65 Slowdown checklist Acknowledge (CP) 
0.05 22_66 Slowdown checklist Acknowledge (N) 
0.05 22_67 Slowdown checklist Acknowledge (E) 
0.05 22_7 Slowdown checklist [callsign] slowdown,  slow down, now 
0.05 22_8 Slowdown checklist 5 sec to  slowdown (N) 
0.05 22_9 Slowdown checklist Relay 5 sec FCI (P) 
0 22_999 Slowdown checklist END 
0 24_0 Release Point Checklist START 
0.05 24_10 Release Point Checklist No drop (P) 
0.05 24_11 Release Point Checklist No drop (CP) 
0.05 24_12 Release Point Checklist No drop (N) 
0.05 24_13 Release Point Checklist No drop (E) 
0.2 24_14 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (P) 
0.2 24_15 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (CP) 
0.2 24_16 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (E) 
0.1 24_17 Release Point Checklist Evaluate SCNS time (N) 
0.05 24_18 Release Point Checklist Timing is good (N) 
0.1 24_19 Release Point Checklist Evaluate SCNS xtrk (P) 
0.05 24_2 Release Point Checklist 1 min  advisory (N) 
0.05 24_20 Release Point Checklist SCNS is good (P) 
0.2 24_21 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (N) 
0.1 24_22 Release Point Checklist Evaluate  formation position (CP) 
0.05 24_23 Release Point Checklist TWS is good (CP) 
0.05 24_24 Release Point Checklist 5 sec (FCI) 
0.15 24_25 Release Point Checklist Observe  SCNS time (N) 
0.05 24_26 Release Point Checklist 5 sec (N) 
0.05 24_27 Release Point Checklist Relay  5 sec FCI (P) 
0.05 24_28 Release Point Checklist Passed (P)1 
0.05 24_29 Release Point Checklist Execute (FCI) 
0.05 24_3 Release Point Checklist Relay 1 min FCI (P) 
0.1 24_30 Release Point Checklist Observe  GL time (N) 
0.05 24_31 Release Point Checklist Green  Light! (N) 
0.05 24_32 Release Point Checklist Relay  "E" FCI (P) 
0 24_33 Release Point Checklist turn on light (CP) 
0.05 24_34 Release Point Checklist On! (CP) 
0 24_35_0 Fly to CARP (P) START 
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0.15 24_35_1 Fly to CARP (P) maintain SKE xtrk position (P) 
0.15 24_35_2 Fly to CARP (P) minimize SCNS xtrk (P) 
0.1 24_35_3 Fly to CARP (P) minimize TKE (P) 
0.15 24_35_4 Fly to CARP (P) maintain element drop altitude (P) 
0.15 24_35_5 Fly to CARP (P) maintain drop airspeed (P) 
0.15 24_35_6 Fly to CARP (P) maintain SKE in-track spacing (P) 
0 24_35_999 Fly to CARP (P) END 
0.05 24_36 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged,  Copilot (CP)1 
0.05 24_37 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM)1 
0 24_38 Release Point Checklist Formation cleared to drop? 
0 24_39 Release Point Checklist Formation safe to drop? 
0.05 24_4 Release Point Checklist Passed (P) 
0.05 24_40 Release Point Checklist Pass no drop (FCI) 
0.05 24_41 Release Point Checklist Relay FCI (N)) 
0.05 24_42 Release Point Checklist xxxx, no drop, ack 
0.05 24_43 Release Point Checklist 2 
0 24_44 Release Point Checklist 3 (P) 
0 24_45 Release Point Checklist Jumpers exit 
0.05 24_46_0 Drop Malfunction Pilot,  malfunction (LM) 
0.05 24_46_1 Drop Malfunction Brief description (LM) 
0 24_46_2 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (LM) 
0 24_46_3 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (P) 
0 24_46_4 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (CP) 
0 24_46_5 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (N) 
0 24_46_6 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (FE) 
0 24_46_999 Drop Malfunction END 
0 24_47 Release Point Checklist Time for  usable DZ (N) 
0.05 24_48 Release Point Checklist load clear (LM) 
0.05 24_5 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged, Load (LM) 
0.05 24_50 Release Point Checklist Red light (N) 
0 24_51 Release Point Checklist turn  off light (CP) 
0.05 24_52 Release Point Checklist on (CP) 
0 24_53 Release Point Checklist Time for 60 sec 
0 24_54 Release Point Checklist Nothing 
0.05 24_7 Release Point Checklist 1 min warn (FCI) 
0 24_8 Release Point Checklist Are jumpers safe? 
0.05 24_9 Release Point Checklist No drop (LM) 
0 24_999 Release Point Checklist END 
0 25_0 Completion of Drop checklist START 
0 25_1 Completion of Drop checklist Paratroop  doors (E) 
0 25_10 Completion of Drop checklist Adjust  formation postn (P) 
0.05 25_11 Completion of Drop checklist Accelerate, Accelerate now (N) 
0 25_12 Completion of Drop checklist set AC  master switch (E) 
0 25_13 Completion of Drop checklist Set cabin  px controller (E) 
0 25_14 Completion of Drop checklist set rate knob (E) 
0 25_15 Completion of Drop checklist add throttles (P) 
0.05 25_16 Completion of Drop checklist Pass "E" FCI (P) 
0.05 25_17 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps up (P) 
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0.05 25_18 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps  tracking up (CP) 
0 25_19 Completion of Drop checklist Move flap lever (CP) 
0 25_2 Completion of Drop checklist Close doors (LM) 
0 25_20 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps (E) 
0.05 25_21 Completion of Drop checklist up (CP) 
0.15 25_22 Completion of Drop checklist Observe  flaps 0% (E) 
0 25_23 Completion of Drop checklist IFF/TCAS (E) 
0.15 25_24 Completion of Drop checklist verify stdby (CP) 
0.05 25_25 Completion of Drop checklist Set, STBY (CP) 
0 25_26 Completion of Drop checklist Radar  altimeter (E) 
0 25_27 Completion of Drop checklist redial radar alt (P) 
0 25_28 Completion of Drop checklist redial radar alt (N) 
0.05 25_29 Completion of Drop checklist Set, xxx,  pilot (P) 
0.05 25_3 Completion of Drop checklist Closed  and locked (LM) 
0.05 25_30 Completion of Drop checklist Set xxx Nav (N) 
0 25_31 Completion of Drop checklist AD/TJ swtich (E) 
0.1 25_32 Completion of Drop checklist verify MAN (CP) 
0.05 25_33 Completion of Drop checklist AD/TJ manual (CP) 
0 25_34 Completion of Drop checklist Red light (E) 
0 25_35 Completion of Drop checklist switch off (CP) 
0.05 25_36 Completion of Drop checklist off (CP) 
0 25_37 Completion of Drop checklist Drop checks (E) 
0.05 25_38 Completion of Drop checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0.05 25_39 Completion of Drop checklist Complete, Engineer (E) 
0 25_4 Completion of Drop checklist close  AD switch (CP) 
0.05 25_40 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 5 sec FCI 
0.05 25_41 Completion of Drop checklist Lead's 5  sec turn prep (N) 
0 25_42 Completion of Drop checklist Calculate time delay (N) 
0.05 25_44 Completion of Drop checklist Pass execute FCI 
0.05 25_45 Completion of Drop checklist state in- track position (CP) 
0.15 25_46 Completion of Drop checklist set PPI line (CP) 
0.05 25_47 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 5 sec FCI (P) 
0.05 25_48 Completion of Drop checklist Relay "E" FCI (P) 
0.05 25_49 Completion of Drop checklist L/R turn  xxx (N) 
0.05 25_5 Completion of Drop checklist indicate  closed (CP) 
0.15 25_50 Completion of Drop checklist monitor lead's  position (CP) 
0 25_51 Completion of Drop checklist advance  throttles (P) 
0 25_52 Completion of Drop checklist Accelerate  140 KIAS (P) 
0 25_53 Completion of Drop checklist Climb 1000 ft/min (P) 
0 25_54 Completion of Drop checklist Level @  new alt (P) 
0 25_55 Completion of Drop checklist Turn to  escape heading (P) 
0.05 25_56 Completion of Drop checklist provide trend  info to Pilot (CP) 
0 25_57 Completion of Drop checklist Roll out  on course (P) 
0.05 25_58 Completion of Drop checklist Lead is lvl xxxx 
0.05 25_59 Completion of Drop checklist 2 is level 
0 25_6 Completion of Drop checklist air deflector  doors (E) 
0 25_60 Completion of Drop checklist 3 is level (P) 
0.15 25_61 Completion of Drop checklist Pass new  IAS (FCI) 
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0.05 25_62 Completion of Drop checklist Relay IAS FCI (N) 
0.05 25_63 Completion of Drop checklist New speed xxx (N) 
0.05 25_64 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 30  sec (FCI)1 
0.05 25_65 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 30  sec FCI (N) 
0.05 25_66 Completion of Drop checklist 30 sec prep,  Passed (N) 
0.05 25_67 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 5  sec (FCI) 
0.05 25_68 Completion of Drop checklist 5 sec (N) 
0.05 25_69 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 5 sec FCI (P) 
0 25_7 Completion of Drop checklist SKE 2nd  cntrl panel (E) 
0.05 25_70 Completion of Drop checklist passed (P) 
0.05 25_71 Completion of Drop checklist Pass "E" (FCI)1 
0 25_72 Completion of Drop checklist accelerate 
0 25_73 Completion of Drop checklist adjust throttles (P) 
0 25_74 Completion of Drop checklist Adjust  formation postn (P)1 
0 25_8 Completion of Drop checklist reset  SKE panel (CP) 
variable 25_9 Completion of Drop checklist 
Set, (state  setting) (CP) 
 
25_999 Completion of Drop checklist END 
 
26_0 AWADS updates (N) START 
 
26_1 AWADS updates (N) AWADS Update 1 
 
26_2 AWADS updates (N) AWADS Update 2 
 
26_3 AWADS updates (N) AWADS Update 3 
 
26_999 AWADS updates (N) END 
 
44_0 Freq change START 
 
44_1 Freq change Direct freq change1 
 
44_2 Freq change Acknowledge (P)2 
 
44_3 Freq change Change radios (CP)1 
 
44_4 Freq change Check in1 
 
44_5 Freq change Acknowledge (P)3 
 
44_999 Freq change END 
 
45_0 Freq change1 START 
 
45_10 Freq change1 Copy drop scores (N) 
 
45_3 Freq change1 Obtain drop scores 
 
45_4 Freq change1 Direct freq change 
 
45_5 Freq change1 Acknowledge (P) 
 
45_6 Freq change1 Change radios (CP) 
 
45_7 Freq change1 Check in 
 
45_8 Freq change1 Acknowledge (P)1 
 
45_9 Freq change1 Copy drop scores (CP) 
 
45_999 Freq change1 END 
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999 (Root) Model END 
Table 30: Task Listing and Tactical SA Values for SKE Formation Airdrop scenario (C-130J) 
Tac SA 
Value  Task ID Function Task 
0 0 (Root) Model START 
0 19_0 Drop Preparation  Checklist START 
0 19_1 Drop Preparation  Checklist Crew, 20  min advisory (CP) 
0 19_10 Drop Preparation  Checklist Load is off headset (LM) 
0 19_11 Drop Preparation  Checklist Brief Airdrop card (CP) 
0 19_13 Drop Preparation  Checklist Complete (CP) 
0 19_15 Drop Preparation  Checklist set radar altimeter (P) 
0 19_16 Drop Preparation  Checklist Set Radar altimeter (CP) 
0 19_17 Drop Preparation  Checklist Altimeters (CP) 
0.05 19_18 Drop Preparation  Checklist Set  xxx, Pilot 
0 19_19 Drop Preparation  Checklist Set  xxx, Copilot (N) 
0 19_20_0 Depressurize (CP) Is altitude appropriate? 
0 19_20_4 Depressurize (CP) set air cond master switch 
0 19_20_999 Depressurize (CP) END 
0 19_22 Drop Preparation  Checklist Turn on  Troop Caution (CP) 
0 19_23 Drop Preparation  Checklist Red Light  On (CP) 
0 19_24 Drop Preparation  Checklist (Jumpers stand) 
0 19_26 Drop Preparation  Checklist Relayed  xx L/R (CP) 
0 19_28 Drop Preparation  Checklist Cabin  Depressurized (CP) 
0.05 19_29 Drop Preparation  Checklist Pass Airdrop drift FCI 
0 19_3 Drop Preparation  Checklist Drop Preperation  Personnel Checklist (P) 
0.05 19_30 Drop Preparation  Checklist Relay Altimeter FCI 
0 19_31 Drop Preparation  Checklist Input drift (CP) 
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0.05 19_32 Drop Preparation  Checklist Relay  altimeter (CP) 
0 19_33_0 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) START 
0 19_33_1 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) Verify CARP Page 1 
0 19_33_2 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) Verify CARP Page 2 
0 19_33_3 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) Verify CARP Page 3 
0 19_33_4 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) Verify CARP Page 4 
0 19_33_5 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) Verify CARP Page 5 
0 19_33_999 Check CNI-MU CARP data (CP) END 
0.05 19_39 Drop Preparation  Checklist Computer drop  switch-Manual (CP) 
0.05 19_4 Drop Preparation  Checklist Crew, 10  min advisory (CP) 
0 19_41 Drop Preparation  Checklist Drop preparation checks (CP) 
0.05 19_42 Drop Preparation  Checklist Load is back up (LM) 
0.05 19_43 Drop Preparation  Checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0.05 19_44 Drop Preparation  Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM)1 
0.05 19_46 Drop Preparation  Checklist Listen to brief (P) 
0.05 19_47 Drop Preparation  Checklist Relay drop  altitude (CP) 
0 19_6 Drop Preparation  Checklist Open checklist (CP) 
0.05 19_8 Drop Preparation  Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM) 
0.05 19_999 Drop Preparation  Checklist Complete  Copilot (CP) 
0 20_0 Formation descent Approaching top of descent 
0.05 20_1 Formation descent Pass new altitude (FCI) 
0.05 20_10 Formation descent Next altitude xxxx (P) 
0.05 20_11 Formation descent Relay  30 sec FCI (J) 
0.1 20_13 Formation descent Verify clear of terrain 
0.05 20_14 Formation descent Clear of terrain (CP) 
0 20_15 Formation descent Relay 5 sec FCI (J) 
0 20_16 Formation descent Passed 
0 20_17 Formation descent Relay  "E" FCI (J) 
0 20_18 Formation descent Autopilot pitch  wheel down (P) 
0.05 20_2 Formation descent Pass  30 sec FCI 
0 20_20 Formation descent Descend 
0 20_21 Formation descent Level off (J) 
0.05 20_24 Formation descent 1000 above (CP) 
0 20_3 Formation descent Pass 5 sec FCI 
0 20_4 Formation descent Pass Execute FCI 
0 20_5 Formation descent Level out 
0.05 20_6 Formation descent Lead is level @ xxxx 
0.05 20_7 Formation descent 2 is level 
0 20_8 Formation descent Dial new alt  in REF MODE (P) 
0.05 20_9 Formation descent Lead's 30 sec  downprep (P) 
0 20_999 Formation descent 3 is level 
0 21_0 Formation turn at IP Approaching turn point 
0 21_1 Formation turn at IP Pass TAS (FCI) 
0 21_10 Formation turn at IP Pass 5 sec (FCI) 
0 21_11 Formation turn at IP Pass execute (FCI) 
0 21_12 Formation turn at IP 30 sec, passed (J) 
0 21_13 Formation turn at IP Relay FCI (J)1 
0 21_14 Formation turn at IP Compute time delay (J) 
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0 21_15 Formation turn at IP State time delay (J) 
0 21_16 Formation turn at IP Read in-track dist (J) 
0 21_17 Formation turn at IP State in track dist (J) 
0 21_2 Formation turn at IP Pass present hdg (FCI) 
0 21_22 Formation turn at IP Relay FCI (J) 
0 21_23 Formation turn at IP Passed (J) 
0 21_25 Formation turn at IP Relay "E" FCI (J) 
0 21_26 Formation turn at IP Passed (J)1 
0 21_27 Formation turn at IP begin turn (J) 
0.25 21_28 Formation turn at IP Begin turn (Lead) 
0.25 21_29 Formation turn at IP Roll out (Lead) 
0.05 21_3 Formation turn at IP Pass next hdg (FCI) 
0.25 21_30 Formation turn at IP Observe Lead's  turn (CP) 
0.05 21_31 Formation turn at IP Lead is in the turn (CP) 
0.25 21_32 Formation turn at IP Provide trend  info (J) 
0.25 21_33 Formation turn at IP Observe  Lead's turn (P) 
0 21_4 Formation turn at IP Lead is loading  computer turn (J) 
0 21_5 Formation turn at IP Relay TAS (J) 
0 21_6 Formation turn at IP Relay present hdg (J) 
0 21_7 Formation turn at IP Lead's next hdg (CP) 
0 21_8 Formation turn at IP Box is loaded (J) 
0 21_9 Formation turn at IP Pass 30 sec (FCI) 
0.25 21_999 Formation turn at IP Roll out (J) 
0 22_0 Run-In checklist Run-in  checklist (P) 
0.05 22_1 Run-In checklist Pass 30  sec SD (FCI) 
0 22_10 Run-In checklist Passed (J)1 
0.05 22_11 Run-In checklist Slowdown,  slowdown, now (P) 
0.05 22_12 Run-In checklist Relay "E" FCI (J) 
0 22_14 Run-In checklist Retard  throttles (J) 
0 22_15_0 Move flaps  50% (CP) START 
0 22_15_10 Move flaps  50% (CP) Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0.15 22_15_11 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (CP) 
0 22_15_12 Move flaps  50% (CP) Flaps 50 (P) 
0.15 22_15_13 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (P) 
0.15 22_15_14 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (P) 
0.15 22_15_15 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (P) 
0.15 22_15_16 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (P) 
0.15 22_15_3 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 22_15_5 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 22_15_7 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 22_15_9 Move flaps  50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (CP) 
0 22_15_999 Move flaps  50% (CP) END 
0 22_16 Run-In checklist Silence warning horn (CP) 
0 22_17 Run-In checklist Slow to  140 KIAS (J) 
0.15 22_19 Run-In checklist Observe  <150 KIAS "Clear for air  deflectors" (P) 
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0.05 22_2 Run-In checklist 30 sec to  slowdown (P) 
0.05 22_21 Run-In checklist Coming open throw switch (CP) 
0.05 22_22 Run-In checklist observe light (CP) 
0.05 22_23 Run-In checklist Air deflector doors Indicate open. Doors clear to open (CP) 
0 22_24 Run-In checklist Open  paratroop door (LM) 
0.05 22_25 Run-In checklist Drift and  wind information relayed (CP) 
0 22_26 Run-In checklist Add power  to maintain  140 KIAS (J) 
0 22_27 Run-In checklist Contact Drop zone 
0.05 22_28 Run-In checklist Recieve DZ winds 
0.05 22_29 Run-In checklist Pass updated  drift data (FCI) 
0 22_3 Run-In checklist Pass 5  sec SD (FCI) 
0 22_30 Run-In checklist Lead is 140 KIAS 
0.15 22_31 Run-In checklist Arrive @ earliest descent point 
0.05 22_34 Run-In checklist  Flaps 50% (CP) 
0 22_37 Run-In checklist Pass 5 sec (FCI) 
0 22_38 Run-In checklist Pass "E" (FCI) 
0 22_39_0 input  new winds (CP) Input  new winds (CP) 
0.05 22_39_1 input  new winds (CP) Verbalize  new CARP (CP) 
0.05 22_39_2 input  new winds (CP) Repeat  new CARP (P) 
0.05 22_39_3 input  new winds (CP) VERT GDNC  Set, ___ (CP) 
0.05 22_39_5 input  new winds (CP) X PATH  OFS, Set 0 (CP) 
0 22_39_999 input  new winds (CP) END 
0 22_4 Run-In checklist Relay 30  sec FCI (J) 
0.05 22_41 Run-In checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0 22_42 Run-In checklist Lead descends  to drop altitude 
0 22_43 Run-In checklist Lead slows  to 130 KIAS 
0 22_47 Run-In checklist Relay 5 sec FCI 
0 22_48 Run-In checklist relay FCI (J) 
0.05 22_49 Run-In checklist descending (P) 
0 22_5 Run-In checklist Passed (J) 
0.25 22_51 Run-In checklist Confirm DZ  entry point (P) 
0 22_52 Run-In checklist Autopilot pitch wheel down (P) 
0 22_53 Run-In checklist Dial Drop Alt+50 ft (P) 
0 22_54 Run-In checklist Slow  to 130 KIAS 
0 22_56 Run-In checklist stop descent /level (J) 
0 22_57 Run-In checklist Run-in  Checks (CP) 
0.05 22_58 Run-In checklist Complete,  Copilot (CP) 
0.05 22_6 Run-In checklist Pass execute (FCI) 
0.05 22_63 Run-In checklist Clear to drop (DZ) 
0.05 22_64 Run-In checklist Acknowledge (P) 
0.05 22_65 Run-In checklist Acknowledge (CP) 
0 22_66_0 Check Nav sys (CP) START 
0.15 22_66_2 Check Nav sys (CP) Verify system  position (CP) 
0 22_66_3 Check Nav sys (CP) Perform Update (CP) 
0 22_66_999 Check Nav sys (CP) END 
0.05 22_67 Run-In checklist Listen/record  DZ winds (CP) 
0.05 22_68 Run-In checklist Listen  DZ winds (P) 
0 22_69 Run-In checklist Relay drift FCI (J) 
 200 
 
0.05 22_7 Run-In checklist [callsign] slowdown,  slow down, now 
0 22_70_0 Maintain  In-track distance (P) START 
0.15 22_70_6 Maintain  In-track distance (P) maintain drop airspeed (P) 
0.15 22_70_7 Maintain  In-track distance (P) maintain SKE in-track spacing (P) 
0 22_70_999 Maintain  In-track distance (P) END 
0 22_71 Run-In checklist clear to  deselect CMD RLY (P) 
0 22_72 Run-In checklist Deselect  CMD Relay (CP) 
0.05 22_73 Run-In checklist CMD  RELAY-OFF (CP) 
0.05 22_8 Run-In checklist 5 sec to  slowdown (P) 
0 22_9 Run-In checklist Relay 5 sec FCI (J) 
0 22_999 Run-In checklist END 
0 24_0 Release Point Checklist START 
0.05 24_10 Release Point Checklist No drop (P) 
0.05 24_11 Release Point Checklist No drop (CP) 
0.2 24_14 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (P) 
0.2 24_15 Release Point Checklist Aircraft safe to drop? (CP) 
0.05 24_2 Release Point Checklist 1 min  (P) 
0.05 24_24 Release Point Checklist 5 sec (FCI) 
0.15 24_25 Release Point Checklist Observe  time (P) 
0.05 24_26 Release Point Checklist 5 sec (P) 
0 24_27 Release Point Checklist Relay  5 sec FCI (J) 
0 24_28 Release Point Checklist Passed (J)1 
0.05 24_29 Release Point Checklist Execute (FCI) 
0 24_3 Release Point Checklist Relay 1 min FCI (J) 
0.1 24_30 Release Point Checklist Observe  GL time (P) 
0.05 24_31 Release Point Checklist Green  Light! (P) 
0 24_32 Release Point Checklist Relay  "E" FCI (J) 
0 24_33 Release Point Checklist turn on light (CP) 
0.05 24_34 Release Point Checklist On! (CP) 
0.05 24_36 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged,  Copilot (CP)1 
0.05 24_37 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged,  Load (LM)1 
0 24_38 Release Point Checklist Formation cleared to drop? 
0 24_39 Release Point Checklist Formation safe to drop? 
0 24_4 Release Point Checklist Passed (J) 
0.05 24_40 Release Point Checklist Pass no drop (FCI) 
0.05 24_42 Release Point Checklist xxxx, no drop, ack 
0.05 24_43 Release Point Checklist 2 
0 24_44 Release Point Checklist 3 (P) 
0 24_45 Release Point Checklist Jumpers exit 
0.05 24_46_0 Drop Malfunction Pilot,  malfunction (LM) 
0.05 24_46_1 Drop Malfunction Brief description (LM) 
0 24_46_2 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (LM) 
0 24_46_3 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (P) 
0 24_46_4 Drop Malfunction Perform emergency actions (CP) 
0 24_46_999 Drop Malfunction END 
0 24_47 Release Point Checklist Time for  usable DZ (J) 
0.05 24_48 Release Point Checklist load clear (LM) 
0.05 24_5 Release Point Checklist Acknowledged, Load (LM) 
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0.05 24_50 Release Point Checklist Red light (P) 
0 24_51 Release Point Checklist turn  off light (CP) 
0.05 24_52 Release Point Checklist on (CP) 
0 24_53 Release Point Checklist Time for 60 sec 
0 24_55 Release Point Checklist Computer  drop switch (CP) 
0.05 24_56 Release Point Checklist Set,  Auto, Pilot 
0.05 24_57 Release Point Checklist Set,  Auto, Copilot 
0 24_58_0 Fly to CARP (P) START 
0.15 24_58_2 Fly to CARP (P) maintain SKE xtrk position (P) 
0.15 24_58_3 Fly to CARP (P) minimize SCNS xtrk (P) 
0.15 24_58_4 Fly to CARP (P) minimize TKE (P) 
0.15 24_58_5 Fly to CARP (P) maintain element drop altitude (P) 
0.15 24_58_6 Fly to CARP (P) maintain drop airspeed (P) 
0.15 24_58_7 Fly to CARP (P) maintain SKE in-track spacing (P) 
0 24_58_999 Fly to CARP (P) END 
0 24_59 Release Point Checklist Set computer  drop switch (CP) 
0.05 24_7 Release Point Checklist 1 min warn (FCI) 
0 24_8 Release Point Checklist Are jumpers safe? 
0.05 24_9 Release Point Checklist No drop (LM) 
0 24_999 Release Point Checklist END 
0 25_0 Completion of Drop checklist START 
0 25_1 Completion of Drop checklist Paratroop  doors (CP) 
0.05 25_11 Completion of Drop checklist Accelerate, Accelerate now (P) 
0 25_12 Completion of Drop checklist set AC  master switch (CP) 
0 25_15 Completion of Drop checklist add throttles (J) 
0 25_16 Completion of Drop checklist Pass "E" FCI (J) 
0.05 25_17 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps up (P) 
0.05 25_18 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps  tracking up (CP) 
0 25_19 Completion of Drop checklist Move flap lever (CP) 
0 25_2 Completion of Drop checklist Close doors (LM) 
0.05 25_21 Completion of Drop checklist Flaps  up (CP) 
0.15 25_22 Completion of Drop checklist Observe  flaps 0% (CP) 
0.05 25_3 Completion of Drop checklist Closed  and locked (LM) 
0 25_32 Completion of Drop checklist Select Computer  drop switch-MAN (CP) 
0 25_35 Completion of Drop checklist switch off  red light (CP) 
0 25_37 Completion of Drop checklist Drop checks (CP) 
0.05 25_38 Completion of Drop checklist Complete,  Load (LM) 
0.05 25_39 Completion of Drop checklist Complete, Copilot 
0 25_4 Completion of Drop checklist close  AD switch (CP) 
0.05 25_40 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 5 sec FCI 
0.05 25_41 Completion of Drop checklist Lead's 5  sec turn prep (P) 
0.05 25_44 Completion of Drop checklist Pass execute FCI 
0.05 25_47 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 5 sec FCI (P) 
0 25_48 Completion of Drop checklist Relay "E" FCI (J) 
0.05 25_49 Completion of Drop checklist L/R turn  xxx (P) 
0.05 25_5 Completion of Drop checklist indicate  closed (CP) 
0.25 25_50 Completion of Drop checklist monitor lead's  position (CP) 
0 25_51 Completion of Drop checklist advance  throttles (P) 
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0 25_52 Completion of Drop checklist Accelerate  140 KIAS (P) 
0 25_54 Completion of Drop checklist Level @  new alt (J) 
0 25_55 Completion of Drop checklist Turn to  escape heading (J) 
0.25 25_56 Completion of Drop checklist provide trend  info to Pilot (CP) 
0 25_57 Completion of Drop checklist Roll out  on course (J) 
0.05 25_58 Completion of Drop checklist Lead is lvl xxxx 
0.05 25_59 Completion of Drop checklist 2 is level 
0 25_6 Completion of Drop checklist air deflector  doors (CP) 
0 25_60 Completion of Drop checklist 3 is level (P) 
0.05 25_61 Completion of Drop checklist Pass new  IAS (FCI) 
0 25_62 Completion of Drop checklist Relay IAS FCI (J) 
0.05 25_63 Completion of Drop checklist New speed xxx (P) 
0.05 25_64 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 30  sec (FCI)1 
0 25_65 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 30  sec FCI (J) 
0 25_66 Completion of Drop checklist 30 sec prep,  Passed (J) 
0 25_67 Completion of Drop checklist Pass 5  sec (FCI) 
0 25_68 Completion of Drop checklist 5 sec (J) 
0 25_69 Completion of Drop checklist Relay 5  sec FCI (J) 
0 25_71 Completion of Drop checklist Pass "E" (FCI)1 
0 25_72 Completion of Drop checklist accelerate 
0 25_73 Completion of Drop checklist adjust throttles (J) 
0 25_74 Completion of Drop checklist Adjust  formation postn (J)1 
0.05 25_75 Completion of Drop checklist X PATH  OFS, Set 0 (CP) 
0.05 25_76 Completion of Drop checklist VERT GDNC  Set, ___ (CP) 
0 25_77 Completion of Drop checklist clear to  select CMD RLY (P) 
0 25_78 Completion of Drop checklist select  CMD Relay (CP) 
0.05 25_79 Completion of Drop checklist CMD  RELAY-ON (CP) 
0 25_80 Completion of Drop checklist Dial Escape Alt (REF MODE) (P) 
0 25_81 Completion of Drop checklist Autopilot pitch wheel up (P) 
0 25_82 Completion of Drop checklist select  CMD Relay (CP)1 
0 25_999 Completion of Drop checklist END 
0 44_0 Freq change START 
0.05 44_1 Freq change Direct freq change1 
0.05 44_2 Freq change Acknowledge (P)2 
0 44_3 Freq change Change radios (CP)1 
0.05 44_4 Freq change Check in1 
0.05 44_5 Freq change Acknowledge (P)3 
0 44_999 Freq change END 
0 45_0 Freq change1 START 
0.05 45_3 Freq change1 Obtain drop scores 
0.05 45_4 Freq change1 Direct freq change 
0.05 45_5 Freq change1 Acknowledge (P) 
0 45_6 Freq change1 Change radios (CP) 
0.05 45_7 Freq change1 Check in 
0.05 45_8 Freq change1 Acknowledge (P)1 
0.05 45_9 Freq change1 Copy drop scores (CP) 
0 45_999 Freq change1 END 
0 999 (Root) Model END 
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Table 31: Task Listing and Tactical SA for Maximum Effort Airland (C-130H) 
Tac SA 
Value  Task ID Function Task 
0 0 (Root) Model START 
0 1_0 Descent checklist START 
0 1_1 Descent checklist Compute  TOLD card (E) 
0 1_10 Descent checklist SCNS  LZ Data (E) 
0.05 1_11 Descent checklist Checked,  Copilot (CP) 
0.05 1_12 Descent checklist Checked,  Nav (N) 
0 1_13 Descent checklist Enter/verify LZ data (N) 
0.1 1_14 Descent checklist verify LZ data (CP) 
0 1_15_0 Depressurize (E) Is altitude appropriate? 
0 1_15_2 Depressurize (E) Wait 
0 1_15_3 Depressurize (E) Set cabin rate knob 
0 1_15_4 Depressurize (E) Set pressure controller 
0 1_15_5 Depressurize (E) set air cond master switch 
0.15 1_15_999 Depressurize (E) Cabin diff press =0 
0 1_16 Descent checklist Set fuel panel (E) 
0 1_18 Descent checklist Altimeters (E) 
0 1_19 Descent checklist set altimeter (N) 
0 1_2 Descent checklist Give card to CP (E) 
0 1_20 Descent checklist set altimeter (CP) 
0 1_21 Descent checklist set altimeter (P) 
0.05 1_22 Descent checklist state setting (P) 
0.05 1_23 Descent checklist state  setting (CP) 
0.05 1_24 Descent checklist state setting,  SCNS set (N) 
0 1_25 Descent checklist set SCNS altimeter (N) 
0 1_26 Descent checklist Radar  altimeter (E) 
0.05 1_27 Descent checklist set radar altimeter (N) 
0.05 1_28 Descent checklist set radar altimeter (P) 
0.05 1_29 Descent checklist state setting (P) 1 
0.1 1_3 Descent checklist Check  TOLD (CP) 
0 1_30 Descent checklist state setting(N) 
0 1_31 Descent checklist GCAS (E) 
0 1_32 Descent checklist set GCAS (CP) 
0.05 1_33 Descent checklist set,  tactical (CP) 
0 1_34 Descent checklist Vert Ref  switches (E) 
0.05 1_35 Descent checklist state setting (P)2 
0.05 1_36 Descent checklist state setting (CP)1 
0 1_37 Descent checklist set defensive systems (N) 
0 1_38 Descent checklist Defensive  systems (E) 
0.05 1_39 Descent checklist state setting(N)1 
0 1_4 Descent checklist TOLD (E) 
0 1_40 Descent checklist Descent checks (E) 
0.05 1_41 Descent checklist Complete,  Copilot (CP) 
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0.05 1_42 Descent checklist Nav 
0.05 1_43 Descent checklist Load 
0 1_44 Descent checklist Retard  throttles (P) 
0 1_45 Descent checklist Silence  warning horn (CP) 
0 1_46 Descent checklist Disconnect  autopilot (P) 
0 1_47 Descent checklist Call LZ (CP) 
0.05 1_48 Descent checklist Give Wx/rwy (ATC) 
0.05 1_49 Descent checklist Copy wx 
0.05 1_5 Descent checklist Checked (CP) 
0.05 1_50 Descent checklist Copy wx (E) 
0 1_51 Descent checklist Give Posit and  appch request (CP) 
0.05 1_52 Descent checklist acknowledge/ approve entry (ATC) 
0.05 1_53 Descent checklist Report 2  way w/ LZ (N) 
0.05 1_54 Descent checklist acknowledge/approve  frequency change (Tac ATC) 
0 1_55 Descent checklist Report release  from Tac ATC (CP) 
0 1_56 Descent checklist Reach descent point 
0 1_57 Descent checklist Compute descent (P) 
0 1_58 Descent checklist Compute descent (CP) 
0 1_59 Descent checklist Compute descent (N) 
0 1_6 Descent checklist Crew,  Descent checklist (P) 
0.05 1_60 Descent checklist Compare Data (P) 
0.05 1_61 Descent checklist Compare Data (CP) 
0.05 1_62 Descent checklist Compare Data (N) 
0.05 1_63 Descent checklist Listen to brief (CP) 
0.05 1_64 Descent checklist Listen to brief (N) 
0 1_7 Descent checklist Crew  briefing (E) 
0 1_8 Descent checklist Brief arrival (P) 
0.05 1_9 Descent checklist Complete (P) 
0.05 1_999 Descent checklist Complete,  Engineer 
0.2 12 (Root) Field in  sight, copilot (CP) 
0.2 13 (Root) Field in  sight, Pilot (P) 
0 2_0 Before  Landing checklist START 
0.05 2_1_0 Move flaps 50% (CP) Flaps tracking  50% (CP) 
0 2_1_10 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 30% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_11 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_1_12 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 40% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_13 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 2_1_2 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <220 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_1_3 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_4 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (CP) 
0.15 2_1_5 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (E) 
0 2_1_6 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 10% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_7 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_1_8 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 20% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_9 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_1_999 Move flaps 50% (CP) END 
0 2_10 Before  Landing checklist Move gear handle (CP) 
0.15 2_11 Before  Landing checklist Watch hydro px (CP) 
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0 2_12 Before  Landing checklist Before Landing  checklist (P) 
0 2_13 Before  Landing checklist Hot Mike (listen) 
0 2_14 Before  Landing checklist Seat belt,  shoulder harnesses (E) 
0.05 2_15 Before  Landing checklist Fastened,  unlocked, Pilot 
0.05 2_16 Before  Landing checklist Copilot 
0.05 2_17 Before  Landing checklist Engineer 
0 2_18 Before  Landing checklist Altimeters (E) 
0 2_19 Before  Landing checklist set altimeter (N) 
0.05 2_2 Before  Landing checklist Flaps 50,  on speed (P) 
0 2_20 Before  Landing checklist set altimeter (CP) 
0 2_21 Before  Landing checklist set altimeter (P) 
0.05 2_22 Before  Landing checklist state setting (P) 
0.05 2_23 Before  Landing checklist state setting (CP) 
0.05 2_24 Before  Landing checklist state setting, SCNS set (N) 
0 2_25 Before  Landing checklist set SCNS altimeter (N) 
0.05 2_26 Before  Landing checklist set/read radar altimeter (N) 
0.05 2_27 Before  Landing checklist set/read radar altimeter (P) 
0 2_28 Before  Landing checklist Radar altimeter (E) 
0 2_3 Before  Landing checklist Level at  config altitude 
0 2_31 Before  Landing checklist Flaps 
0.05 2_32 Before  Landing checklist state  flap setting (CP) 
0 2_33 Before  Landing checklist Gear 
0.15 2_34 Before  Landing checklist verify gear/ nose wheel (P) 
0.05 2_35 Before  Landing checklist Down, indicators  checked, Pilot 
0.05 2_36 Before  Landing checklist Copilot1 
0.15 2_37 Before  Landing checklist verify gear (CP) 
0.15 2_38 Before  Landing checklist verify gear (E) 
0.05 2_39 Before  Landing checklist Engineer1 
0.05 2_4 Before  Landing checklist Flaps are 50% (CP) 
0.1 2_40 Before  Landing checklist verify yaw damper disengaged (E) 
0 2_41 Before  Landing checklist turn off syncrophaser (E) 
0 2_42 Before  Landing checklist turn off underfloor heating (E) 
0 2_43 Before  Landing checklist Landing Light panel 
0 2_44 Before  Landing checklist Flip landing light switches 
0 2_45 Before  Landing checklist lights on point 
0.05 2_46 Before  Landing checklist Set (CP) 
0 2_47 Before  Landing checklist hydraulic panel (E) 
0.05 2_48 Before  Landing checklist Set (CP)1 
0.15 2_49 Before  Landing checklist verify brake  swtiches/pressures (CP) 
0.15 2_5 Before  Landing checklist Observe <230 IAS (P) 
0 2_50 Before  Landing checklist turn on aux pump (CP) 
0 2_51 Before  Landing checklist Flip Antiskid test switch (E) 
0.1 2_52 Before  Landing checklist Observe Antiskid test lights (E) 
0 2_53 Before  Landing checklist Before Landing checks (E) 
0.05 2_54 Before  Landing checklist Complete, Copilot 
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0.05 2_55 Before  Landing checklist Nav 
0.05 2_56 Before  Landing checklist Load 
0.05 2_57 Before  Landing checklist Complete,  Engineer (E) 
0.15 2_58 Before  Landing checklist Observe <145 KIAS (P) 
0.05 2_59 Before  Landing checklist Flaps 100% (P) 
0.15 2_6 Before  Landing checklist Observe  <165 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_60 Before  Landing checklist Observe  <145 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_61 Before  Landing checklist Move flaps to 100% (CP) 
0.05 2_62 Before  Landing checklist Flaps tracking 100% (CP) 
0 2_63 Before  Landing checklist Adjust throttles (P) 
0 2_65 Before  Landing checklist slow to threshold speed (P) 
0.05 2_67 Before  Landing checklist 
Flaps set 100% (CP) 
 
2_68 Before  Landing checklist descend @ final approach (P) 
 
2_69 Before  Landing checklist adjust defensive systems (N) 
 
2_7 Before  Landing checklist Command gear down 
 
2_70 Before  Landing checklist Give winds / Clear to Land" (ATC) 
0.05 2_71 Before  Landing checklist Cleared to land (CP) 
0.05 2_72 Before  Landing checklist Gear down (CP) 
0 2_73 Before  Landing checklist Slowdown/trim (P) 
0.05 2_74 Before  Landing checklist 1000 Above (CP) 
0 2_75 Before  Landing checklist Pull hot  mike knob (P) 
0 2_76 Before  Landing checklist Pull hot  mike knob (CP) 
0.05 2_77 Before  Landing checklist Pilot is  hot mike (P) 
0.05 2_78 Before  Landing checklist Copilot is  hot mike (CP) 
0.15 2_8 Before  Landing checklist Verify <165  KIAS (CP) 
0.05 2_9 Before  Landing checklist Speed's good,  gear down (CP) 
0 2_999 Before  Landing checklist END 
0 4_0 On the  runway START 
0.05 4_1_0 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 50 feet (N) 
0.05 4_1_1 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song State speed  & descent rate (CP) 
0 4_1_10 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Adjust throttles (P) 
0.05 4_1_2 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 40 (N) 
0.05 4_1_3 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song State speed  & descent rate (CP)1 
0.05 4_1_4 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 30 (N) 
0.05 4_1_5 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song State speed  & descent rate (CP)2 
0.05 4_1_6 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 20 (N) 
0.05 4_1_7 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song State speed  & descent rate (CP)3 
0.05 4_1_8 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 10 (N) 
0 4_1_9 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Adjust pitch (P) 
0 4_1_999 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song END 
0.05 4_10 On the  runway Going around (P) 
0 4_100 On the  runway Offload/Onload (LM) 
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0.15 4_101 On the  runway Safety Observe (N) 
0 4_102 On the  runway Run locks (N) 
0.05 4_103 On the  runway Relay  upload weight (LM) 
0 4_104 On the  runway Compute  TOLD (E) 
0 4_105 On the  runway Post  TOLD (E) 
0.1 4_106 On the  runway Check  TOLD (CP) 
0.05 4_107 On the  runway Clear to taxi (LM) 
0 4_108 On the  runway Return to seat (N) 
0 4_109 On the  runway Interphone/PA (E)1 
0 4_110 On the  runway flip PA switch (P)1 
0 4_111 On the  runway flip PA switch (N)1 
0.05 4_112 On the  runway set, Pilot1 
0.05 4_113 On the  runway Copilot2 
0.05 4_114 On the  runway Nav2 
0.05 4_116 On the  runway Engineer2 
0 4_117 On the  runway ERO Ops  Stop checks (E) 
0.05 4_118 On the  runway Complete,  Load 
0.05 4_119 On the  runway Engineer3 
0 4_120 On the  runway Release  parking brake (P) 
0.05 4_121 On the  runway Clear to up speed a pair (P) 
0.05 4_122 On the  runway Inboards  coming up (E) 
0 4_123 On the  runway pull LGSI  buttons (E)2 
0.15 4_124 On the  runway Observe  upspeed (E) 
0.15 4_125 On the  runway Observe  upspeed (CP) 
0.2 4_126 On the  runway Taxi (P) 
0.05 4_127 On the  runway Flaps 50 
0.05 4_130 On the  runway Flaps tracking 50% (CP)1 
0 4_131 On the  runway Move flaps to 50% (CP)1 
0 4_132 On the  runway Set take off trim (CP) 
0 4_133 On the  runway Set exterior lights (CP) 
0 4_134 On the  runway Set exterior lights (CP)1 
0 4_135 On the  runway Lights (P) 
0 4_136 On the  runway Set exterior lights (CP)2 
0 4_143_0 Go Around START 
0 4_143_1 Go Around Add power (P) 
0 4_143_10 Go Around Turn to final 
0 4_143_15 Go Around Announce go around  / request closed (CP) 
0.05 4_143_16 Go Around Clear to closed  pattern (ATC) 
0.05 4_143_17 Go Around Acknowledge  clearance (CP) 
0.15 4_143_18 Go Around Observe <145 KIAS (P) 
0.05 4_143_19 Go Around Flaps 100% (P) 
0 4_143_2 Go Around Climb to altitude (P) 
0.15 4_143_20 Go Around Observe  <145 KIAS (CP) 
0 4_143_21 Go Around Move flaps to 100% (CP)1 
0.05 4_143_22 Go Around Flaps tracking  100% (CP) 
0 4_143_23 Go Around Reduce throttles (P)1 
0.05 4_143_29 Go Around Report  base turn w/ gear (CP) 
0.05 4_143_3 Go Around Flaps tracking 50% (CP) 
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0.05 4_143_30 Go Around Give winds /  "Clear to Land" (ATC) 
0.05 4_143_31 Go Around Cleared to land (CP) 
0 4_143_32 Go Around Turn to closed pattern (P) 
0.05 4_143_33 Go Around Leaving gear and  flaps, after takeoff touch  and go checklist (P) 
0.05 4_143_34 Go Around Checklist (E) 
0 4_143_35 Go Around Crew Briefing (P) 
0.05 4_143_36 Go Around Listen (CP) 
0.05 4_143_37 Go Around Listen (N) 
0.05 4_143_38 Go Around Listen (E) 
0 4_143_4 Go Around Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0 4_143_40 Go Around Before Landing  Touch and Go Checklist (P) 
0.05 4_143_41 Go Around Checklist (E)1 
0.05 4_143_42 Go Around Checklist (CP) 
0.05 4_143_43 Go Around Checklist (P) 
0.05 4_143_5 Go Around Flaps 50 
0 4_143_7 Go Around Level at altitude 
0 4_143_9 Go Around adjust throttles (P) 
0 4_143_999 Go Around END 
0.05 4_144 On the  runway Give taxi instructions 
0.05 4_145 On the  runway Read back (CP) 
0 4_146 On the  runway Coordinate  departure (CP) 
0.05 4_147 On the  runway Coordinate  departure (ATC) 
0 4_148 On the  runway Request  taxi (CP) 
0.05 4_149 On the  runway Give taxi  instructions 
0.05 4_150 On the  runway Read  back (CP)1 
0.05 4_151 On the  runway Listen (CP) 
0.05 4_152 On the  runway Listen (N) 
0.05 4_153 On the  runway Listen (E) 
0.2 4_2 On the  runway Observe aimpoint (CP) 
0.2 4_29 On the  runway Check for  asymmetric thrust (P) 
0.05 4_3 On the  runway direct pilot  corrections (CP) 
0.15 4_30 On the  runway Check for  asymmetric thrust (E) 
0.05 4_31 On the  runway Cleared  reverse (E) 
0 4_32 On the  runway Apply brakes (P) 
0.15 4_33 On the  runway Verify <115 KIAS 
0.15 4_34 On the  runway Verify <115 KIAS (E) 
0.05 4_35 On the  runway Copilot's yoke (P) 
0.05 4_36 On the  runway Copilot's yoke (CP) 
0.2 4_37 On the  runway Maintain  wings level (CP) 
0 4_38 On the  runway Steer with tiller wheel (P) 
0 4_39 On the  runway Move throttles  to Max reverse (P) 
0.2 4_4 On the  runway Make  corrections (P) 
0.15 4_40 On the  runway Observe 60 KIAS (CP) 
0.05 4_41 On the  runway 60 (CP) 
0 4_42 On the  runway Move throttles  out of reverse (P) 
0.05 4_43 On the  runway 40 (CP) 
0 4_44 On the  runway Throttles-ground idle (P)1 
0.2 4_45 On the  runway Slow to taxi speed (P) 
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0.05 4_46 On the  runway Clear to down- speed outboards (P) 
0.15 4_47 On the  runway verify <30 knots (E) 
0.05 4_48 On the  runway Outboards  coming down (E) 
0 4_49 On the  runway press LGSI  buttons (E) 
0 4_5 On the  runway Reduce throttles (P) 
0.15 4_50 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (E) 
0.15 4_51 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (CP) 
0 4_52 On the  runway Start APU (E) 
0 4_53 On the  runway ERO Ops stop checklist 
0 4_54 On the  runway Safe defensive system (N) 
0 4_55 On the  runway Radar-standby (N) 
0 4_56 On the  runway Set AC 'No Press' (E) 
0 4_57 On the  runway Clear to open  ramp/door (P) 
0 4_58 On the  runway Nav panel (E) 
0.05 4_59 On the  runway set (N) 
0.2 4_6 On the  runway Flare aircraft (P) 
0 4_60 On the  runway Set APU/ electrical panel (E) 
0.05 4_61 On the  runway Clear to down speed inboards? (E) 
0 4_62 On the  runway Roger (LM) 
0 4_63 On the  runway Open ramp/door (LM) 
0.1 4_64 On the  runway Observe door  open light (P) 
0 4_65 On the  runway Clear (P) 
0.05 4_66 On the  runway Inboards  coming down (E)1 
0 4_67 On the  runway press LGSI  buttons (E)1 
0.15 4_68 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (E)1 
0.15 4_69 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (CP)1 
0 4_7 On the  runway Throttles-ground idle (P) 
0 4_70 On the  runway Set anti-icing panel (E) 
0.2 4_71 On the  runway Turn off of runway (P) 
0 4_72 On the  runway Crew briefing (E) 
0 4_73 On the  runway Brief crew (P) 
0.2 4_74 On the  runway Taxi to park (P) 
0.2 4_75 On the  runway Brake to stop (P) 
0.05 4_76 On the  runway complete (P) 
0 4_77 On the  runway Set parking brake (P) 
0 4_78 On the  runway Parking brake (E) 
0.05 4_79 On the  runway set (P) 
0.2 4_8 On the  runway Touchdown 
0 4_80 On the  runway Hot Mike (E) 
0.05 4_81 On the  runway on, Pilot 
0.05 4_82 On the  runway Copilot 
0.05 4_83 On the  runway Nav 
0.05 4_84 On the  runway Engineer 
0 4_85 On the  runway Interphone/PA (E) 
0 4_86 On the  runway flip PA switch (P) 
0 4_87 On the  runway flip PA switch (N) 
0.05 4_88 On the  runway Checked, Pilot 
0.05 4_89 On the  runway Copilot1 
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0.05 4_9 On the  runway Go around (CP) 
0.05 4_90 On the  runway Nav1 
0.05 4_91 On the  runway Load 
0.05 4_92 On the  runway Engineer1 
0 4_93 On the  runway Move to Safety position (N) 
0 4_94 On the  runway Safety Observer (E) 
0.05 4_95 On the  runway In position (N) 
0 4_96 On the  runway Doors 
0.05 4_97 On the  runway Clear to open  ramp/door (P)1 
0 4_98 On the  runway Offload/Onload clearance (E) 
0.05 4_99 On the  runway Clear to  offload/onload (P)2 
0 4_999 On the  runway END 
0 8 (Root) Give Posit (CP) 
0.05 9 (Root) Request posit (ATC) 
0 999 (Root) Model END 
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Table 32: Task Listing and Tactical SA Values for Maximum Effort Airland (C-130J) 
Tac SA 
Value  Task ID Function Task 
0 1_0 Approach checklist START 
0 1_1 Approach checklist Program  TOLD (CP) 
0 1_10 Approach checklist CNI-MU  Data (CP) 
0.05 1_11 Approach checklist Checked,  Copilot (CP) 
0.05 1_12 Approach checklist Checked,  Pilot (P) 
0 1_13 Approach checklist Program CNI-MU 
0.1 1_14 Approach checklist verify LZ data (P) 
0 1_15_0 Depressurize (CP) Is altitude appropriate? 
0 1_15_3 Depressurize (CP) Set cabin rate knob 
0 1_15_4 Depressurize (CP) Set pressure controller 
0 1_15_5 Depressurize (CP) set air cond master switch 
0 1_15_999 Depressurize (CP) END 
0 1_16 Approach checklist Set fuel panel (CP) 
0 1_18 Approach checklist Altimeters (CP) 
0.1 1_2 Approach checklist Read  TOLD (P) 
0 1_20 Approach checklist set altimeter (CP) 
0 1_21 Approach checklist set altimeter (P) 
0.05 1_22 Approach checklist state  setting (P) 
0.05 1_23 Approach checklist state  setting (CP) 
0 1_26 Approach checklist TOLD (CP) 
0 1_27 Approach checklist set radar altimeter (CP) 
0 1_28 Approach checklist set radar altimeter (P) 
0.05 1_29 Approach checklist Reviewed, Pilot (P) 
0.05 1_30 Approach checklist Reviewed, Copilot (CP) 
0 1_32 Approach checklist set GCAS (CP) 
0 1_37 Approach checklist set defensive  systems (CP) 
0 1_4 Approach checklist Approach  setup (CP) 
0 1_40 Approach checklist Approach  checks (CP) 
0.05 1_43 Approach checklist Complete  Load 
0 1_44 Approach checklist Retard  throttles (P) 
0 1_45 Approach checklist Silence  warning horn (CP) 
0 1_46 Approach checklist Disconnect  autopilot (P) 
0 1_47 Approach checklist Call LZ (CP) 
0.05 1_48 Approach checklist Give Wx/rwy (ATC) 
0.05 1_49 Approach checklist Copy wx 
0.05 1_5 Approach checklist Copilot (CP) 
0 1_51 Approach checklist Give Posit and  appch request (CP) 
0.05 1_52 Approach checklist acknowledge/ approve entry (ATC) 
0.05 1_53 Approach checklist Report 2  way w/ LZ (P) 
0.05 1_54 Approach checklist acknowledge/approve  frequency change (Tac ATC) 
0.05 1_55 Approach checklist Report release  from Tac ATC (CP) 
0 1_56 Approach checklist Reach  descent point 
0 1_57 Approach checklist Compute  descent (P) 
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0 1_58 Approach checklist Compute  descent (CP) 
0 1_6 Approach checklist Crew,  Approach checklist (P) 
0.05 1_60 Approach checklist Compare  Data (P) 
0.05 1_61 Approach checklist Compare  Data (CP) 
0.05 1_63 Approach checklist Listen to brief (CP) 
0 1_64 Approach checklist Configure HUD/REF  MODE/CNBP/AMU (P) 
0 1_65 Approach checklist Configure HUD/REF  MODE/CNBP/AMU (CP) 
0 1_66 Approach checklist set stby  altimeter (P)1 
0.05 1_67 Approach checklist Complete (P) 
0 1_68 Approach checklist Seat belt,  shoulder  harnesses (CP) 
0.05 1_69 Approach checklist Fastened,  unlocked, Pilot 
0 1_7 Approach checklist Crew  briefing (CP) 
0.05 1_70 Approach checklist Copilot 
0 1_8 Approach checklist Brief arrival (P) 
0.05 1_9 Approach checklist Complete,  Pilot (P) 
0.05 1_999 Approach checklist Complete, Copilotr 
0.2 12 (Root) Field in  sight, copilot (CP) 
0.2 13 (Root) Field in  sight, Pilot (P) 
0 2_0 Before  Landing checklist START 
0 2_1_0 Move flaps 50% (CP) START 
0.15 2_1_11 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 2_1_13 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (CP) 
0.05 2_1_14 Move flaps 50% (CP) Flaps tracking  50% (CP) 
0.05 2_1_15 Move flaps 50% (CP) Flaps 50,  on speed (P) 
0.15 2_1_16 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <190 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_1_17 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <180 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_1_18 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <220 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_1_19 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_1_2 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <220 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 2_1_20 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (P) 
0 2_1_3 Move flaps 50% (CP) Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0.15 2_1_4 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe rudder  hyrdaulic pressure increase (CP) 
0.15 2_1_7 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <210 KIAS (CP) 
0.15 2_1_9 Move flaps 50% (CP) Observe  <200 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_1_999 Move flaps 50% (CP) END 
0 2_10 Before  Landing checklist Move gear handle (CP) 
0.15 2_11 Before  Landing checklist Watch hydro px (CP) 
0 2_12 Before  Landing checklist Before Landing  checklist (P) 
0 2_3 Before  Landing checklist Level at  config altitude 
0 2_33 Before  Landing checklist Gear 
0.15 2_34 Before  Landing checklist verify gear/ nose wheel (CP) 
0.05 2_35 Before  Landing checklist Down, indicators  checked, Copilot 
0.05 2_36 Before  Landing checklist Pilot1 
0.15 2_37 Before  Landing checklist verify gear (P) 
0.05 2_4 Before  Landing checklist Flaps are 50% (CP) 
0 2_44 Before  Landing checklist Flip landing light switches 
0 2_45 Before  Landing checklist lights on point 
0.15 2_49 Before  Landing checklist verify brake  swtiches/pressures (CP) 
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0.15 2_5 Before  Landing checklist Observe <230 IAS (P) 
0 2_50 Before  Landing checklist turn on aux pump (CP) 
0.1 2_52 Before  Landing checklist Check for Anti- skid Error msg (CP) 
0 2_53 Before  Landing checklist Before Landing  checks (CP) 
0.05 2_54 Before  Landing checklist Complete, Copilot 
0.05 2_55 Before  Landing checklist state setting 
0.05 2_56 Before  Landing checklist Load 
0.15 2_58 Before  Landing checklist Observe <145 KIAS (P) 
0.05 2_59 Before  Landing checklist Flaps 100% (P) 
0.15 2_6 Before  Landing checklist Observe  <165 KIAS (P) 
0.15 2_60 Before  Landing checklist Observe  <145 KIAS (CP) 
0 2_61 Before  Landing checklist Move flaps to 100% (CP) 
0.05 2_62 Before  Landing checklist Flaps tracking 100% (CP) 
0 2_63 Before  Landing checklist Adjust throttles (P) 
0 2_65 Before  Landing checklist slow to  threshold speed (P) 
variable 2_67 Before  Landing checklist 
Flaps set  100% (CP) 
 
2_68 Before  Landing checklist descend @  final approach (P) 
 
2_69 Before  Landing checklist adjust defensive  systems (CP) 
 
2_7 Before  Landing checklist Command gear down 
 
2_70 Before  Landing checklist Give winds / Clear to Land" (ATC) 
0.05 2_71 Before  Landing checklist Cleared to land (CP) 
0.05 2_72 Before  Landing checklist Gear down (CP) 
0 2_73 Before  Landing checklist Slowdown/trim (P) 
0.05 2_74 Before  Landing checklist 1000 Above (CP) 
0 2_79 Before  Landing checklist Reset  HUD FPA (P) 
0.15 2_8 Before  Landing checklist Verify <165  KIAS (CP) 
0.05 2_80 Before  Landing checklist HUD reset  X deg (P) 
0.05 2_9 Before  Landing checklist Speed's good,  gear down (CP) 
0 2_999 Before  Landing checklist END 
0 4_0 On the  runway START 
0.05 4_1_0 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 50 feet (CP) 
0 4_1_1 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Delay 
0 4_1_10 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Adjust throttles (P) 
0.05 4_1_2 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 40 (CP) 
0 4_1_3 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Delay1 
0.05 4_1_4 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 30 (CP) 
0 4_1_5 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Delay2 
0.05 4_1_6 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 20 (CP) 
0 4_1_7 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Delay3 
0.05 4_1_8 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song 10 (CP) 
0 4_1_9 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song Adjust pitch (P) 
0 4_1_999 
Airspeed/Altitude sing-
song END 
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0.05 4_10 On the  runway Going around (P) 
0 4_100 On the  runway Offload/Onload (LM) 
0 4_102 On the  runway Run locks (LM) 
0.05 4_103 On the  runway Relay  upload weight (LM) 
0 4_104 On the  runway Program  TOLD (CP) 
0.1 4_106 On the  runway Check  TOLD (P) 
0.05 4_107 On the  runway Ready for taxi (LM) 
0 4_117 On the  runway ERO  checks (CP) 
0.05 4_118 On the  runway Complete,  Load 
0.05 4_119 On the  runway Copilot 
0 4_120 On the  runway Release  parking brake (P) 
0.05 4_121 On the  runway Clear to up speed a pair (P) 
0.05 4_122 On the  runway Inboards  coming up (CP) 
0 4_123 On the  runway pull LGSI  buttons (CP)2 
0.15 4_125 On the  runway Observe  upspeed (CP) 
0.2 4_126 On the  runway Taxi (P) 
0.05 4_127 On the  runway Flaps 50 
0.05 4_130 On the  runway Flaps  tracking 50% (CP)1 
0 4_131 On the  runway Move flaps to 50% (CP)1 
0 4_132 On the  runway Set take off trim (CP) 
0 4_133 On the  runway Set exterior lights (CP) 
0 4_134 On the  runway Set exterior lights (CP)1 
0 4_135 On the  runway Lights (P) 
0 4_136 On the  runway Set exterior  lights (CP)2 
0 4_143_0 Go Around START 
0 4_143_1 Go Around Add power (P) 
0 4_143_10 Go Around Turn to final 
0.05 4_143_15 Go Around Announce go around  / request closed (CP) 
0.05 4_143_16 Go Around Clear to closed  pattern (ATC) 
0.05 4_143_17 Go Around Acknowledge  clearance (CP) 
0.15 4_143_18 Go Around Observe <145 KIAS (P) 
0.05 4_143_19 Go Around Flaps 100% (P) 
0 4_143_2 Go Around Climb to altitude (P) 
0.15 4_143_20 Go Around Observe  <145 KIAS (CP) 
0 4_143_21 Go Around Move flaps to 100% (CP)1 
0.05 4_143_22 Go Around Flaps tracking  100% (CP) 
0 4_143_23 Go Around Reduce throttles (P)1 
0.05 4_143_29 Go Around Report  base turn w/ gear (CP) 
0.05 4_143_3 Go Around Flaps tracking 50% (CP) 
0.05 4_143_30 Go Around Give winds /  "Clear to Land" (ATC) 
0.05 4_143_31 Go Around Cleared to land (CP) 
0 4_143_32 Go Around Turn to closed pattern (P) 
0.05 4_143_33 Go Around Leaving gear and  flaps, after takeoff touch  and go checklist (P) 
0.05 4_143_34 Go Around Checklist 
0 4_143_35 Go Around Crew Briefing (P) 
0.05 4_143_36 Go Around Listen (CP) 
0 4_143_4 Go Around Move flaps to 50% (CP) 
0 4_143_40 Go Around Before Landing  Touch and Go Checklist (P) 
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0.05 4_143_41 Go Around Checklist (CP)1 
0.05 4_143_42 Go Around Checklist (CP) 
0.05 4_143_43 Go Around Checklist (P) 
0.05 4_143_5 Go Around Flaps 50 
0 4_143_7 Go Around Level at altitude 
0 4_143_9 Go Around adjust throttles (P) 
0 4_143_999 Go Around END 
0.05 4_144 On the  runway Give taxi instructions 
0.05 4_145 On the  runway Read back (CP) 
0 4_146 On the  runway Coordinate  departure (CP) 
0.05 4_147 On the  runway Coordinate  departure (ATC) 
0 4_148 On the  runway Request  taxi (CP) 
0.05 4_149 On the  runway Give taxi  instructions 
0.05 4_150 On the  runway Read back (CP)1 
0.05 4_151 On the  runway Listen (CP) 
0.05 4_152 On the  runway Def Sys  set Stby (CP) 
0 4_153 On the  runway Test open Swing window (P) 
0 4_154 On the  runway Program CNI-MU 
0 4_155 On the  runway Configure HUD/REF  MODE/CNBP/AMU (CP) 
0 4_156 On the  runway Configure HUD/REF  MODE/CNBP/AMU (P) 
0.05 4_157 On the  runway Hotel  Mode (CP) 
0 4_158 On the  runway Propeller control  switches (CP) 
0.15 4_159 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (CP)2 
0 4_160 On the  runway Propeller control  switches (CP)1 
0.15 4_161 On the  runway Observe  upspeed (CP) 
0.05 4_162 On the  runway Departure setup,  complete Copilot 
0.05 4_163 On the  runway Pilot 
0.05 4_164 On the  runway CNI-MU  checked Copilot 
0.05 4_165 On the  runway Pilot1 
0.05 4_166 On the  runway Listen (CP)1 
0 4_167 On the  runway Departure  briefing (CP) 
0 4_168 On the  runway Brief crew (P)1 
0.05 4_169 On the  runway complete (P)1 
0 4_170 On the  runway Shut down  APU (CP) 
0 4_171 On the  runway Set APU/ electrical panel (CP)1 
0 4_172 On the  runway Arm defensive  system (CP)1 
0.05 4_173 On the  runway Def Sys  set Stby (CP)1 
0.15 4_174 On the  runway Look at  brake panel (CP) 
0.05 4_175 On the  runway Brakes  set normal (CP) 
0.05 4_176 On the  runway LGSI switches  set, normal (CP) 
0.15 4_177 On the  runway Look at  flap gauge (CP) 
0.05 4_178 On the  runway Flaps  set 50% (CP) 
0.15 4_179 On the  runway Look at  trim gauge (CP) 
0.05 4_180 On the  runway Trim set (CP) 
0.2 4_2 On the  runway Observe aimpoint (CP) 
0.2 4_29 On the  runway Check for  asymmetric thrust (P) 
0.05 4_3 On the  runway direct pilot  corrections (CP) 
0.15 4_30 On the  runway Observe BETA  indication (CP) 
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0.05 4_31 On the  runway 4 B's (CP) 
0 4_32 On the  runway Apply brakes (P) 
0.15 4_33 On the  runway Verify <145 KTAS 
0.15 4_34 On the  runway Verify <145 KIAS (CP) 
0.05 4_35 On the  runway Copilot's yoke (P) 
0.05 4_36 On the  runway Copilot's yoke (CP) 
0.2 4_37 On the  runway Maintain  wings level (CP) 
0 4_38 On the  runway Steer with tiller wheel (P) 
0 4_39 On the  runway Move throttles  to Max reverse (P) 
0.2 4_4 On the  runway Make  corrections (P) 
0.15 4_40 On the  runway Observe 60 KIAS (CP) 
0.05 4_41 On the  runway 60 (CP) 
0 4_42 On the  runway Move throttles  out of reverse (P) 
0.05 4_43 On the  runway 40 (CP) 
0 4_44 On the  runway Throttles-ground idle (P)1 
0.2 4_45 On the  runway Slow to taxi speed (P) 
0.05 4_46 On the  runway Clear to down- speed outboards (P) 
0.15 4_47 On the  runway verify  <30 knots (CP) 
0.05 4_48 On the  runway Outboards  coming down (CP) 
0 4_49 On the  runway press LGSI  buttons (CP) 
0 4_5 On the  runway Reduce throttles (P) 
0.15 4_51 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (CP) 
0 4_52 On the  runway Start APU (CP) 
0 4_53 On the  runway ERO Ops stop checklist 
0 4_54 On the  runway Safe defensive  system (CP) 
0 4_56 On the  runway Set AC  'No Press' (CP) 
0 4_57 On the  runway Clear to open  ramp/door (P) 
0.2 4_6 On the  runway Flare aircraft (P) 
0 4_60 On the  runway Set APU/ electrical panel (CP) 
0.05 4_61 On the  runway Clear to down speed inboards? (CP) 
0 4_62 On the  runway Roger (LM) 
0 4_63 On the  runway Open ramp/door (LM) 
0.1 4_64 On the  runway Observe door  open light (P) 
0 4_65 On the  runway Clear (P) 
0.05 4_66 On the  runway Inboards  coming down (CP)1 
0 4_67 On the  runway press LGSI  buttons (CP)1 
0.15 4_69 On the  runway Observe  downspeed (CP)1 
0 4_7 On the  runway Throttles- ground idle (P) 
0.2 4_71 On the  runway Turn off of runway (P) 
0 4_72 On the  runway Crew briefing (CP) 
0.05 4_73 On the  runway Brief crew (P) 
0.2 4_74 On the  runway Taxi to park (P) 
0.2 4_75 On the  runway Brake to stop (P) 
0.05 4_76 On the  runway complete (P) 
0 4_77 On the  runway Set parking brake (P) 
0.2 4_8 On the  runway Touchdown 
0.05 4_9 On the  runway Go around (CP) 
0 4_98 On the  runway Offload/Onload clearance (CP) 
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0.05 4_99 On the  runway Clear to  offload/onload (P) 
0 4_999 On the  runway END 
0 8 (Root) Give Posit (CP) 
0.05 9 (Root) Request posit (ATC) 
0 999 (Root) Model END 
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Appendix E: UML Activity Diagrams 
 
Figure 36: Basic Aircraft Control UML Activity Diagram 
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Figure 37: SKE Formation Airdrop UML Activity Diagram 
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Appendix F: IMPRINT Task Networks 
Basic Aircraft Control 
C-130H 
 
Figure 38: Basic Aircraft Control Task Network (C-130H) 
 
Figure 39: Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Function (C-130H) 
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Figure 40: Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Function (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 41: Navigate the Airplane (P/CP) Function (C-130H) 
 
Figure 42: Formation Position (P/CP) Function (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 43: Navigate the Airplane (N) Function (C-130H) 
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Figure 44: Scan for Threats Function (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 45: Monitor Systems (E) Function (C-130H) 
 
Figure 46: Listen to Radios Function (C-130H) 
 
Figure 47: Control the Airplane (P) Function (C-130H) 
C-130J 
 
Figure 48: Basic Aircraft Control Task Network (C-130J) 
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Figure 49: Monitor Aircraft Performance (P) Function (C-130J) 
 
Figure 50: Pilot Monitoring Duties (CP) Function (C-130J) 
 
Figure 51: Navigate the Airplane (P/CP) Function (C-130J) 
 
Figure 52: Formation Position (P/CP) Function (C-130J) 
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Figure 53: Scan for Threats Function (C-130J) 
 
 
Figure 54: Monitor Systems (C-130J) 
 
Figure 55: Listen to Radios Function (C-130J) 
 
 
Figure 56: Control the Airplane (P) Function (C-130J) 
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SKE Formation Airdrop Scenario 
C-130H 
 
Figure 57: SKE Formation Airdrop Task Network (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 58: Preslowdown Checklist (C-130H) 
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Figure 59: Formation Descent Function (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 60: Formation Turn at IP (C-130H) 
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Figure 61: Slowdown Checklist (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 62: AWADS Update (N) Function (C-130H) 
 
 
Figure 63: Release Point Checklist (C-130H) 
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Figure 64: Completion of Drop Checklist (C-130H) 
 
Figure 65: Frequency Change Function (C-130H) 
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C-130J 
 
Figure 66: SKE Formation Airdrop Task Network (C-130J) 
 
Figure 67: Drop Preparation Checklist (C-130J) 
 
Figure 68: Formation Descent Function (C-130J) 
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Figure 69: Formation Turn at IP (C-130J) 
 
Figure 70: Run-In Checklist (C-130J) 
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Figure 71: Release Point Checklist (C-130J) 
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Figure 72: Completion of Drop Checklist 
 
Figure 73: Frequency Change Function (C-130J) 
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Maximum Effort Airland Scenario 
C-130H 
 
Figure 74: Maximum Effort Airland Task Network (C-130H) 
 
Figure 75: Descent Checklist (C-130H) 
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Figure 76: Before Landing Checklist (C-130H) 
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Figure 77: On the Runway Function (C-130H) 
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C-130J 
 
Figure 78: Maximum Effort Airland Task Network (C-130J) 
 
Figure 79: Approach Checklist (C-130J) 
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Figure 80: Before Landing Checklist 
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Figure 81: On the Runway Function (C-130J) 
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